

# **TRUTH HAS NO COLOUR**

By,

**A. H. Meftah**



**IRAN**

**AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR World  
War**

With

**MOSSADEGH AND ZAHEDI**

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Res Hermitage  
7 Boulevard du Cap,  
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France

**To my daughter " Dey "**



**Tehran, January 31<sup>st</sup> 1949**  
**Oslo, July 16<sup>th</sup> 1964**

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## **Forword**

**Dear Reader,**

**My father, Abdul Hussein Meftah, originally wrote this book in Persian. It was banned from publication in Iran under the late Shah and was subsequently published after the 1979 Iranian upheaval, in Germany. After his retirement my father decided that, the book should be published in English language for a better understanding of the Iranian dilemma by the world at large. So he spent some time turning the text into English. He passed away and the manuscript languished among his collection of books for some years.**

**Recently, following gentle pressure from friends, I was persuaded to make the book available to the English speaking world. To bring this task to fruition, I was very fortunate to have the help and co-operation of Mr. Mohammad Reza Pardisan, without whose dogged determination and constant prodding this book might never have reached this stage. For this I am grateful. Also, thanks go to Mr. M. A. Karimzadeh for supplying the documentation as to the origins of our family name by Mahmoud Mefteh-al-Molk.**

**Special thanks goes to one of my fathers friends, His Excellency Hashem Hakimi, who spent many months sourcing relevant photographs and retyping the manuscript into his computer and to make it ready for publication.**

**For this I will forever be in his debt.**

**Bojang Mrftah,  
London**



**H.E. Hashem Hakimi and the publisher, Bojang Meftah, at  
Langham Hotel, London, July 2007**

# **PART 1**

## **FATEMI AND I**

**It was my second year in Hamburg when on Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> of May 1952, I received a telegram from Bagher Kazemi, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mossadegh's Cabinet,**



*Bagher Kazemi*

**to the effect that the Prime Minister would leave Tehran to The Hague on 25<sup>th</sup> May, and that I should proceed immediately to Frankfurt, and arrange the necessary security measures at the airport.**

**After informing the Iranian Minister in Stuttgart, Khalil Esfandiary, of the contents of the telegram, I left by first train for Frankfurt. I arrived Frankfurt next day at 9 AM and taking a room in nearest hotel to the station. After a quick wash & breakfast, I contacted the police authorities explaining that I was present in Frankfurt. They were very helpful. They put at my disposal an officer with 15 policemen in civilian attire at my disposal.**

**Dr. Mossadegh's plane was due to land at 18.40, therefore I asked the police officer and his men to be at the hotel at 4 PM. This was arranged very quickly. Thanks to the cooperation of Frankfurt's police authorities. I had plenty of time to go around the town to refresh my memory and have luncheon, before resting to compensate for the restlessness of the night before. At 4 PM the police officer**

along with his men arrived in four cars. We proceeded to the airport. Upon our arrival the airport was put under careful watch of the police. Shortly afterwards, Esfandiary arrived accompanied by two of his secretaries.

Dr. Mossadegh's plane arrived. He was accompanied by a number of his advisers and his private doctor who was his son, Gholam Mossadegh. All alighted the plane during stop over except Dr. Mossadegh. He felt it better to wait in bed on board the plane. Mr. Esfandiary and I paid him a short visit in the plane. Since I was very much interested in the proceedings of the International Court of Justice, I asked Dr. Mossadegh's permission to accompany him to The Hague, which the permission was accorded.

On the flight to The Hague Dr. Mossadegh called and said," Dr. Fatemi is also present. He is going to Hamburg for an operation for injuries caused after the attempt to his life. You should look after him."

We landed at Amsterdam airport at 8 PM. Dr. Mossadegh along with his advisers, consisting of, Hassibi, Dr. Shayegan, Dr. Aliabadi, Dr. Sanjabi (Judge ad hoc), Allahyar Saleh, Dr. Matin Daftary, and Dr. Gholam Hossein Mossadegh, left for The Hague with Mr. Navab, the Iranian Minister, Iranian Representative, in The Hague. I took Dr. Fatemi and his wife to a hotel in Amsterdam. Next morning, after making arrangement for transferring Dr. Fatemi to hospital in Hamburg, already arranged for him, I went to The Hague to attend the proceedings of the Court. But as Professor Rolin needed several days to study Iran's defense plan, the hearing of the case was postponed to June the 9<sup>th</sup>. Therefore I thought my stay in The Hague during the court recess waste of time. So after paying a short visit to Dr. Mossadegh, who asked me again to look after Dr. Fatemi, I left for Hamburg on 31<sup>st</sup> May.

I arrived to Hamburg in the afternoon and a visit to Dr. Fatemi in the hospital. He was not at all feeling well. His doctor while advising the necessity of an operation was not sure of its successful outcome. However, two days latter, Dr. Fatemi was operated. Owing to the skill of the doctor the result of the operation was satisfactory. But it took quite a long time before Dr. Fatemi could leave the hospital. He left the hospital not fully cured, since he was constantly suffering from a rupture in his stomach, for which he had to wear special belt.

During Dr. Fatemi, s long recuperation, I paid him regular visits two or three times per week, supplying him with newspapers, magazines, and even some times, Persian food! Inevitably now and then we discussed our country's problems. One day when I felt that he was strong enough to have a lengthy discussion. I referred to



certain Tehran newspaper's strong criticism of the Shah and Royal Family, which to my opinion was against the interest of our activities in Europe for the Nationalization of Oil.

Fatemi, while trying to show himself very calm and speaking very carefully, tried to make me understand that the interference of the Imperial Court, particularly the Royal Family and those around the Shah, were a great hindrance to bringing about the real social reform which was necessary for the country; and somewhat tongue in check he said: "The public opinions is different to what you think". I went on to relate to him, in short, what I have seen and heard myself from different people of our tribes, from the west of the country to the furtherest eastern end, what the name or personality of "SHAH" means to them, and told him frankly it must be kept very seriously in mind that the change of regime in Iran would mean dismemberment of the country, which was the earnest desire of our Northern Neighbor. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the Shah himself greatly helped in achieving the task of oil nationalization. How can he now be a barrier to reforms? It was undeniable that our Royal Court is in need of radical reform. A reform, in my opinion, was still not difficult to realize. Here Dr. Fatemi cut me and said, "All right, we make this a present to you". I replied, no, I preferred him to take into consideration and study what I told him, and if he found reason to believe that I was wrong, I would very gladly hear them and submit to reason. But I would like to tell him what I mentioned to Dr. Mossadegh. Then he felt uneasy and impatiently said "what did you say to Mossadegh"?

I told him, I went to The Hague in June to hear Dr. Mossadegh's argument against the competence of the Court to handle the Anglo-Iranian Oil dispute. I told him about the strong rumors in the papers and among the Iranians in Hamburg concerning differences and bad relations existing between the Imperial Court and Dr. Mossadegh, had an unpleasant effect on my activities in Germany, where I was trying hard to find market for our oil. It forced me to seek an interview with Dr. Mossadegh through the help of his son. I succeeded to meet him and spent nearly one and a half hour with Dr. Mossadegh to inform him of what he did not at all appreciate about the consequences of the rift between his government and the court. I came to believe that Dr. Fatemi was not aware either. Dr. Fatemi inquired if Dr. Mossadegh knew about it? No, was my answer.

He suddenly became interested and said "then it must be something worth to hear, what was it?"

I said, "To my opinion it was very interesting, and please listen carefully. As I told Dr. Mossadegh, because of the intense interest I

have in your success in Nationalizing our oil industry, which was my old earnest longing as all Iranians, I hate to see that the way you are handling the case, as it indicates that you intend to play the Anglo-Russian card”. Dr. Fatemi became so interested that he put aside his Le Mond newspaper, and started to listen attentively. I continued: “surely Dr. Mossadegh remembered how Iran was occupied during the war and how Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of Crown Prince, while Russia and England were both strongly against Mohammad Reza Shah occupying his father’s place? Mossadegh said; he was not aware of that. In short when Reza Shah was forced to abdicate, Russia and England, jointly approached Mr. Saed, our ambassador in Moscow, and asked him to accept the regency of Iran till a Shah was chosen! Saed refused the proposal, but suggested that they ask Foroughi, who was more suitable and popular to head a Regency Council, Saed’s suggestion was accepted, but Forooghi also refused the proposal.



M.A. Foroughi



Saed Maragheh

In order to pressure Foroughi to accept the regency the British Ambassador, Reader Bullard, accompanied by his Russian colleague, Smirnov, visited the day before the Shah took the oath and informed him, that their respective governments would not recognize Mohammad Reza as the Shah of Persia! Therefore, who ever is

informed of that episode, will no doubt believe that you are playing the Anglo-Russian card!"

Dr. Fatemi did not utter a word and fell into deep thought. My conversation with Dr. Fatemi took quite a long time that I felt it better to take my leave, so that he could think it over what I had said to Dr. Mossadegh.



*Dr. Hossein Fatemi*



*Mossadegh's Second Cabinet presented to M. R. Shah*



## **MOSSADEGH AND I**

Here I feel it necessary to go into details of what passed between Dr. Mossadegh and I, in the Palace Hotel at The Hague on 5<sup>th</sup> February 1956, since I believe my interview with him reveals a page of the history of what was going on behind the scenes and why I went to The Hague to have an interview with Dr. Mossadegh.

A good number of my compatriots who were in Hamburg during my two years stay as Consul General (1950-1952), knew about my effort to introduce to the German public, by publishing a weekly bulletin, my country's problems and the struggle to pull her out of the miseries created for her just because Iran had oil!

Each number of the bulletin had an article written by me, in which I explained our problems and the injustice done by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. My writings were not as strong as it has been explained by Elwell Sutton, in his book, "Persian Oil". Strangely my patriotic articles were disliked by our Legation in Köln. Our Minister's pretext was that my articles did not please the British Authorities!

Apart from the articles, I made myself a traveling Public Relation person. Traveling around and lecturing German Youth and Journalists on our problems and the way Iran was treated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company during fifty years of acquiring its concession!

In the midst of such struggle and effort the most unpleasant and discouraging news reached me from Tehran concerning deep differences between the Shah and Dr. Mossadegh.

At the same time news reached Hamburg that the British government had referred the Oil Dispute to the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and that Dr. Mossadegh was proceeding to The Hague to question and oppose the competence of the International Court in interfering in a case which is solely an Iranian National Affair.

I was eagerly awaiting his arrival in The Hague so that I could go there and have an interview with him, to make him realize the harm the differences between him and the Shah would cause his plan and effort for Nationalization of our Oil.

It was 7<sup>th</sup> June 1952 that Tehran Radio announced the departure of Dr. Mossadegh to The Hague. Next day I left Hamburg for The Hague and attended the proceedings of the Court, particularly the defense of Professor M. Henri Rolan which was highly appreciated by listeners. The Courts proceedings lasted till 11<sup>th</sup> June. When the

Court's proceedings were over, I found the time was ripe to have my interview with Dr. Mossadegh. I managed through his son, Dr. Gholam Mossadegh, to obtain an appointment for 12.45 on 12<sup>th</sup> June.



*Dr. Mossadegh, Dr. Fatemi & A.H. Meftah right behind Dr. Mossadegh in the International Court of The Hague.*

At the appointed time, I entered his apartment in the Palace Hotel. He received me warmly and we sat facing each other. I thanked him for receiving me and started with these words: "As you know, I have been trying to attract German public opinion and sympathy towards your patriotic struggle and the country's national desire, through the publication of a weekly bulletin, and also by giving conferences. But I regret to say that certain rumors leaking out from Tehran which is reflected in European papers, is not only hampering my activities, it strongly harms your effort in nationalizing the oil."

Mossadegh inquired, "What news & and rumors?"

I replied, "The first strange and harmful news in Tehran's papers was that you have said to the members of Parliament, who were invited to your home, that you thought the British would submit to your plan after two or three months, therefore you did not draw a proper plan to fight them, and you asked the Parliament members present at your home, to gather together to draw up a plan!"

Dr. Mossadegh said, "I told the truth".

I replied, "Truly speaking when I read the news I felt surprised and disappointed, because I could not allow myself to believe that a statesman such as your Excellency would ever start such an important campaign without preparing a plan beforehand, particularly at a time when this very meager income from oil helped the country to stand on its feet. Apart from that, you can see for yourself that even now, I mean 7 years after the war; Britain's living

on a very strong ration system and bearing all her hardship for the sake of her financial and economic recovery. What made your Excellency think or imagine that a country which bore or supported all the miseries and sufferings of the war, while conniving her resistance, was going to surrender to us for the sake of a few barrels of oil? I was sure that you had an economic plan, already prepared to replace and compensate for the loss of oil income, as the consequence of Nationalization, so that the government could bear the burden of the most difficult undertaking to which they committed themselves. And at the same time give a chance to the people to occupy themselves in usual work. In my opinion even now, which is very late, if we cut short the losses, it will be the beginning of a gain. I therefore suggest you employ the army, which at present has nothing to do (and considering the present difficult condition, is a burden on the country) on the field to help the peasants, so that at least the daily bread of the masses could be secured; and meanwhile, the world could watch that your government is seriously struggling to achieve its aim. The struggle surly would attract the sympathy and admiration of friend and foe.”

Dr. Mossadegh liked my suggestion, but said, “His Majesty would not like us to touch the army”.

I said “All right if His Majesty dislikes or disapproves of using the help of the army in such an important struggle, you should immediately organize a labour force and employ it on the field.”

Dr. Mossadegh inquired how a labour force should be organized. I having in mind the system of German Arbeitsdienst, explained, how it should be organized and recruited. Dr. Mossadegh took note of the subject.

I continued, “There is another important subject that I would like to discuss with your Excellency, and that is about a strong rumor of a sharp differences between the Imperial Court and the government over the Oil Question and other political matters, which the rumors would strongly hinder the government’s activities, because, with the existing records that our two great neighbors were not at all in accordance with the enthronement of His Majesty, it will the opponents an effective reason to propagate that Dr. Mossadegh was playing the old Anglo-Russian cards, and I wonder if your Excellency knows about that record?”

Dr. Mossadegh said, “I do not know anything about that case. Please tell me what & how it happened”.

I explained the case as the late Soheili, the Foreign Minister of the time related to me: “England and Russia were not willing for Mohammad Reza Shah to take his father’s place. They preferred

that, before any definite decision taken, a Regent should be appointed. They contacted our Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Saed first, who refused with the excuse that Mr. M. A. Foroughi, the Prime Minister of the time, due to his popularity, would be a better fit for that task. They were rebuffed strongly by M. A. Foroughi. The day before the appointed the Shah's proclamation, Bullard the British Ambassador, and the Russian Ambassador, Smirnov, went together to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and said: "our governments are informed that tomorrow the Crown Prince is going to Parliament to take the oath and be proclaimed Shah of Iran. We are here to inform you that our governments will not recognize the Reign of the Crown Prince."


Soheili replied that according to the agreement signed between Iran and the allies, they had no right to interfere in our internal affairs, particularly in our Home Affairs, and this is clearly an internal affair."

Bullard who was the speaker of the two, said, "We are only instructed to inform you of our government's decision." Soheili then asked them, they better meet the Prime Minister". Soheili got up and proceeded to the upper floor, where Foroughi had his office, and told him the purpose of their visit and asked him to receive them. Foroughi received them. Bullard repeated his message in a more vehement tone and, without listening to Foroughi's objections, that this decision was contrary to the signed agreement between the three powers, they left his office.

Foroughi was very much disturbed and remained seated, keeping his head between his hands. After a while he got up and left for the Palace. When he had the audience with the Crown Prince he was in a worried mood. The Crown Prince was probably indirectly informed of the Anglo-Russian decision, immediately upon receiving Foroughi and observing his disturbed state, said, "You have come to tell me that they are not going to recognize my reign? If you really think it in the best interest of the country, it would be better to stop tomorrow's ceremony"

Foroughi had replied, "They came to inform me of their government's decision, but we will carry on our decision according to The plan.





محمدرضا شاه و فروغی

Foroughi Takes the Crown Prince Mohamad Reza Pahlavi to the parliament for proclamation



*Bullard on his way to present his credential to Reza Shah*

**My last sentence was not quite finished when Dr. Mossadegh lost control, and said in a loud voice, “Mr. Meftah, my difficulty is that, there are not even two of twelve members of my Cabinet in agreement. What can I do?”**





Soheili

**I was shocked and I thought “still worse”. I immediately pulled myself together and said, “Now that you have been informed of the past, the best thing you can do, upon arriving to Tehran, is to go straight to the Shah, lay down your cards and make him open his heart, so that the differences between the two parties can be settled.”**



Smirnov and his Embassy's staff in Marble Palace to greet the Shah for 1320 Novroos

**It was about 1.45 p.m. we were both tiered and hungry. I took my leave as I was invited out to lunch and pleasantries were exchanged. While leaving I felt that my conversation had had a favorable effect on him, as I could understand, he had unwillingly fallen into the clutches of a group, that he did not know how to deal with!**

**The difference of the opinion between the members of the group accompanying him to The Hague was obvious, due to the fact that I**

could not see any two of them sitting together, let alone consulting each other!

Anyhow, soon after lunch, I went back to Hamburg. There I eagerly listened to Tehran Radio to know what Dr. Mossadegh was going to do upon his arrival to Tehran. It gave me great satisfaction when I heard on his arrival in Tehran he went straight to the Palace and had an audience with the Shah, which lasted over three hours.



## **FATEM'S RETURN TO TEHRAN**

Fatemi's condition was improving, but due to difficult healing of the muscles on his stomach not healing properly a sort of rupture was observed in his stomach, which kept his surgeons worried, and the resulting pain made him suffer every now and then.

On one of his last days in hospital, Fatemi renewed his discussion of reforms in the country and said, "Mr. Meftah, you in your reports as well in your conversations always speak of the imperative need for reforms. It has attracted the attention of everybody in the government. But surly you are not ready to leave your pleasant life in Europe and come to Tehran for the sake of the very reforms you are advocating!"

I immediately replied, "You are absolutely wrong. I have never been one of the favorites of the Ministry or the government. Because of my very sharp critical tongue and pen, I was always on the black list of the superiors, with the result that I could not gain the favor of anybody, and due to that I had to stay in Tehran over three to four years before I could manage to get an assignment abroad. And that was only due to their desire to get rid of my poisonous tongue and pen"!

Fatemi said, "We do not dislike your criticisms. On the contrary, we value them. It is true that we differ on certain points, but the right criticism is very much appreciated by us".

I should mention here that from the day I joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the things I saw and read, made me criticize, which reached higher authorities but have been swept under the rug by empty headed superiors.

Fatemi was still in Hospital when Hossein Macky, accompanied by Messers Parsa and Mahlooji came to Hamburg on their way to U S A During their few days stay in Hamburg they got acquainted with me and my opinions, as well as, through the Iranian Nationals residing in Hamburg with my work and reputation.

Fatemi felt well enough to leave for Iran. He left Hamburg on Tuesday 11<sup>th</sup> September 1952, via Geneva to meet his wife & newly born son, before proceeding to Tehran.



**The author A. H. Meftah, His wife, H. Hakimi & Dr. H. Montazem,  
Antibes, France  
December 1980**

## **UNDERSECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

About a month after Fatemi departure from Hamburg, my wife and I along with few intimate friends were listening to radio Tehran, when it was announced the resignation of Hossein Navab the Foreign Minister. All of us wondered who would be the next Foreign Minister? Each named a different personality! But my wife jokingly said, “Dr. Fatemi”. We all laughed. Two days latter, to be exact, on the 11<sup>th</sup> October 1952 to be exact I was in my office, busy talking to a German Gentleman, Capitan K. (Who can be taken as one of the most daring pilot of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, due to the fact that he smuggled, more than 20 times, arms to Spain during the Spanish Civil war, without being caught), when my telephone rang. I picked up the receiver and in German language, said “Meftah speaking”. The caller replied in Persian, said, Meftah, how are you? That was my wife, (it was her habit to say “How are you” to me, when her predictions proved correct). I inquired, as to what had happened? She asked, if I had been listening to the radio, and once I said no. She said, “did not I tell you that Dr. Fatemi would become Foreign Minister, and you all laughed at me”? Now you see I was right, since he has been appointed Foreign Minister. It was just announced by the BBC.

I replaced the receiver and continued my conversation with Capitan K. while my mind was going around. I could imagine any post for Dr. Fatemi, save the Foreign Affairs Ministry, particularly when quite recently he was elected a member of Majles (Parliament), which from the conversations we had, he was very enthusiastic about it.

The news kept me thoughtful and anxious the whole day until I received the usual circular telegram confirming the appointment from Tehran. At the end of the day I received a telegram from Dr. Fatemi that I should hand over the affairs of the Consulate General to Dr. Sadri, the assistant of mine, and leave Hamburg immediately for Tehran, where a new post was awaiting me. This telegram displeased me, because in the course of conversation with Dr. Fatemi and this telegram, the uprising of 20<sup>th</sup> July 1952 had taken place. Which could not be a favorable sign for Mossadegh’s government, particularly what General Setvat, Fatima’s father-in-law, who arrived from Tehran few days before Dr. Fatima’s departure to Tehran, revealed about the instability of Dr. Mossadegh’s Cabinet.

Apart from this information, the text of the telegram was also vague. It did not indicate what kind of a job was envisaged for me. I was wondering, whether it was in the Foreign Ministry or some

where else? If it was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was it to the benefit of Ministry or my career, to accept it!?

I had no doubt that the majority of the members of the Foreign Affairs Civil Service would not be pleased with the appointment of Dr. Fatemi as Foreign Minister. Taking that into consideration, if my job was indeed in the Foreign Ministry, how would my colleagues in the Ministry react to my appointment? As an instrument for Dr. Fatemi or a buffer for themselves, or both? What would they expect from me politically?

What political work had been done up till then? According to Dr. Mossadegh, nothing was based on any plan, and whatever was done, was badly handled to the extent that he had put himself and the country into a very difficult position!

Was Dr. Mossadegh's intention to reach an understanding with England? Was the American mediation a genuine, or were they being played by the British to damage American reputation and prestige? Why the Russians were keeping quiet? Was there between England and Russia, even now, a mutual understanding about Iran?

If I went on thinking about different angles of our Foreign Relations, I would get more and more confused and dizzy, especially when I did not know the eventual aim of Dr. Mossadegh. I therefore preferred to satisfy myself with the belief that Dr. Mossadegh had taken Foreign Policy into his own hands and, as far as I knew, the Foreign Ministry was not permitted to express opinions, therefore I should not have worried about things which the Foreign Ministry was not even consulted.

All these different considerations made me decide to find an excuse to delay my departure to Tehran. Dr. Fatemi knew that I was waiting for his departure from Hamburg to be able to go to hospital for an eye operation, which had been due before his arrival to Hamburg. So, I immediately contacted the eye specialist, asked for an earliest operation date and sent a telegram to Dr. Fatemi, using that as an excuse to delay my departure to Tehran. At the same time I sent a telegram to my brother and two friends in the Foreign Ministry asking them, what my job would be and if it was wise for me to proceed to Tehran. My brother's answer was, that I was called to replace Nabil, the undersecretary, and that I should leave Hamburg for Tehran immediately, since the majority of my colleagues in the Ministry believed that my presence in Tehran would be in the interest of the Ministry and them in particular.

Two days latter I received another telegram from Dr. Fatemi requesting that I proceed to Tehran immediately. Next day he contacted me by telephone and said, "Mr. Meftah, please start

immediately. Work has piled up. Your eye operation will be arranged latter on. Do not worry about that. I have ordered your tickets to be sent”.

After these telegrams and the telephone call, I received some letters from my brother and friends which informed me that my colleagues impatiently were awaiting my arrival, because they were afraid that if I refused the offer, some outsider who will be supported by National Front would be imposed on Fatemi, which would be to the detriment of the Ministry.

That demonstration, on behalf of my colleagues, encouraged me to forget about my eye surgery, which was absolutely necessary, and I gave more importance to safeguarding the Ministry or even better, my ancestor's home. I met my eye specialist and cancelled the reservation. I left Hamburg on the 19<sup>th</sup> October 1952 by car to Bonn, where I said farewell to the Iranian Minister and some officials of different German departments. Next day I took a plane from Frankfurt to Tehran, leaving my wife and children in Hamburg to join me latter.

I must add, even though I was going to occupy an important post in Tehran, I left Hamburg reluctantly, while carrying the best memories of my life, which was the friendly and respectful feeling of my compatriot and German friends. On the occasion of my departure from Hamburg the Iranian colony organized an afternoon tea-party at the hotel Atlantic, the expressed feelings and the sympathy by my compatriots towards my wife and I was indeed encouraging and appreciable.

I could not forget the two verses recited by one of my compatriots at the end of his eloquent speech, which is translated into English, by my best ability of the language, was, “It is no use enthroning yourself in a Ministry – Happy those who can enthrone themselves in people's heart”. Truly, it should be a man's struggle to capture the throne of hearts. For me no reward could be more important than these to sentences, and I feel very proud and happy that even now, after a decade from those days in Hamburg, I yet have a place in a corner of their hearts.

However, at 8.20 P.M. after taking leave of my wife and my sister and few friends, who accompanied me as far as Frankfurt, I flew to Tehran. Next day, 21<sup>st</sup>. October 1952 at about 5 P.M. the plane touched down in Mehrabad airport. Practically all my colleagues in the Ministry were present at the airport to receive me. Being aware of their anxiety, I kissed them all, as a sign of assurance, and left the airport with my brother for his home.



## **DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH ENGLAND**

Upon arriving in my office, on 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1952 at 9 A.M. an attendant of the Minister's office ran to tell to tell me, that the Mister was awaiting me".

When I arrived in his office, Dr. Fatemi got up to greet me, he asked, "Where were you, we have been expecting you for over a week. Your colleague have been to the airport once, but returned disappointed. Now, as we are in a very short of time because a great amount of work is accumulated, we better go and talk over the work first. Then later on we shall meet each other."

He called his private secretary and asked for all the Directors to be present in the Undersecretary's office. It did not take long before the Directors were all gathered in undersecretary's office. Dr. Fatemi still needing stick to walk led me via the communicating door to the Undersecretary's Office. Fatemi after thanking the previous Undersecretary Mr. Nabil said that Mr. Nabil was leaving shortly for a post abroad. He added that he found me capable and able enough to be trusted with the responsibility that goes with the position. He finished by saying "I therefore introduce Mr. Meftah as Undersecretary to you gentlemen". And left the room!

As soon as Fatemi had left, Mr. Nabil approached me with great joy, greeting and congratulating me, and offering his seat. He then left in such a hurry, as if he was relieved from a burden!

It was quite understandable that for a man like Nabil, to work with Fatemi was not an easy job, particularly when, as the readers will come to know, in subsequent pages, Fatemi had unpleasant plans in mind for the Foreign Ministry.

My colleagues, after congratulating me and showing their satisfaction that their second-in-command was an old hand of the Ministry, left the room.

With a call for the assistance from God almighty, I sat behind my desk and spent the entire day working.

Next day Dr. Fatemi came to my office to accompany me to "Majles" (Iranian Parliament), to be introduced me as the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office. Having been extremely busy I had not thought for the required formalities, so I cleared my desk and left with him for the Parliament. Majles had just started its regular session. Fatemi introduced me according to the customary formalities and received the congratulations of the House.

We could not leave immediately so sat for little while. The first thing which attracted me was the presentation of a big roll of petition by Ghanatabadi, supposed to have been signed by thousands of



people, demanding the dissolution of the Senate Assembly. The discussion over the question started and it did not take long before that Parliament unanimously voted for the Senate's dissolution!

For me, the speed with which the resolution passed by the Parliament, for such an important affair, was astonishing like a comedy. Fatemi noticed my astonishment, mingled with a sarcastic look, he whispered in my ear, "It is a theater, is it not?" Sneeringly, I replied, "not theater but perhaps a comedy!"

After a short time, Parliament went into recess, and we left for the Foreign Office. We were about to leave the Parliament grounds, when I suddenly realized that I should have been presented to the Shah first. So I turned to Fatemi and said, "A mistake has been made, you should have taken me to the Palace first." He suddenly stopped and said "You are right. I did not realize it. I shall arrange it the first thing in the morning."

Next morning we went to Saad Abad Palace, and after short pause in Mr. Alaa's office, we were led to the Shah's office. Fatemi carrying his walking stick and limping, with I, following entered the room, The Shah, as usual on these occasions, was standing a few paces away for the door. We bowed, The Shah shook hands and Fatemi introduced me. The Shah said, "Having such a young and willing Minister, you should succeed in your duty". We took our leave to return to the Ministry after a short while.

My duties really started from that date. The first two weeks I was fully occupied in receiving the Heads of the Diplomatic Missions and attending certain receptions.

It was in the afternoon of Thursday, 30<sup>th</sup>. October 1952, while I was extremely busy in my office, Fatemi opened the door by which our two rooms communicated, and invited me to his office. I found him very tired. I inquired whether he was exhausted, or not feeling well? He said "Both". In his office Fatemi had not much to do. He hardly saw five percent of the correspondence. Most of his time was concentrated on National Front activities, guiding the press, and receiving sympathizers of the National Front who had nothing to do with the Foreign Ministry.

Fatemi asked, "What I was doing the next day, which was Friday, an Iranian weekend?" I replied, "I was planning to come into the office and work all day". He said, "I will be here about 11 o'clock and would like you to be here as well". I said, "I hope it will be something pleasant".

He got up and said, "I have to leave now, we shall meet each other tomorrow".

I returned to my office and continued my work, while my mind wondered about what was so important that Fatemi wanted to discuss on a Friday, with me?

Anyhow, next day I went to my office even earlier than 11 o'clock to get some work done prior to our meeting. Shortly after, Fatemi arrived too and called me to his office. As usual I sat in front of him. He said the Prime Minister wished to meet me at 6 P.M." I asked, "Anything new?" He replied, "Yes we have broken off diplomatic relations with England, and Middleton, (The British Charge des, Affairs) will leave tomorrow morning. The Prime Minister would like you to see him off in Karaj."

I said, "Apart from my being against the diplomatic rupture, which luckily for me, took place before my arrival to Tehran, (1) to see Middleton off at Karaj is contrary to tradition and it does not make any sense."

Fatemi asked me the reason for my objection against severance of the Diplomatic relations. I said, "Today several countries are fighting one another openly in Korea, without breaking their Diplomatic relations. I can not understand why we should sever our relation because of an economic or commercial cause. Apart from that, while we had normal relations with England, we could not come to an understanding with her. What possible hope of success is there through the mediation of others? I would not be surprised to see the British tightening more strongly her economic encirclement further and creating yet more difficulties for us." Fatemi replied, "It was a decision taken at a Cabinet meeting, therefore nothing can be done".

I said, "Anyhow, I do not see any point in my going to see the Charge des Affairs off and I do not think it is the right thing to do. I think it would be appropriate if you make him understand my point of view."

Fatemi said, "The Prime Minister asked me to tell you that you have to meet him at 6 P.M. If you could convince him of your opinion then do not go to see Middleton. As it stands, you have to go, because that was his order."

Being new in Tehran, I was not yet fully acquainted with certain new formalities and protocols, particularly the protocol of entering Mossadegh's house. I left my office for Mossadegh's house in my battered official car a few minutes earlier. As it was only the second time at Mossadegh's house, the guards and the secret police did not

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(1)- Fatemi had informed Middleton of government's decision on the 26<sup>th</sup>. Mehr, 17<sup>th</sup> October 1952

know me, and I could not enter the house. The big iron gate of the house was shut. The guard asked my name and pressed a button. Another soldier from inside opened the door, enough to peek out. The outer guard told him that a gentleman was here claiming to be Undersecretary of the Foreign Office who had an appointment for 6 P.M. with His Excellency, The Prime Minister. The door was shut. After two, three minutes it was opened and a man in a civilian suit came out saying, "His Excellency, Mr. Meftah?" I replied, "Yes". He said, "Follow me please." He took me past a few soldiers, standing irregularly in the garden, and showed to the steps of the building. At the entrance a soldier with bayoneted rifle was on guard, and a man in civilian attire (one of the secret police) was sitting near him on a chair. He got up and took me to Mr. Freydooni, private secretary to the Prime Minister. I introduced myself. He got up at once, took me to the waiting room on the second floor and went to inform Mossadegh of my arrival. It did not take long before he returned and led to Mossadegh's office-bedroom. Dr. Mossadegh, who was lying in his bed half stretched out, showed me a chair near to his bed, and said, "Please sit down". Then he continued, "Early morning tomorrow, Middleton is leaving and I want you to see him off at Karj with great respect, and tell him "That I am very sorry that I could not see him again before his departure, but I hope he will have a pleasant journey and a safe return to his country," Mossadegh then gave me a big open yellow envelope which contained a message to the British Nation, saying it should be handed over to Echer (Swiss Minister) as Middleton has no status in Iran anymore, as Middleton could not possibly accept it, therefore it was appropriate to give the envelope to Echer, that he could give it to Middleton."

I said "I certainly will make this message to reach to Mr. Echer, but not you think that seeing Middleton off by me, is inadvisable?"

Mossadegh said, "Why"?

I replied that there was no precedence that the Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry to see a Charge des Affairs or even head of a mission off, and would not look nice in the public's eyes. It would tarnish the prestige of the Foreign Ministry."

Mossadegh said, "If you do not like to go alone, take somebody else with you." I felt that he did not want to see my point, so I said, "In principle for me to see him off is not appropriate, if you allow me, I would like to send the chief of protocol to the Embassy to deliver the message, and convey your good wishes for his return journey, and see him off there, as the Embassy would be the departure point."

Mossadegh said, "Oh no, as I said it is YOU that should go as far as Karaj and if you like to take another person along, you may." I

repeated what I had said before. Mossadegh looked a bit uncomfortable and said, "Mr. Meftah why are you haggling so?" And insisted those were his wishes!

I took the envelope and left for the chief of protocol's home, in anger.

I told Mr. Meykadeh to be at the Embassy at 5 A.M. next morning to accompany Middleton to Karaj, where we had to see him off, and I left for home. As I had to get up early morning, I went to bed earlier as usual, but was too angry and nervous to sleep. I was angry because I could not understand the purpose of sending me to see Middleton off. I passed a very uncomfortable night and left my bed at 4 A.M. arriving at the British Embassy at the appointed time. Mr. Meykadeh arrived soon afterwards. Middleton was in the drawing room of his house. He offered us tea. I noticed, he was not quite ready to leave and our presence there was no doubt embarrassing him, so we left for Karaj at a slow speed ahead of him. On passing through Karaj we saw the Embassy's cars passing us fast. We had to see Middleton off at Hessarak, a few kilometers beyond Karj, where he and his party were due to have breakfast before starting their journey.

At Hessarak, opposite the school of Agriculture, where the party stopped to have breakfast and take leave of a few Diplomats, we reached him. I conveyed Dr. Mossadegh's wish for a safe return home to Middleton, and turned to Echer to hand him the message to be given to Middleton. Echer refused to accept the message, saying, "I regret we are not permitted to accept."

I immediately returned to Tehran and went straight to Dr. Mossadegh. It was almost 9 A.M. when I reached his house. His private servant, Mashadi Mehdi, took me to the waiting room and offered my first cup of tea of the day, and went to inform Dr. Mossadegh of my arrival. The tea cup was not even half empty, when he returned with the message that I should go to him.

Dr. Mossadegh was sitting up in his bed when I entered the room, with the yellow envelope in my hand. We greeted each other and he showed me a chair next to his bed. I told him that his message to Middleton was conveyed. Middleton thanked your Excellency for the message, but the Swiss Minister refused to accept the message to the British nation, saying that he was not authorized to accept the message. Mossadegh took the envelope and threw it on his bed, and said, "Echer said that he was not authorized to accept my message? Very good, I have nothing more to trouble you for," I left him, but the message was published and broadcasted the very day.

His message to the British was true except for his unfounded condemnation of Reza Shah. It has been treated by Elwell Sutton in his book, *Persian Oil*.

I remarked above that Mossadegh did an injustice to the late Reza Shah in his message. He chose to ignore the reality of Iran's situation just after the first world war was the heritage of Qajar's time, and it was also very unfair not to take into consideration the confused state of affairs of the country and imbalanced international relations, combined with famine and abject poverty.


By breaking off diplomatic relation with England, the wise men of the National Front proved their wisdom! All my colleagues and those who knew my family close, know perfectly well that I have that I have always felt the same towards England and Russia; since we received from both of them the most inhuman, humiliating, ruinous treatment, of which a short history has been given in my book, *Armane Iran*," (Longing of Iran). That was why, I, like any other Persian, from the Shah down to the destitute in the country, greeted the oil nationalization with joy.

My reports, particularly those from Hamburg, and the bulletins I distributed there, during two years of stay in Hamburg is the best proof of my view towards the two colonial powers. A view formed by close study of my country's international relations during the last two centuries.

In spite of my personal view, to break off diplomatic relations with England, in my opinion, was not at all advisable. Because by keeping our normal relations with England, there could have been some possibility to arrive to some understanding and at the same time prevent the dangers of economic pressure and blockade. I was much worried that the diplomatic rupture might produce other difficulties for us, which unfortunately it did. At one point, I felt the country is entrapped into a political blockade.

I remember very well, one day at a Cabinet Meeting (which took place in Mossadegh's house though he was not present), there was a row between the Minister of Education and the acting Finance Minister, over Ministry of Education finance. The Minister of Education was asking for more Government borrowing. The acting Finance Minister refused, saying the government could not raise the credit. When Dr. Azar, the Minister of Education, started to insist, Mr. Jaafari, the Acting Finance Minister got angry and using the Persian expression about the fate of Government finances he vitiated to his demands said, "Mr. Azar, what are you asking about ? It will burst one of these days!" Mr. Akhavi, the Minister of Economy, said," Huh! Will it burst? No, it will explode like a bomb!"

**I was watching the event with surprise, mixed with cynical amusement. Dr. Moazami, Minister of Post Telegraph and Telephone (P.T.T.), was sitting opposite me, perhaps grasped my surprise look, and with a wink quietly asked me, “What do you see?”**



*Dr. Moazami*

**I replied in a very quiet voice, “This is the inside scene of the government and its financial situation. In the Foreign Office I feel we are in a very delicate international situation. We have reached a blind ally. We are actually in a political blockade. I do not see anyway out. God alone may save our country.”**



## **THE REFORM OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE**

Diplomatic rupture with England was completed. The activities of Henderson, the American Ambassador in Tehran, were accelerated, but with Fatemi as the head of Foreign Ministry the American curtailed his visits to the Ministry. Fatemi actually did not occupy himself with political matters, therefore, I was practically in charge of the entire affair. Fatemi showed interest in the Ministry's organization, which we had discussed in detail while we were both in Hamburg. And now that I was in Tehran, he wanted first start with the reorganization.

Before my return to Tehran the Ministry had already prepared a project of re-organization and even had sent it to the Cabinet for approval. I asked for the project to be sent back for revision. I found it necessary for the project to be examined by a commission. Fatemi agreed, but insisted that Dr. Kaviani and two young members of the Foreign Office should be included in the commission. I reasoned that the reorganization of the Ministry was not the job for inexperienced young men. The commission should consist of experienced men and consult the younger members to hear their arguments. Therefore I proposed that the commission should be headed by me and that I would call Abdollah Entezam and another experienced person and two consultative younger members. Fatemi did not appreciate my suggestion, but he felt that I would be very persistent on my proposal, so he gave up, on one condition, that the three persons he introduced should be included.

The commission started with its review of the reforms. In the meantime, Fatemi kept reminding me, to expedite the reorganization. My difficulty was that the heavy workload of the Ministry did not permit me to accelerate the work of the commission. Finally one day, Fatemi entered my room asking again that I should hasten the work of commission. Not being able to imagine what he had in mind, I felt a bit suspicious. I told him that the reform consisted of two parts, Administrative Reform and Personnel Reform. He did not wait for me to finish, and said, "I mean personnel reform to be considered first." I replied, "That is very easy for me, but I thought it would be better if we first finished the administrative reform." Fatemi replied, "No, no, get on with personnel reorganization first." I said, "All right to him".

I sat at my desk and wrote a list of forty five names to be axed and gave it to him and said, "There you are, but it has one condition, that

is, you should not do anything about it! You have to leave it to me , as I know better how to handle the case, because among these forty five persons there are only a few who are of no use, but the rest can be exchanged with other Ministries as they are well educated and, respectable members of the civil service. In this way ,the reorganization will succeed” I added that I had a second condition which was, that the list should be kept absolutely secret. Not to be shown to anybody.

Fatemi agreed with me, and said, “Let me study the list first then we shall talk it over.”

After few days, Parsa, a member of National Front, visited me and said, “I have to congratulate you.” I inquired, “Congratulate me! What for?” he replied, “for the list you have given to Fatemi, and I told him, if he had asked the Director of Personnel for such a list, he would not be able to furnish him with a list like that in such a short time. That shows how well Meftah is informed of the past of each member of the Foreign Office.” I thanked him for his opinion, but felt rather uncomfortable due to the fact that Fatemi did not observe the condition, that the list should be kept secret and not to be shown to anybody. Now it appeared that the list was discussed at National Front meetings.

About a week later Fatemi called me to his room and said, “I have studied the list. To me, the list is not complete, because I understand; there are no forty five persons, but one hundred and ten persons we need to let go. I therefore suggest that you should make a deeper study of this case.”

I replied that our arrangement was that, the list should be kept confidential, but I have come to know that the list had been discussed at the National Front meeting, and that one hundred and ten persons was their opinion. Fatemi denied my information and said that his personal study brought him to that conclusion and that I should make a more careful study.

I was informed that in the National Front, it was Dr. Kaviani who had shown himself strongly against the Foreign Office, and had introduced a list of one hundred and seventy persons, who had to be dismissed from the Foreign Office (Political cleaning); but finally, they decided on one hundred and ten persons. I was also informed that in National Front meetings, the Foreign Office was heavily attacked and insulted. Having the information about the National Front’s antipathy towards the Foreign Office, I did not lose the opportunity at one of the reform commission’s meetings, in which Dr. Kaviani had made me very angry, to pay back the National Front by



their own method, I left the meeting in protest due to indecent behavior of the National Front towards the Foreign Office.

Abdollah Entezam, who was present at the meeting, thought like me that by that gesture I was bound to lose my post in the Foreign Ministry, and that the order of my dismissal would soon follow me home.

Contrary to our expectation, next morning, while I was busy in my office, Fatemi opened the door and asked me to his room. He handed a letter to me from Dr. Kaviani, stating, "After what happened at yesterday's commission meeting, I believe my presence will no longer be appreciated, I therefore refrain from being present at any future meetings." Fatemi was anxious to see my reaction. I said, "The only good thing Kaviani did in his entire life is this. I am very pleased."

Fatemi expressed an opinion which I knew was not his own, that the number was indeed more than forty five. Listening to Fatemi talk at the meetings of the commission, it dawned on me that main motivation from the reorganization was to clear the way to make political appointees bringing in his cronies and friends.

The only way left for me to avoid the pressure on personnel reform, as Fatemi was forced to put to the commission, was that, they should separate personnel reform from administrative reform. So I said to Fatemi, "to avoid any misunderstandings or discriminations, I suggest that a separate commission should be assigned to go through everybody's file, right from me to the lowest grade. Fatemi liked the idea and said that I should start immediately with forming that commission under my own chairmanship. The work of the special commission had to be kept top secret. To enable the commission to observe the secrecy, a room was put at the disposal of the special commission in the Police Headquarters.

I chose Entezam and two others to collaborate with me. But to go through four hundred files was not the task for few days or even weeks. It was in need of number of months, as it did on another occasion. That was the only way to escape from Fatemi's or National Front's pressure, and resulted in saving the Foreign Office from undue political interference and the eventual destruction of their regime.

It was before the third meeting of the special commission that Fatemi felt ill again, due to his injury, and had to go to Germany for further treatment.

The day after the first meeting of the Special Commission, Fatemi entered my room and said, "I would like to have a talk with you over the personnel reform." I replied, "I am at your disposal."

He said, "You show yourself quite a fanatic about your own list, and there are also people who believe that your list was well chosen, but to me it seems that you have forgotten to include few others." I said, "Such as?" He continued, "The very Aram that you sent to Baghdad, Eshraghi, and few others." He emphasized Aram and Eshraghi and asked me if I knew anything about their careers before entering the Foreign Office? I replied that I did, and added that I do not take their pre-Foreign Office careers into consideration.



*Hossein Eshraghi*

Their file did not show anything against them since their admission into the Ministry. Fatemi said, "Your files are not complete. Aram was suspected by the secret police." I replied, "As we have not yet received any report against him from our security authorities, I can not take any action against him." Fatemi suddenly got nervous and with a shaking hands and loud voice said. "Mr. Meftah, you pretend you do not know. You are feigning ignorance. You know perfectly well that this Aram was Percy Sykes's private servant, and he was in south Persian Rifles Hospital. Are not these sufficient reasons to throw him out?" I replied, Mr. Fatemi, if you ask my honest opinion, I will tell you frankly that whoever has been serving foreigners should not be admitted into government service and into the Foreign Office in particular; but, as I told you, his file did not register anything of the sort, and the same goes for Eshraghi. Apart from that, as you know there are records that people who were in foreign employment and who afterwards entered the government service went so high as to occupy the post of Prime Minister." He again in a loud voice said, "No, Mr. Meftah that was not right." I asked, "What was not right, my opinion or the rule?" He said, "Your opinion is quite right. The practice was wrong." I repeated that I agree with him one hundred percent that the practice was not right. I told him, he must have known by then that I was not a person sincerely attached to the principle of justice and impartiality. If he had any

genuine document to prove that these were unreliable persons, I would finish with them immediately and I warned him that I could not trust the secret police agent's reports as I had no confidence in them.

Shortly after Fatemi's departure for Germany the files were returned to the Ministry and their study was postponed for a more appropriate time.

There was no doubt that the Foreign Office first needed a radical administrative reform before we could touch personnel reform. Having toured Europe, during 1936-1937 to study the administration of Foreign Ministries, I was always eager for an opportunity to bring about a proper reform in ours, so that it had a capacity to train efficient, interested patriots and well trained Diplomats. I fully realized the exigency of such a reform to equip the Ministry with trained officers. The Ministry often had difficulty with foreign powers in obtaining agreement for a non-career diplomats or an outsider, who was forced on the Ministry by higher personalities. Such people could never stay long in a post. They had to be recalled either due to their misbehavior or some other unpleasant conduct.

It happened during my time in the Foreign Office as Undersecretary that the Ministry was forced to ask agreement for a non-career person, and was asked, if the Ministry had nobody with some Diplomatic experience and training to propose?

These kinds of difficulties existed, even with regret at the appointment of young, inexperienced men. The country had to go through heavy expenses changing them from one post to another, because they happened to be favorites of a high personality.



## **FROM BAD TO WORSE**

While I was busy fighting National Front over their politically inspired Foreign Office reforms, other political complications worried me more.

First: differences between the members of the National Front, which reflected heavily on the Cabinet. It was the result of Dr. Mossadegh keeping himself away from the Cabinet meetings. Therefore the Cabinet was always chaired by Deputy Prime Minister, first by Bagher Kazemi and after his departure as Ambassador to Paris, then by Dr. Sadighi.

That gloomy atmosphere in the Cabinet weighed more and more on the oil problem.

Second: The oil problem by it self, totally broke the financial and economic strength of the country, with the result that intense public disappointment was created.

Third: The disorder and anarchy which disrupted public life gave a great advantage to the Toudeh (Communist) Party, enabling them to accelerate their destructive and subversive activities.

Public life was so badly disrupted in Tehran that the shopkeepers that I was one of their clients, repeatedly asked me, "When will this hooliganism stop? How much longer have we to pull down and up the shutters of our shops, hundred times per day? Our business is totally paralyzed; we have to live and keep large families. You are in the government; you have to come up with some solution."

After Allahyar Saleh was sent to Washington as Ambassador, or more correctly, removed from National Front under that pretext, the crisis inside the National Front grew to such extent that the loneliness of Dr. Mossadegh could easily be felt.

Differences between Bagher Kazemi and Fatemi on one side and strong antipathy between Fatemi and Dr. Shaygan, on the other, with the tense relations between Dr. Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani, split people's support. The older generation sympathy was towards the Shah and Kashani, but the younger ones were more inclined towards Toudeh Party. I received information that the Toudeh Party was profiting from the crisis and was active to strengthen its position. The papers of the two parties did not fail in fanning the flames by using the most atrocious enflaming language against each other and other personalities. The really murky political water allowed foreign powers to exploit the situation easily in their own interest.



Ayatollah Kashani

**Dr. Mossadegh who had no sympathy for President Truman, knowing he was pro-British, was eagerly waiting for the upcoming of US Presidential election; as soon as Eisenhower was elected a long telegram was addressed to him in which Dr. Mossadegh expressed his suspicions that Iran's situation might have been reported inaccurately and unfairly to the President. The President in his reply rejected Mossadegh's suggestion.**

**I mentioned in the previous sections that following the departure of Middelton, Henderson's activity accelerated. That activity was not to help settle the Anglo-Iranian Oil dispute, but more to further American interest in Iran. This claim of mine could easily be proved by the British papers of November 1952, in which Britain did not hesitate to show anxiety at what was going on between Dr. Mossadegh and Henderson. The more the days of 1952 advanced, the more the last days of President Truman's administration arrived, and the more Great Britain's anxiety grew, because they thought there would be no chance of gaining anything through the Republicans!**

**Now and then a new voice could be heard by British papers, regarding An Anglo-Russian collaboration in Iran? It was as far as to warn of an Anglo-Russian close understanding of the situation in Iran. The warnings, some times were so strong as to suggest the renewal of the old Anglo-Russian sphere of influence of 1919, (Anglo Russian treaty splitting Iran into two spheres of influence - See London papers of November 1952).**

**I certainly was studying the proceedings very carefully. I reached to the conclusion that if the problem continued as it was, Iran would no doubt become a second Korea!**

**Day by day the situation grew more dangerous. The government could not show anything positive due to lack of funds. The**

government was completely bankrupt. Not even one Rial could be found in the treasury or in the Saving Banks or even the special places! Finally the National Front's Wise Men and strategists thought that, now that Dr. Mossadegh's power was renewed by Parliament, the government should proceed with a new tactic, to create "Psychological Food" for the people, as it was said by some eminent National Front members. The government papers were instructed to bring the Shah and the Royal Family under the most atrocious attacks. Two papers, Bakhtare Emrouz (East Today) of Fatemi, and Shooresh (Uprising) of Karimpoor Shirazi, did not fail to use the most disgusting words they could find!

I remember one of the days that the paper, Bakhtare Emrooz, was perusing its attacks and insults; I met Fatemi and told him that the way his paper was behaving towards the Royal Family was not appropriate, for a paper of which every body knew HE was the proprietor and editor, in particular, when he was Minister, Of Foreign Affairs, a post for which the Shah's Decree has been issued.



*Karimpoor Shirazi*

He looked at me astonished, and said, "It is funny, when I had audience with the Shah this morning; HE told me the same thing." I asked, "What did you reply?" Fatemi said, I told the Shah, since I occupied a post in the Cabinet, I stopped to overlooking the affairs of the paper."!

Yet that was a lie as it was well known that Fatemi was indeed still in-charge of the political direction of his paper!

I asked him, if the Shah was satisfied with his answer? He told me, "That was the fact, was it not?" I said, "I just wanted to tell you that it was not right for a Foreign Minister to behave as such, and I wonder what the Foreign Representatives thought of the situation?"

Unfortunately neither the Shah's remark nor mine could have any effect on the government's behavior! The government situation was

such that they were forced into that appalling behavior to camouflage their deteriorating position. As was expressed by some members of the National Front, “Psychological Food” should be prepared for the people! The prominent National Front members were deeply engaged in preparing “Psychological Food” for the people, without realizing that the FOOD they were preparing was more destructive than Molotov’s cocktail!

Fortunately, Ayatollah Kashani could foresee the danger and the way to neutralise it. He thought it would be the best that the Shah and his Queen Soraya should take a trip to Shiraz.

The trip took place on the 1<sup>st</sup> of Azar 131 or 22<sup>nd</sup> of November 1952. The Shah and Soraya were received with great pomp. I could see how that trip angered the government and the members of National Front.

At the same time Iraq’s Coup d Etate took place which gave a chance to the government to use the occasion for organizing demonstrations. The demonstrations were not solely in favor of Iraq’s Coup d Etate, but also to create disorder, of which the police took advantage by arresting many of anti-Mossadegh’s regime personalities.

In short, if we remember the events of those days in Tehran, we could easily judge that Tehran was nothing but a ground for demonstrations of different groups, which automatically aggravated the situation.

These events, and the rumor that England and Russia had reached an understanding over Iran, increased the worry of the government. The remedy to this was found by the Wise Men of National Front in prolonging the exclusive power of the government, which was passed by the Parliament under duress.

I heard from some Diplomats, who were previously in Balkan countries, that the Tehran events of those days resembled the pre-revolution conditions in Balkan countries, and they were wondering if the same tactics were being employed in Iran. This news worried me more, in particular, when it was heard that the government was planning to close the Parliament in the hope to reduce Kashani’s influence. But Kashani’s influence was still strong enough to stop the plan.

From then on Dr. Mossadegh felt that his life was in danger. He particularly enclosed himself in a “safe cage”. A big wall was erected in-front of the balcony of his room, which overlooked at the garden of a neighboring house. That was where He rested in the evenings and received people at the same room. A steel door was fixed between tow other wooden doors leading to his room. I asked him one day,

**“Why this wall in-front of the balcony?” He said, “I can easily be shot at from the trees of the opposite garden”.**

**The house opposite to his garden belonged to Dr. Mossadegh himself, but was rented by the Americans!**

**That state of affairs continued with aggravating speed. The National Front papers concentrated their propaganda to justify a regime change. The propaganda was so strong that even the occupants of the Palace were counting their days in the country. The news leaked out from the Palace that the Queen Soraya was collecting her private belongings. Those who knew Soraya well never found her interested in staying in Iran, and thought she was taking a meager excuse to leave the country.**



*Student Demonstration in Tehran*

**On the 9<sup>th</sup> Of Esfand 1331, 28<sup>th</sup> February 1953, I went to my office as usual, it was not long before Fatemi’s room door opened and asked me to his office. He handed me an envelope and said, “Will you please ask the head of the Passport office to bring his register to issue passports for these people. The passports should be ready with the appropriate visas before 11 o’clock. Do not allow anybody in your room and the entire proceedings should be kept confidential.”**

**I went back to my room with the envelope. It contained a letter from the Imperial Court and a number of photographs. Among them the photos of the Shah and Soraya, asking for passports for them. Seeing the Shah’s photos among them and the confidential way the passports should be issued made me suspicious. Remembering the news that Soraya was collecting her private belongings, followed by asking for passports made me believe that the Shah was indeed**



forced to get out, but this time the departure would be a permanent one.

However, I called Mr. Shahidi the head of the Consular Department and conveyed the instruction of the Minister. I also asked my private secretary not to allow anybody in my office.

Shahidi started with the passports, and I sat on my chair with deep anxiety, picturing the most unpleasant happening for my country, visualizing the Korean catastrophe for Iran. I asked myself, have they got the approval of Kashani? The answer was NO, since if the government had obtained the approval of Parliament, why should the case be handled so secretly? If Kashani does not know, who can inform him? I was in these deep thoughts, when my private secretary entered with very small leaflet bearing a communiqué from Kashani, which read as follows:

*“The people should know the treacherous policies have caused our beloved, democratic Shah, to decide to leave the country. He has decided to leave today 9<sup>th</sup> Esfand. You know that if the Shah leaves, whatever we have would follow him. Therefore run and make him change His decision, because today our independence, our existence, depends solely on the person of His Majesty Mohamad Reza Shah Pahlavi but no one else.”*

The declaration of Kashani worked on me as the best elixir. I felt relieved.

Fatemi must have received the same leaflet, since soon after, came to my room in a worried state and asked if the passports were ready. He added that it is getting late, the passports should be at the private Palace before 11 o'clock.”

Roknedin Ashtiyani, Fatemi's private secretary, was also ordered to take the passports round the Embassies to get the necessary visas. The passports were handed to Fatemi about 10 o'clock. He endorsed them and gave them to Ashtiyani with assertion that the passports should be taken to the private Palace not later than 11 o'clock.

As soon as I received Kashani's leaflet, an intelligence agent was dispatched to Bazaar to keep me informed by telephone of people's reaction towards Kashani's declaration. The first telephone information was that, thousands of Bazaaries were marching towards the Palace with slogans in favor of the Shah and against his decision to leave the country.

When Ashtiyani reached the Palace with the passports, crowds were swarming the streets leading to the Palace shouting, “We do not

want the country without the King.” The density of the crowd was so great that the guards had to shut the Palace gates.

Dr. Mossadegh, with the members of his Cabinet, rushed to the Palace to bid farewell to the Shah and to send him off before the situation got out of hand, without realizing that the Palace was virtually surrounded by people!

The Shah was standing on the steps of the Palace waiting for the passports. Cars were packed and ready to embark their passengers. Heavy cases were sent by Lorries to England and the Shah had to travel by road.

I was still in my office receiving regularly the telephone reports of my touring agent. The clock struck 11 o'clock: no news of the Shah's departure; this increased my happiness. At 12.30 I received the most amusing news; exchange of farewell message between the Shah and Mossadegh. How the Shah praised him for his success and said, HE would support him always and pray for his success.

Dr. Mossadegh in his reply thanked the Shah, and said, “I repeatedly requested your Majesty not to leave the country for medical treatment, but now that His Majesty has decided to leave, I assure you that I return to your Majesty, what is entrusted to me safe and sound,” and he wished the Shah a speedy recovery and return to the country. The Shah kissed Dr. Mossadegh goodbye.

But before the Shah stepped into his car, the situation in the Palace grew so difficult, due to the growing number of people and slogans used against Dr. Mossadegh that he had to escape through the back door of the Palace, under the protection of Palace guards.

Finally, I received the news that the Shah, to subdue the angry people and make them disperse, decided to call off his departure. For me it was the best news.

My remark in my diary on 9<sup>th</sup> Esfand was “A worrying day for me.” Why did I make such remark? Because I could see where my country was being pushed to! At each mistake of National Front and the government, I could picture my country as a second Korea, and it was that frightening picture which kept me always worried, uneasy and nervous. I was not alone in getting worried, due to unwise policy of the government, on the 9<sup>th</sup>. Esfand, Allahyar Saleh, Iranian Ambassador in Washington who was one of the leading members of the National Front, was even more worried and nervous. One can read his state of anxiety from a telegram I received from him next day. It read almost like this:



Allahyar Saleh

*“Why that, what I spun turned to wool again? A joint declaration from the Palace and the Prime Minister should be immediately issued to the effect that there exists no difference of policy between them.”*

Instead of paying attention to that telegram and finding a remedy for the damage done, an “Eight Men Committee was created to counter act the 9<sup>th</sup> Esfand’s people’s uprising against Mossadegh’s government, which was supported by Kashani the Speaker of the Parliament, by causing artificial strikes, issuing messages to the people to prepare the ground for dissolving the Parliament, so that they could get rid of Kashani. In short the agitation grew day by day which increased public uneasiness.

On the other hand, the behavior of Dr. Mossadegh in keeping the leadership of National Front, in particular Fatemi, uninformed of his conversations with Henderson on the oil question, created strong dissatisfaction among them.

I had felt for a long time that Dr. Mossadegh had kept the National Front in the dark about the oil discussions and political affairs concerning it.

Henderson occasionally visited me. In one of his visits, he related,



Henderson

what had passed between him and Dr. Mossadegh over the oil question. I asked, if he had informed the Foreign Minister of their conversations, or if he wanted me to inform the Minister? He put His fingers on his lips, made shish-sound and said, *“You being an old officer of the Foreign office, I do not like to do anything over your head. Not a word should be said to HIM (Fatemi).”*

On other occasions I had a chance to confirm my suspicion about Mossadegh acting alone. It was in the morning of a day in Esfand 1331 (February or March 1953), when I left for the office in my car. My driver said that he had heard from the Minister’s driver that the Minister was ill in bed at his home. This news surprised me, since when I left Fatemi at the end of the previous day; he seemed fine and had made no complaint. I got the impression that some thing must have happened after I left to make him feigning illness! Therefore I told the driver to take me to the Minister’s home. I went in and found him in bed, but from his face, I could see that nothing physically was wrong with him. He looked a bit depressed. I told him that from the look of his face nothing was wrong physically with him, but some thing must have made him depressed and angry. I asked, “Did anything happen after I left you yesterday?”

“Yes,” He said, “I went to see Dr. Mossadegh; his private secretary told me that Henderson was with him. I told the man, that it did not matter, please inform the Prime Minister that I am here and would like to see him. The man returned with the message, Mr. Henderson is with me. If there is anything urgent that I should know, I shall ask the Ambassador to go to the other room, but if not, we can leave your business till later. So I got angry and came home decided that I am not going to the Ministry anymore.”

More proof that Dr. Mossadegh was keeping the National Front and the Parliament uninformed of his activities about the oil question. The same applied to our International Relations. After Fatemi’s departure for Hamburg for medical treatment, the Foreign Committee of the Parliament called for me to appear before the Committee. When they sat to work, its first item was to question me about state of our International Relations.

Messers Razavi and Parsa, both members of National Front, criticized strongly the Foreign Ministry strongly for not keeping the Parliament informed of the state of country’s International Relations, and said, that Parliament did not know what was going on, particularly about the oil affair. “It was your duty to come and inform the Parliament about it,” Appearing before the Committee, I was seated between Doctor Fakher and Mr. Zolfaghari. The later remarked that their attack made me uncomfortable, and being

acquainted with my character and temper, kept touching my knees as a sign to keep me quiet. I took their attacks, though unjust and unfair. I did not take any notice of Zolfaghari's advice, but said, "I can not understand why you gentlemen are attacking me or the Foreign Office. You both are members of National Front, why not go to the Prime Minister, your leader, and ask him? Your criticisms are totally unjust." In a stronger voice, Razavi continued his attack and said, "No that is not right. You have a duty to inform Parliament and that behavior of yours is considered as failing in your duties."

The last four words, failing in your duty" made me very angry, I replied, "The foreign Office itself was not aware of the country's Foreign Relations, therefore how I could inform the Parliament?" Razavi asked, since when has the Ministry been kept uninformed about the country's International Relation." I replied, "Since Razmara, [Previous Prime Minister], Foreign Office, has been kept out of Foreign Relations, therefore we can not inform the Parliament of what we are not informed ourselves."

In the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Mossadegh called me and criticized my way of speaking at the committee. I asked Him, if what I said was not true? He confirmed my opinion, but said that I should not have spoken so frankly! I said, I thought it my duty to defend my Ministry.

The two examples were only to show that Dr. Mossadegh did not keep neither his Foreign Minister nor the National Front, or Parliament informed about Foreign Relations, particularly about the oil question.

The differences inside the National Front, on one side, and the serious unrest of the country on the other, which gave increasing opportunities to the Toudeh Party to increase its sabotage, worried me more than ever. Moreover the pro-government and the National Front papers along with Dr. Mossadegh himself went to the extreme in attacking the Shah in their articles and speeches. This most unhealthy state made me realize that neither the defeat of 9<sup>th</sup> Esfand nor Selah's telegram taught the National Front a lesson. They continued with their plan to force the Shah to abdicate and, for me, it was as clear as day that Shah's abdication would be followed with general disorder in the country and most probably the disintegration of my home land.

I thought it better to first and foremost find a way, to bring about peace between the Shah and Mossadegh and prepare a sort of King's Council, who could mediate between the Shah could meet the National Front leaders or Dr. Mossadegh. My second thought was that if I failed with my first plan, the best solution would be to ask

Ayatollah Broojerdi, the highest Shia religious authority for help. Having very little hope of success with my first plan, I thought it would be better to prepare the ground for meeting Ayatollah Broojerdi through Mr. Rashed, the famous clergyman and preacher. To put my first thought into practice, I met Mr. Alaa, Minister of Imperial Court; He showed appreciation of my suggestion and promised to study the proposal.

Persian new year of (NoRouz literally New Day, No, means New and Rouz, means, Day) 1332 or 20/21 March 1953 brought new life to the activities of both sides. One day during the first week of Farvardin (March), I went to Mr. Macky for New Year's greeting, and told him about the necessity of bringing peace between the two parties. He said, "I fully agree with you and to prove it on the subject, I even met Dr. Mossadegh a few days ago about it. After a long talk, he agreed to go to the Shah to resolve the quarrel; but before I left Mossadegh, Fatemi arrived and asked, what was the news? Mossadegh told him what had passed between us, and that he was going to meet the Shah. Fatemi on hearing Mossadegh's decision, suddenly raised his hands and said, "Oh, never, never! We have decided to settle the case forever! So I left the room in anger and saw that with Fatemi around, nothing could be done." Macky's statement depressed me very much and I thought there was no other way but to press for the establishment of a King's Council, and call for Broojerdi's help.



*Ayatollah Hossein Broojerdi*

I met Mr. Alaa again and insisted that the establishment of a King's Council should be given serious consideration.

I arranged to meet Mr. Alaa at his home in the afternoon of the 3<sup>rd</sup> of Oridibehest (April), to prepare the list of the candidates for the King's Council. I suggested that Abdollah Entezam be present as well.



*Hossein Macky*

*Mozafar Baghaee*

**It was about 10 A.M. on the appointed day, when I received a telephone call from Mr. Alaa: He said, “Mr. Meftah, I just wanted to inform you that today’s meeting has been called.” Very much surprised I asked, “Why?” Mr. Alaa said. “Have not you heard that I have resigned?” I felt very uneasy and I thought “What a bad luck we have! It looks as if the country is condemned to disintegrate.”**



*Hossein Alaa*

**I calmed myself down with the hope that possibly the new Imperial Court Minister would be someone that I work my plan with or he could be a good mediator. It did not take long before I received the news of Mr. Abol-Ghassem Amini was chosen as an acting Minister of the Imperial Court.**


**I immediately started to investigate the reasons for his appointment, because, I could not see in him the capacity that I had**

hoped. My investigation informed me that He had come with a plan which did not correspond with my patriotic and peace-loving activities.



*Abolghasem Amini*

After that, the only way left open to me was to contact Ayatollah Broojerdi; as I saw the situation was going at full speed towards such a dangerous state that I could not predict! Next day, particularly after Dr. Mossadegh's speech of 17<sup>th</sup> Farvardin, 6<sup>th</sup> April 1953, Abol-Ghassem Amine's appointment and the assassination of General Afshartoos, The chief of Police, and his burial ceremony, all of which looked to me like a drowning person clinging to whatever he can hold on to.



*General Afshar Touss*

It was then that I really felt deeply sorry to be in Tehran, particularly when I felt that Fatemi was feeling very displeased and was trying to get away under the pretext of deteriorating health, which necessitated his departure for Germany to get help from his



doctor. He even some times expressed his willingness to accept a post in Europe, preferably the Embassy in Rome, if possible.

Finally he managed to leave for Germany, on the 10<sup>th</sup> Khordad 1332, 31<sup>st</sup> May 1953, under the pretext of referring to his doctor and getting medical treatment.

Shortly after Fatima's departure, I met Broojerdi, accompanied by Entezam, in Qom. Broojerdi thought that the National Front would not repeat the same mistake, considering their previous defeat on the 9<sup>th</sup> of Esfand. I explained the situation to Ayatollah and made him to understand that the government had no control over the state of affairs of the country, with the result that the Toudeh Party was almost Master of the county's affairs. I emphasized that if the Toudeh Party succeeded in its attempt, Iran would be another country like those behind the Iron Curtain, where religion, independence, all National traditions and symbols will be made to be forgotten. Boroojerdi listened attentively and felt very much depressed. He promised to see what he could do."

*First Mossadegh Cabinet*



*From right to left*

*General Nadhdi (Minister of war), M. A. Varasteh (Minister of Finance), Bagher Kazemi (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister), Dr. Mohamad Mossadegh (Prime Minister), Dr. Loghman Adham (Minister of Health), Ali Heyat (Minister of Justice), Ziya-al-Molk Farmand (Minister of Agriculture), Amir Homayoun Boushehri (Minister of Roads), General Fazol Llah Zahedi (Minister of Interior), Dr. Karim Sanjabi (Minister of Education).*



## **THE TWO HAZARDOUS MONTHS AND THE 18 HOURS, I SPENT IN AN UNBELIEVABLE FORLONE HOPE**

While leaving Broojerdi's house with little consolation, I saw the Toudeh slogans painted on the wall facing his gate, **"Toudeh Republic is Victorious"**. The slogans were written all along the lanes leading to his house. I thought how could the inhabitants of a religious town such as Qom, where a strong man like Broojerdi lived; allow them selves to see such slogans painted right in front of his house and all the way leading to the shrine? Was Broojerdi's power declining so fast that Qom people did not dare to erase these slogans?

In that state of uneasiness, and weakly depending on Broojerdi's activities, we left Qom for Tehran, after paying a visit to the shrine and my mother's grave.

Convulsion and disturbances increased daily. Uneasiness and worry inside the government could easily be noticed. The only thing left for National Front and its Papers, was abusing and insulting the Shah, the Royal Family and anybody that they thought being against the National Front.

The numbers of pro-government papers declined fast. And some of them such as Syasat-e-Ma, which was vehemently pro Mossadegh, started to call Him, Pishvaye Patoo Panah" (Blanket Protected Leader). The same paper criticised Mossadegh for obtaining a vote of confidence by hand twisting and threatening to resign. The paper wrote that obstinacy and vindictiveness would have a bitter end.

In short, the government's demand for the extension of special power under duress and the resignation of Macky from the membership of the Parliament, which was indicative of leaving National Front, plus hundreds of other problems, demonstrated the setback of the government in its general policy.



## **PLAN FOR A MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST IRAQ**

It was about 6 A.M. on Friday, 5<sup>th</sup>. Tir = 26<sup>th</sup>. June 1953, I received a telephone call from Dr. Mossadegh, asking to meet him immediately at his house. He wanted to tell me that there would be a commission at the Interior Ministry the next day at 12 noon, and that I had to join it.

I asked Him, what the commission was all about, so that I could prepare myself for it. Mossadegh replied, "It does not matter. You will know when attending it!"

I asked if the Foreign Ministry had any previous knowledge about it. The same reply was repeated, and the way He looked at me indicated that He had nothing more to say. I left him thoughtfully, recalling all the events of the last few days, but could not find anything which could concern the two Ministries jointly. I recalled all the frontier incidents, yet could not find any reason for a meeting to be held at the Interior Ministry. I even thought that there might be another case like that of the Northern Fisheries in which my suggestion was accepted, the difference was, that I had been informed before hand about the Fisheries case. Anyhow, I passed a very uneasy night. Next day, I asked different departments of the Ministry to report to me about their outstanding cases with the Interior Ministry. Nothing special or unusual was reported. I recalled all the news and articles published in foreign press, particularly those forecasting Korean-like state for Iran which made me shiver. But none of them had anything to do with the Interior Ministry; therefore nothing could help or give me the slightest clue. I left my office at 11.45 A.M. to be there at 12 noon. When I reached Dr. Sadighi's office, the waiter said that the Minister was awaiting me, and opened the door. I entered the room and saw that General Riahi, chief of General Staff, was there as well. I felt more uncomfortable and thought and said to myself; "What is HE doing here?" We sat round of a small table.

Dr. Sadighi began with a long speech which lasted nearly one hour.

It was all about what the government had done and what they had to do. But for the government to be able to fulfill its patriotic duties, many obstacles and difficulties had to be removed. Obstacles and difficulties which are created by spies, particularly foreign ones! We would have to destroy the net and center of these spies to give a free hand to the government to affect the desired result of its endeavor! Many obstacles and difficulties had to be removed. Obstacles and

difficulties which are created by spies, particularly foreign ones! We would have to destroy the net and center of these spies to give a free hand to the government to affect the desired result of its endeavor!

Till here, General Riahi and I listened carefully and attentively to his long talk without expressing any idea.



*Dr. Shaygan*



*Dr. Sadighi*



*General Riyahi*

Then Dr. Sadighi turned to me and asked, “Mr. Meftah, from now on please listen carefully, because on this subject your opinion is essential.”

Though I was listening to him carefully, now I strained my ears to listen to what he was going to say, meantime, I thought, “where was that Nest of Spies that we were going to bomb out?”

Dr. Sadighi turned to me and said, “Mr. Meftah, if we know that a certain Foreign Power act contrary to the interest of our government and people, what should be done or what is the procedure?” I replied, “If there is any evidence or proof, it should be sent to my Ministry so that we could call the representative concerned country and advise him to stop activities which may injure or damage our existing relations.”

Dr. Sadighi said, “If we have done what you said, but the misbehavior continues, what should be done next?”

I told him, “I should call their representative and hand him, a note of protest.” Dr. Sadighi said, “And if it did not bring about any satisfactory result, what then?” I replied that, I should send a stronger note, warning him that the continuation of such behavior would cause severance of our relation, responsibility of which would be theirs.”

Dr. Sadighi repeated the same sentence! I told him, that I should send an ultimatum to that government, warning them, that the continuation of their interference into our internal affairs would cause the rupture of our Diplomatic Relations, and if the misbehavior continued, I should suspend Diplomatic Relations after giving them a time limit.

Dr. Sadighi said, “and if they did not stop sending spies and their interference, by our suspending Diplomatic Relations, what then?”

On hearing that, I pictured a terrifying state of affairs far more dangerous than that of Korea. Being hammered by those unnerving words for over two hours, it is easy to imagine in what a mental state of agony I was. The government did not have any proof or evidence for their claims. At least I was not informed of any. Yet acting on what could be read in the papers about British spies coming from Iraq, I had called the Ambassador of Iraq to my office several times, and had protested against allowing his country to be used as a center of spying against Iran, which the Ambassador always denied the publication of papers, and interpreting their publications as provocative.

I thought it was no use getting nervous, therefore I tried to control myself and explained my views logically, and said, “Then our opponent is England and that the nest of spies is in Iraq that we should destroy it by armed forces?”

Dr. Sadighi said, “YES”.

I told him to be able to start such an operation there are three prerogatives. First Military power, to be ready in every respect, to undertake such an important responsibility; which is up to the chief of the General Staff to answer,” and while looking at General Riahi, I

asked him if he was ready to accept the responsibility? Which he did not answer!

Second, to carry out such an operation we need money, where is it? We have been busy quite a long time trying unsuccessfully to make the Russians hand over the Bank-Meli's gold. And I know that the government is in a very bad financial state.

Third, "The political aspect of the case, which concerns me. I have to draw your attention to the geographical situation of the country. As Russia considers Iran a buffer state, so do the western powers (the last proved that Iran could be a stepping-stop to, as it was called, a bridge), and it has been heard that, or was considered also as Mediterranean or African, and more particularly as an oil defense outpost. Apart from that, if an Iranian Soldier put his foot on the other side of the frontier, we shall no doubt meet heavy resistance and attack from the British Air Force, stationed in Iraq, plus the bitter animosity of Noory Saiid under the pretext that their oil interest was in danger, and that we will be looked upon as aggressors. Yet, as soon as a British soldier puts his foot this side of the frontier, Russia, pretending that his outpost is in danger, relying on the 1921 Agreement, will enter Iran, in which eventually a second Korea will be produced. What a strange policy!"

General Riahi took note of what I said, but my reasoning angered Dr. Sadighi, while lifting his arms, he said, "Mr. Meftah, we have to prepare some Psychological Food for the people!"

That incredible statement made me more uncomfortable, and I thought," will it be the Psychological Food of a hot bullet which the poor people are going to receive?"

I got up and left the meeting with a very worried mind.

It was late afternoon; the hot weather of July and my empty stomach combined with the worry state that the meeting caused, I could picture a most devastating condition for the country. A condition far more ruinous than that of Korea! I could not remember how I drove 17 Kilometers home safely, my mind torn with anxiety. I lived up in Darband (a hill station north of Tehran). All the way home I thought that, before the dangerous policy comes into practice, I had better resign and leave the country with my wife and children; and now that the Minister was not in Tehran, people look upon me as responsible for Foreign Relations or Policy, (a policy which was always kept secret from the Foreign Office), I had better leave the government so that, I will not be associated with such strange, unbelievable decision. In this worried mood, I arrived home about 3 P.M. My wife saw me back earlier than usual, (I generally took lunch in town so that I could continue my work in my office till about

9 P.M.), in a very angry and nervous state, felt surprised. She asked, "If I had lunched and what had happened that I was back home earlier than usual"? She was so disturbed that she did not gave chance for an answer, and continued asking me what had happened, had I been quarreling again with somebody? Had I resigned or was I dismissed? She finally asked, "Why you do not answer?" I replied "you do not give me a chance to speak." I have not yet resigned, neither been dismissed, nor had lunch. I am much tiered and would like to have a rest, after which, I shall think, what is best to do." She went to prepare some food, while murmuring, "I have not resigned yet, after which I shall think what is best to do!" In the mean time I undressed and stretched out myself on the bed, deep in the most frightening thoughts.

It was not long before she returned with a tray of some light food. Leaving the tray on the table, she asked what I meant by, not yet resigned and shall think what is best to do. I told her not to worry. Nothing had happened, but that is due to hot weather and too much work, I felt tired. I shall now take a cold shower, and then I will feel better.

She left the room, while I was eating, and struggling with my mental torture. I rested for an hour, and then took a shower. I was still under the shower when the telephone rang. My wife took the call. It was Dr. Mossadegh's private secretary asking me to meet Prime Minister immediately.

I left in a hurry, thinking of all sorts of things on the way: Were we going to have a quarrel? Was he going to ask me to leave my job? In that case, I should be very thankful and should prepare myself to leave the country. Anyhow in this wondering state, I reached Mossadegh's house and was shown to his room. In exchanging greetings, I felt that the atmosphere was not as tense as I had thought. He asked me to sit down and said, "did you go to the commissioning the Interior Ministry this morning, that I had asked you to join?"

I said, "Yes I did".

Well what happened (khob cheh shod?).

I did not like the phrase "cheh shod."

After a short pause, looking strangely at him, I pulled myself together and said, "Did not yet the chief of the General Staff has reported the proceedings of the commission?" Dr. Mossadegh after staring at me for a few seconds, said, "Yes. I liked your argument and agree with you."

Well I can not describe how happy and comforted I felt. The two phrases soothed my nerves better than any sedatives.



Dr. Mossadegh felt that his answer gave me a pleasant feeling and said, “I just wanted to tell you I like your argument and that it was a correct opinion.”

I left Dr. Mossadegh as happy as a man who comes out of victorious, struggle or competition. I felt very proud of being able to save my country from a definite catastrophe.

Strangely enough, in that moment I remembered a consoling phrase of the Soheilli, who told me, after my return from Quetta as the result of the devastating earthquake of 1935, that, “Meftah, you, with your patriotic feeling, have been saved by God for our country, to fulfill some important duties which that, will be the best reward.”

Was this the important duty that I was saved to fulfill? If so, I have to be very proud and thankful to the Almighty.





## **LAVRENTIEV REPLACED SADTCHIKOF**



*Sadchikof & Mossadegh*

The days of July 1953 advanced fast with a new unnerving event every day, which forced me to take sleeping pills before going to bed, to be able to work next day.

On the same day of commission, I received a telegram from Arasteh, our Ambassador in Moscow, saying that he was called to the Russian Foreign Department and presented with a note-verbal regarding the settlement of frontier differences between the two countries.

Receiving that telegram just before the arrival of the new Russian Ambassador, Lavrentiev, made me somehow thoughtful, because, I thought the new Russian Ambassador must be coming with particular instructions regarding the frontier dispute. Otherwise, they could wait till He reached Tehran. On the other hand, I remembered the opinion of some certain Diplomats in Tehran, who were previously serving in Balkan countries and were aware of Lavrentiev's activities there, that I should be aware of Him, due to the fact, that He was known as being a revolution instigator!

I personally regretted the departure of Sadtchikof because on several occasions I had discussed the necessity of having a friendly relationship between our two countries, and I had felt that He paid attention to my sincere suggestions. I hoped that through Him we could settle many of our problems amicably, as we did the question of the Northern Fisheries; which Fatemi was very much pessimistic

about it, and one day, opposing my opinion, Fatemi said, "Mr. Meftah, we can not fight in two fronts." Still I put down my opinion on paper and proposed it to Dr. Mossadegh. It was accepted and put into practice without creating the second front.

Having been informed of Lavrentiev's character, the 29<sup>th</sup> June, when Sadtchikof came to say far well, was a very sad day for me, because, I was worried about His successor's behavior. I thought perhaps the Russians, taking the uneasy conditions of Iran, combined with deep differences between members of the National Front, into account, have find it the best occasion to renew the mischief that they had successfully practiced in the Balkans. So Lavrentiev, the champion of that kind of a devilish game, was dispatched to Tehran to watch the situation and in case a revolution broke out to turn it to the favor of the Russian Policy with the tacit help of Toudeh Party. Of course nobody could be better than Lavrentiev, with his success in creating revolutions in Balkan countries.

Delay to answer Moscow's telegram angered Fatemi, who was at the time in Europe for medical treatment. He, by telegram urged that, in a warm reply, the Russian proposal should be accepted, because, according to Fatemi, delay in reply would give a chance to Britain to sabotage it. Finally, a warm reply was sent to Moscow with a proposal that a mixed commission should study the differences in Tehran. On the 9<sup>th</sup> Of Amordad, 31<sup>st</sup> July 1953, a reply telegram received from Moscow saying, that, our proposal was accepted by the Russians, and that the new Ambassador was furnished with the necessary instructions, which would be worked out after His arrival.

During the exchange of telegrams between Tehran and Moscow, the 30<sup>th</sup> Tir procession took place, which encouraged the Russians, and perhaps the same event caused the dispatch of a warm answer to Moscow. Definitely Lavrentiev must have taken it as a good amen!

The government glorified that date by allowing a big march-past by different Political Parties in-front of Bakhtar-e-Emrooz Paper.

To avoid clashes between parties, it was arranged that the National Front should march in the morning and the Toudeh Party in the after noon. In the morning march the government expected a minimum of 12.000 people of the National Front sympathizers, but I saw myself, that they hardly could reach 1.000. I remember one of the Ministers asking my opinion about the number of the people marched. The way He asked made me feel that He expected an exaggeration! To please Him, I said, "About tow or three thousand." He got very uncomfortable, and said, "Mr. Meftah, there should be 12.000 people." I replied, "That is my estimation." The Minister did not take into consideration the capacity of the Parliament Square

with its big central garden, the space required for 12.000 people could not be available! The funny part was that, 800 or 1.000 people whom I saw were mostly soldiers dressed in civilian attire, and shouting slogans.

But in the afternoon, when it was the time for the Toudeh Party to march, according to the police report, a well-organized march of 30.000 was arranged. The Toudeh march frightened the people and worried the government.

Next day in the waiting room of Mossadegh's house, I spoke with the chief of police about the 30<sup>th</sup> Tir march. He openly admitted that it was a mistake to break the march in two, because if the parties could have come one after the other, nobody would have noticed the strength of Tooth's partisans.

There was no doubt that Lavrentiev took that show of strength as a welcome amen for himself!

Lavrentiev came to the Foreign Ministry on the 5<sup>th</sup> of Amordad, 27<sup>th</sup> July, at 12.30, to hand over the copy of his letters of credential, and informed me that a gentleman named Oelov, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, with an assistant named Vorolin with the rank of First Secretary would shortly arrive to join the commission.

Lavrentiev presented his letters to the Shah on the 10<sup>th</sup> Amordad, 1<sup>st</sup> August 1953, at Saad Abad Palace, and on the same day the two above said gentlemen arrived, and on the very same day, Foad Rohani, legal adviser to the Oil Company, left for Geneva, where he could not find the person he wanted to meet!



## **REFERENDUM**



*Mossadegh taking his case to people in-front of Parliament*

Strange things, comings and goings, took place one after the other. One of the strange things was the famous referendum by which Dr. Mossadegh, after denouncing the 8 member committee's resolution, permitted him self to refer his wishes to the people rather than the Parliament!

It was on 30<sup>th</sup> Amordad, 3<sup>rd</sup> August, that Dr. Mossadegh's private secretary informed me by telephone, that I should not forget to be present at he Cabinet meeting, the same evening. I thought some thing about the Foreign Ministry would be discussed. When the meeting started I saw that the question of referendum was getting into discussion, and the idea was to empower the Cabinet Resolution to allow the government to organize a referendum. Already the necessary decree was prepared, but to give it a touch of formality the discussion started. I saw myself trapped in a question regarding its legality.

I made an excuse, left the room and did not return. Next day a member of Prime Minister's office came to me with the referendum's file, saying that I had forgotten to sign the meeting's resolution regarding the referendum, so he brought it to me to sign. I refused to sign, under the pretext that generally the Under Secretaries do not sign Cabinet meeting resolutions. He gave several practical examples which did not satisfy me. He argued that, in the absence of the Minister, I was Acting Minister, and therefore I could sign. Perhaps I

could, but some thing legal. It should be remembered it was the National Front who introduced the practice of referendum.

Bagher Kazami, who was at the same time Minister of Finance as well as deputy Prime Minister, saw the situation is reaching to a critical stage, so profiting from the absence of Fatemi, his personal enemy, Kazemi left Tehran as Ambassador to France. The absence of Fatemi with the help of Dr. Kaviani induced Dr. Shaygan to take his place, and have an advantage to replace me as well! In the mean time Abol-Ghasem Panahi, who had come back from India, two days before, came to see me with a verbal proposal from Middleton, who was at the time in New Delhi, about the oil dispute. I asked Panahi, why the proposal was not written down, because it is possible that Dr. Mossadegh may not believe it! Panahi replied, that He had asked Middleton to put His proposal in writing, but Middleton had refused, adding that Dr. Mossadegh had used all His proposals as propaganda for himself, without giving them serious attention, and He was sure that Mossadegh will do the same with this one as well! Middleton had said, that He was prepared to put his proposal in writing, if He could be sure that Dr. Mossadegh would take it seriously.

I immediately left for Mossadegh's house and related to Him what I had heard from Panahi. Two days latter I received a private and confidential letter from the Late Mohsen Medhat, our Charge d Affairs in Karachi, containing a copy of an English proposal, which was sent to Dr. Mossadegh, first through the Swedish Embassy in London, then through Mirza Esmail Entezam, on 8<sup>th</sup>. Amordad=30<sup>th</sup>. July 1953, which received no acknowledgment, that caused surprise among those who were informed of the proposal!

Anyhow, I took the proposal to Dr. Mossadegh and expressed the opinion that, to me, the proposal was worth study. He took the proposal and without uttering a word threw it on his bed. From the expression on his face, I learned that HE was already in possession of the proposal!

The important parts of the proposal were;

First: Consecration of a board of management consisting of members nominated by the government. It should consist of nine members, six Iranians and three foreigners, who might be businessmen or financial experts, men such as Dr. Schacht.

Second: A general manager, appointed by the government on the recommendation of the Board, would be in executive work.

Third: The Board would discuss with the Anglo-Iranian Company how the Company's claim for compensation could be met. One suggestion would be that the company might accept the position of

sole selling agent for the sale of oil abroad, and it would treat the commission it received as meeting its claim for compensation for the unexpired period of the concession.

These were the outstanding points of the proposal as far as I remember. We had to recognize the fact, as Mirza Ismail wrote, that: it WAS IMPOSIBLE for Iran to market its oil abroad. We had neither the organization nor the tankers necessary for such an undertaking. There was no doubt that Dr. Mossadegh received that proposal, but why he did not take it seriously was a question which should be studied.

Did he feel himself in a sort of embarrassment toward Henderson? Or because of the desperate financial situation, did he feel that the life of the government was very short? Or was he afraid of his hundred per cent anti-British National Front friends?


One thing was absolutely obvious to me, that no Iranian government would in future receive such a proposal again. As they did not!

Possibly Dr. Mossadegh was eager 'to play with America and England to the point of attracting the attention and sympathy of the U.S.S.R., so that he could recover the Bank Melli's gold, accumulated in Moscow since the war, in order that he may ameliorate or improve the financial condition of the country as well as to obtain some money for further propaganda. This supposition would seem to be confirmed by the telegrams sent to Moscow.

Definitely Moscow was not ready to take any step without conditions. To have Dr. Azar in the Cabinet was not sufficient. Probably Russia was counting on Lavrentiev, because with his presence in Tehran, Toudeh Party's activity doubled and the hope of establishing a Toudeh government was encouraged.

In Tehran everybody thought Mossadegh was trying to please the Russians so that he could obtain their assistance. This belief, not only increased the anxiety of the people, it also increased the worry of Americans. That could easily be felt from Eisenhower's speech in the Council of U.S.A. Governors. HE openly said, that Dr. Mossadegh, to get rid of Parliament, called for the Communist Party's assistance which is dangerous for America, due to the fact, that if the free world loses that part of the world, how can she keep the rich Indonesian Empire?(1)

(1)- Eisenhower speech on 1<sup>st</sup>. of August 1953



*Mossadegh in Working Bed*

**Yet all these expressions had no effect on the government of Iran! Mossadegh or the National Front, playing on several tables, had weakened everybody's confidence with the result that the field had become open for the Tudeh Party, to the pleasure of Russia!**

**Fatemi returned hastily from Europe to direct himself to chair of the Commission on differences with Russia. HE arrived on the 10<sup>th</sup> Of August, and the Iran-Soviet Commission, started on 15<sup>th</sup> August. The Iranian side was presented by Fatemi & I, and the Russian side by Lavrentiev, Orlov & Varolin.**

**The first meeting's discussion went on, to draw up the agenda of the work; Lavrentiev, relying on Moscow's contact with our Embassy there, said, that the agenda should start with the frontier differences first and financial affair subsequently. Fatemi said, that the agenda should be drawn up according to the declaration in which had been cleared that anyway chosen by the Iranian government was acceptable to the Soviet government; therefore, we put the financial question first, and the frontier differences second, also the other questions which were not indicated in the declaration.**

**Fatemi's intention was to start with the Bank Melli's gold deposited in Russian bank. Lavrentiev's opinion was that, the Bank Melli's gold was a question which concerned the two banks and was out side of the frontier or any other differences. Anyhow, the first meeting closed without reaching any decision that how the agenda should be worked out. The next meeting took place on the 26<sup>th</sup> Of Amordad, 17<sup>th</sup> August 1953, again with no agreement on the agenda!**

**I realized that, on arriving to Tehran, Lavrentiev felt that Mossadegh's position was fast deteriorating. Particularly when he**

saw that the event of 17<sup>th</sup> August had given initiative to Toudeh Party, therefore He was not very anxious to arrive to any serious conclusion!



*National Front Members in good days*





## **BLOOD ROUND THE PEACOCK THRONE**

Amordad of 1332, 23<sup>rd</sup> July, 22<sup>nd</sup> August 1953, like last years Amordad was an unlucky month for Dr. Mossadegh's government. Taking the Toudeh's impressive march past, of 21<sup>st</sup> July into consideration, the National Front sought Toudeh's help, the help which frightened the public, strengthened anti-Mossadegh feelings and increased public disorder.

The Saad Abad Palaces (summer resident of the Shah) guard was reduced, at the same time Mossadegh's house protection heavily strengthened. These actions of the government had controversial interpretations, to leave the protection of the huge park of Saad Abad Palace to small number of weakly armed soldiers, made the Shah suspicious which made him to fly to Ramsar on the Caspian Sea, along with the Queen.

With the arrival of the new Russian Ambassador Anatoly Lavrentiev, the Toudeh Party felt itself stronger. On the opposite side the influence of Broojerdi combined with that of Kashani, speaker of the Parliament, and the desertion of number of the elite members of the National Front, encouraged the opposition.

Now it needed a strong Army Officer to be able to direct and command the pro-Shah's part of the army. General Zahedi, who was in hiding in a village north of Tehran, due to Mossadegh's search for him, was chosen for the task.

Tow Royal Farmans (Decree) were issued, one dismissing Mossadegh, and another, nominating General Zahedi as Prime Minister. The commanding Officer of the Imperial Guard, Colonel Nassiri, was ordered to personally hand over the decrees to both of them. But before he proceeded to deliver the orders, HE arrested three of Mossadegh's advisers, among them, Fatemi was one. But as Nassiri himself was arrested by pro-Mossadegh Officer guarding Mossadegh's house, on delivery of the Shah's Decree, the three advisers were released by the order of General Riyahi, the Chief of the General Staff.

The news of the event reached the Shah in Ramsar. He felt it is needed for him to leave the country. He piloted his private plane from Ramsar straight to Baghdad & then to Rome.

Departure of the Shah gave an occasion to the National Front to augment its anti Shah propaganda. On the other hand, it proved to the public that the National Front was against the Shah and

monarchy, and that Toudeh Party was overcoming the National Front's power.

There was no doubt that the great religious influence of Brojerdi, combined with the public influence of Kashani, enhanced the campaign against pro-Mossadegh and Toudeh Party resulted their downfall.

With the Royal decree dismissing Mossadegh from Premiership and appointing Zahedi in his place, the crises went from bad to worse. In the slogans of Toudeh Party there was no name of Mossadegh anywhere. Instead the slogans read "The Toudeh Republic was victorious". The only slogan of National Front could be seen was hanging from the banisters of the Parliament which read, "We shall take bloody revenge from the enemies of anti-colonialism."

Fatemi, as the result of his detention on the 16<sup>th</sup> August, went into such a rage of revenge that he arranged daily insult of the Shah and the Royal Family in his papers, and also in his speech in front of the Parliament; also HE directed his brother, Saeed Fatemi, to proceed in breaking up and pulling down Reza Shah's statue in the middle of Parliament square.



*Pulling down the Reza Shah's Statue*

The following day when I entered my office in the Ministry, the Director of Information Service, Mr. Kafai, later on Ambassador to Ankara, in a worried haste, came to me saying that the Minister had ordered that His speech of yesterday, in the Parliament square, should be circulated immediately to all our representatives abroad. Having been very busy the day before, like every other day, I had no

time to read the papers, therefore did not know what Fatemi had said. I asked Mr. Kafai, what importance the speech had that it should be circulated in such haste? He explained what the speech contained, strongly insulting the Shah. I asked Mr. Kafai to prepare the minute of the circular and bring it to me. If Fatemi asked again about the circular, he should be informed that the circular is with me for signature. Mr. Kafai brought the minute, having been informed by him about the contents of Fatemi's speech, I took the minute and put it in my safe. Mr. Kafai looked at me strangely without uttering a word. I told him, "Do as I tell you, if He asked for it, tell him, that it is with me."

As soon as Mr. Kafai left my office, he was called by Fatemi and was inquired about the circular. Mr. Kafai had replied that it was with Mr. Meftah for signature and authorizing its circulation.

What was puzzling me all the time working with Fatemi, why he adopted a reserved attitude towards me? Possibly due to my very frank and open talks I had had with him in Hamburg, through which HE came to know that I was not a "Yes Man." Apart from that, once I had a serious talk with Him about the foul language which was used in his paper, Bakhtare Emrooz.

As soon as Mr. Kafai left, my telephone rang, it was our Baghdad Embassy. The counselor of the Embassy was on the phone and said, "The Mr. Aalam, the Ambassador wanted to talk to me. Realizing what HE was going to ask, I replied, "Tell him to contact the Minister."

Aalam had asked Fatemi what HIS duty was towards the Shah who was in Baghdad. Fatemi told him, that HE had no obligation towards a "Shah-on-the-run" (Shah-e-farari).

I did not destroyed Aalam, neither did I have anything to do with Mr. Khajenoori's and others misbehavior, (Khajehnoori without any reason was very angry with me afterwards). These two gentlemen were responsible for their own behavior, because, neither the Shah had abdicated nor any legal authority had deposed him. Apart from that, no instruction was issued from Tehran to our representatives abroad. The behavior of the two gentlemen with those of Bagher Kazemi and Abass Frouhar, should be taken as the result of their ethical weakness or just their blandishing of Dr. Mossadegh.

The events of the three days of 16<sup>th</sup> To 19<sup>th</sup> August, particularly the extraordinary reception given to the Shah by the public upon His return form Rome, which can be taken as a referendum, were fully reported in Iranian as well as foreign news papers of the time. I therefore do not need to go into it again.

From what I saw during those three days in Tehran, I can say that really blood ran round the Peacock Throne.

The beginning of blood running which took place in front of the Foreign Ministry could be, perhaps of interest for record keepers.

On August 19<sup>th</sup> I left my home for office as usual. Approaching the town I felt a strange uneasiness, more than usual among people. Most of the shops were still closed, and those which were open, had their shutter half way up, with the proprietors standing in front of the shops. From Pahlavi-Naderi crossroad towards the south, one could see more soldiers, gendarmes and policemen than as previous day. The buildings of the General Staff, Ministry of war, and the streets leading to them were strongly protected by the Army. One could feel that the town was in a nervous state. People passing the two above said Military buildings were watched carefully by the soldiers.

Inside the Foreign Ministry everybody seemed to be worried. I asked one of the office attendants, if there was something unusual? He said, "Yes", "Reports from the south of the town and bazaar indicates that shopkeepers are closing down." I asked if the Minister was present. "Not yet" was the answer. I entered my office and started to work. My private secretary came in and confirmed what the office attendant had said. I asked the chief of press and information to dispatch an on foot reporter to town to inform me by telephone of what was going on in the town. Tehran Bazaar was always the center of political agitation, where the clerical power had great influence.

The on foot reporter after a short while called, informing that a great number of people, about 10.000 had started from the south of Tehran and were advancing towards the north, and at each junction large number of people joined them. The crowd carried the Shah's photos and shouted the slogan, "Javid Shah" (Long Live the King).

At about 9.30, the first sound of bullet shot was heard from Sepah Square. A moment later, the Minister's office attendant, reported that the Minister came but after a short telephone conversation left in haste. The office attendant was yet in my room when on foot reporter called again, this time from Parliament Square, he said the square was swarming with people coming from the south, and that they had set the building of Bakhtare Emrooz news paper on fire. I also received news that, big crowd of people armed with sticks were advancing from different main streets of the town, while using the same slogan, "Javid Shah". I ordered that the gates of the Ministry should be shut, and the police guards should be vigilant. I also asked the Police Head Quarter to send additional police for the protection of the Foreign Ministry building. The officer to whom I spoke said,

**“Your Excellency, we have not got enough police to protect ourselves. You will have to make do with what you already have”!**

**It was about one P.M. when I heard, close to the Ministry, slogans of “Javid Shah”. The majority of the Directors had vanished! Only two of them, and my brother, G. H. Meftah, were with me. We moved to the northern part of the Ministry, where the windows overlooked the street leading to the Officer’s Club and General Staff Head Quarters. The street was barred with two lines of soldiers, with two officers commanding them. A group of people advanced from the East with a young man in front carrying a big photo of the Shah and all were using the same slogan. On nearing the line of soldiers, the officers shouted “Stop”. But no attention was paid to the order. One of the officers’ ordered to shoot. The soldiers at first shot into the air, but the officer shouting with anger and pushing one of the soldiers rifle down, said, I tell you shoot into them”. Suddenly I heard my brother shouting, “Whom to shoot? Are you mad?” The officer either did not hear or did not pay any attention to the protest, but kept on repeating his orders. Shooting started and the young man carrying the photo of the Shah fell. Another one was wounded, with blood running out of his body, he ran to the street on the East of Ministry, and the rest of the group changed their route to go round the Ministry.**

**Yes, the blood started running round the Peacock Thrown. That sight grieved us, my brother & me, and the behavior of the Officer astonished us very much, because, we felt a disobedience and disloyalty in the Army, which surly could lead to what I always dreaded.**

**By this time it was past 2 P.M. My brother and others present insisted that now I should leave. After repeating my instructions to the Police Guards to watch the Ministry carefully, we all left the Ministry. I had to change my route several times, owing to shouting crowds with sticks and stones, and the pro-Shah Air Force in their Lorries shouting, “Javid Shah” blocking the streets. Finally I reached the crossroad of Pahlavi-Naderi. Over the crossroad I saw the street turning west was barred by soldiers and tanks protecting the streets leading to Dr. Mossadegh’s house, and the street leading to the East was packed with swarming advancing crowds armed with sticks and stones carrying huge photos of the Shah.**

**I was nearing Shemiran, where I lived, when I heard the thunders of cannon from the town, which was the sign of the clash between the opposing parties of the Army.**

**I kept myself regularly informed by telephone, of what was going on in the town. The blood shedding and shooting stopped at about**

**8.30 P.M to the Shah's partisans or General Zahedi's victory. The integrity of the country and the Crown had escaped most dangerous moments, through the blood of about 300 people. Which power was stronger, power of Dollar or the spiritual power of Broojerdi? We have experienced in Iran that the power of money was not as strong as the spiritual one!**

**Next day, 20<sup>th</sup> of August, I left earlier than usual for my office. On my way, cars could be seen with lights on or a photo of the Shah stuck on their frond wind shield. I was stopped by two or three persons with big sticks in their hands, who said, "Light on sir." I switched the lights on and continued my way.**

**When I arrived to my office the telephone rang, that was the Ministry's telephone switch board, saying hastily that somebody from the Russian Embassy had telephoned several times, to speak to you. He was on the phone again insisting to talk to me.**

**The man without introducing himself, after assuring that he was indeed speaking to Meftah, hastily said, "I just wanted to inform you that the Ambassador attempted suicide last night, and at present is under the supervision of the Russian Hospital's doctors. His state is not promising." Then he put down the receiver.**

**The news astonished me, to make sure that the call was indeed from the Russian Embassy; I called the Chief of Protocol and told him that I have received news that the Russian Ambassador was ill, and that he should enquire about his health. He phoned back and confirmed the news, that the Ambassador was suffering from a very acute influenza and was not permitted to receive anybody. After an hour I asked the Chief of the Second Department (Eastern Europe Department), who spoke Russian to repeat the inquiry. This inquiry said that the Ambassador's influenza was very serious and that the doctor had ordered that the Ambassador should be moved to Zargandeh, (the summer residence of the Ambassador).**

**Later on I learned that, as Anatoly Lavrentiev considered yesterday's victory of the Shah's partisans, the frustration of his own plan, he attempted suicide. The opinion of the Toudeh Party was that, they were trapped unaware and that if the struggle could be prolonged till next morning initiative would be theirs!**

**In short, this was what I saw, or how I contributed to the liberty, to safe guard independence of my country during the ten months I worked with Mossadegh's government.**

**I have to add, while those ten months were very worrying and unpleasant; to get acquainted with the psychology and manner of thinking of the members of the National Front was indeed interesting.**

**In the National Front, apart from two or three people who had no quality save ambition, and due to that, they worked against each other, which was prejudicial to themselves and to the National Front in particular, the rest were honest and well-learned people, who should really have kept to their university activities, where they belonged & could be successful. They should not have entered into politics, since they had no knowledge of the National or International position of the country and that was why, they could not draw up a plan for necessary social reform, lack of which ruined themselves and brought the country to financial bankruptcy.**

**An interesting thing that should be remembered was that first program or charter published by National Front was in 1962!?**



*People uprising against Mossadegh regime in one of the streets of Tehran*



## **P A R T    I I**

### **ZAHEDI AND I**

The Toudeh Party was defeated. Lavrentiev, although successful in instigating communist revolution in other countries, had been forced, by the success or the victory of public uprising, to attempt suicide.


At about 10 A.M I was busy in my office, when the telephone rang. It was General Zahedi who wanted to tell me that he had established his office in the Officer's Club, and that he would like to see me. I left for the Officer's Club, and on arrival was conducted to Zahedi's office,

Passing through the middle room, I saw Nikpoor with another person waiting to see Zahedi. I entered the room, and after exchange of greetings I asked what he was doing here.

“Who, He asked?”

I said, “I saw Nikpoor and another person waiting to see you.”

He did not pay any attention to my objection to seeing Nikpoor there.



*Zahedi in Tehran Officer's Club*

He asked me to sit down behind the desk opposite to him and said, "We have to write an urgent confidential letter," and said what he wanted to be written and that it should be written by me here in the Club. He ordered a room and a typewriter and other necessities to be put at my disposal. In a short time everything was ready and I started to work



in one of the well-furnished rooms on the north side of the building. I asked that a soldier should guard the entrance of the room so that nobody could disturb me. Because of the hot weather I took off my jacket and rolled up my sleeves, and started typing the letter. My mind was concentrated on preparing the draft of the letter when suddenly I heard somebody behind the door asking the soldier to let him in, and, at the same time, trying to push the door open. Finally, the door half opened and a man speaking in French said, "I am an Egyptian reporter, and would like very much to have a few minutes' talk with you." "You see that I am very busy and cannot see you," I replied. He insisted on having an interview. Knowing the character of reporters, I thought, perhaps it would take less time in giving him the interview than in trying to get rid of him. I asked the soldier to let him in and lock the door so that nobody could enter. The reporter and his photographer entered the room. I left my typewriter and took my place at a large table in the middle of the room. The photographer, without wasting time, took a few snaps of me, and the reporter introduced himself as "Akhbar-el-Youm." The reporter started questioning me. While all my thoughts were fixed on the letter I was typing, I forced myself at the same time to give him proper answers. The reporter, feeling my uneasiness, he said, "I apologies very much. I have only a few questions to ask and I will ask them all together, and you can give me a collective answer." "Go on, please," I said. As far as I remember, his questions were as follows: "I only want to know what Iran thinks and what she expects? Is it true that Iran is going to join the western Block? Is it true that Iran is going to sacrifice many of her liberties for the sake of money? Is the policy of logic and wisdom going to replace the old one? I said, "Nobody can imagine in what situation the country is at present. Therefore to be able to fight such unusually difficult conditions, we certainly need cold blood, wisdom and logic without hot and nervous feelings." He said he thought what was very necessary for instance was the security.

I told him; that he numbered his questions and now he had to listen to my answers as my time was limited.

He apologized, and, I continued, "Our most important problem is not security, because the people were really fed up with the last regime. Business was at a standstill and the shopkeepers lost their trade. Today these people themselves, to be able to carry on their businesses, will contribute to the security of the country and if you stay in Tehran you will see for yourself how the people will calm

down and peace will prevail. The people know very well that if tranquility does not prevail, the economic condition will not revive and today it is the economic condition which attracts more attention. We certainly wait for friendly countries to come to our assistance because they know that stability in Iran's economical and political condition contributes greatly TO the stability of the Middle East. (1)" we have thousands of other problems to solve and have no time for these questions."

He asked me if we were going to renew our diplomatic relations with Britain. "Sure" I said, "sooner or later we shall re-establish our relations. We have nothing against Britain and particularly against the people of that country. The reporter interrupted me and said, "Is your policy going to change its course from left to right?"



Zahedi and Author, A. H. Meftah

“I do not exactly understand what you mean by Your Policy“. Excuse me, I mean the Iran government's policy," he said. "Still I do not see what you mean, because I was in the last government, and I am now in this government, in neither of them did I feel anything of the left or of the right. To prevent him putting anymore questions, I told the reporter that this government was not there to counteract the movement that started two years ago, but to continue it. We only wished that they would realize that Iran has changed and that the contemporary Iran is not the old Persia, and that the people of this country are now aware of their rights.

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(1)- The financial condition of the country WAS so badly shattered that immediately upon the fall of Dr. Mossadegh, Churchill was ready to give monetary assistance to Iran, even before the renewal of diplomatic relations, but I could not understand why he did not. Was it because the complex of our statesmen or Americans who were interested in Iranian oil affairs prevented Churchill from giving monetary help? That in my opinion needs careful inquiry.

If these questions be taken into consideration by the people of Great Britain all the difficulties between us can easily be eliminated

I got up. He asked me to reply to his last question and promised to leave after that.

He said, he gathered from my talk that the Iranian government was not entering into any blocks. I said, "There was no talk about entering into any block, I can only tell you we shall not submit to anything that is not in our National Interest."

Then, I went towards the door and bade him "Bon voyage".

The time was getting 12 noon when I finished the letter and took it to General Zahedi. I told him the reason for the delay. General Zahedi wanted to know what had passed between the reporter and me. Therefore, I explained every thing to him in detail. He was very pleased and endorsed my reply to the Reporter.

Zahedi was alone when I took the letter to him. He asked me to stay for lunch so that He could discuss certain points with me.

Conversation started with the formation of the Cabinet. He asked me to take charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I replied, that I have never run away from work, and, he should not have any doubt about me willing to work with him. I added, "It would certainly give me a great pleasure to be able to do something at this stage, but, in my opinion, the present situation indicates that a person such as Nasrolah Entezam should head the Foreign Ministry."

Zahedi said that Entezam is not yet in Tehran, so you have better carry on till later.

For me, I was thinking of obtaining a post abroad with the help of Panahi, because the ten months working in Dr. Mossadegh's government had been enough to shatter my nerves, particularly when I could see from close at hand the devastating dangers threatening the existence of the country. Apart from that, I was not sure that the oil question would end favorably. I thought if the Americans took over the oil it was not certain that we should get better conditions, particularly when Henderson was fully aware of our deteriorating financial circumstances and of America's desire to increase her influence in the Middle East. No occasion could be better than this. (1) But Panahi insisted that I should stay. I was aware of Panahi's insistence.

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(1) The oil production in Iran reached nearly zero. A country which produced in 1947 424,000 barrels daily, at the beginning of Zahedi's cabinet produced, with difficulty 55,000 barrels daily. The stopping of Iranian oil increased Saudi Arabia's oil from 246,000 to 952,000 barrels daily, and Kuwait's oil from 45,000 to 52,000 barrels daily.

That meant that the Iranian oil market was taken by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait  
(2) Ghaitarrieh is a village north of Tehran, and was the hiding place of Zahedi



*General Zahedi's First Cabinet. A.H. Mefteh is first on the second row*

**There were a few people who were anxious to enter Zahedi's to forget them. There was no doubt that in friendship and chivalry, of Zahedi was incomparable. We were of the opinion that those people could be rewarded by money or an appointment outside the cabinet. Cabinet, which we, Panahi and I, did not considered worthy. Zahedi reasoned that these persons had been running up and down the hill of Ghaiterrieh with him for months, therefore it was not easy for him to agree hundred per cent.**



## **MY FIRST CRITIC IN ZAHEDI'S CABINET**

The Shah returned to Tehran after three days' absence from Iran, and the way he was received by the people could be taken only as an answer to Dr. Mossadegh's referendum. And as that Historical event was published in detail in the papers of Iran, I refrain from repeating it here.

Zahedi wanted to be fully independent in constituting his Cabinet, so that he could work with people in whom he had confidence. But the interference, or the influence, of the Shah forced him, contrary to his will, to take one or two undesirable characters into his cabinet.

Anyhow, the cabinet was presented <sup>to the</sup> Shah on the 23rd August 1953 at the Saad Abad Palace as follows:

Prime Minister	General F. Zahedi
Minister of Finance	Dr. A. Amini
Minister of Justice	Jamal Akhavi
Minister of Roads	Ing. Meykadeh
Minister of War	General Vossoogh
Minister of Agriculture	Ing. Ahmad Hossein Adl
Minister of Health	Dr. Jahanshah Saleh
Minister of State	A. G. Panahi
Minister of State	Dr. Ali Asghar Hekmat
Minister of Interior	Brig. Jahanbani
Minister of P.T.T.	Brig. Farzanegan
Acting Minister of F.A.	A.H. Meftah

When the introduction was over, the Shah addressed the Cabinet, as follows:

*“You have to bear in mind that the people have shed blood to get rid of Mossadegh and bring this government into power. Do not behave in a way that will make the people consider their blood was wasted”*

Of course, it was very wise advice, but unfortunately, as mentioned above, two of the cabinet ministers were not ready to grasp the gravity of the situation, and therefore did not respect the Shah's advice. They were, perhaps, thinking that they now had an

opportunity to compensate themselves for the losses they had sustained during the past years.

To my opinion, to establish the Cabinet meetings at the Officer's Club was not appropriate, and I told Zahedi so. I prepared him to transfer his office to the upper floor of the Foreign Ministry, as well as the Cabinet meetings, or to the White Palace. He preferred the Foreign Ministry and the big commission room was used for Cabinet meetings.

Every day at 6 p.m. the meeting of the Cabinet took place and lasted usually till midnight.

Zahedi established his office in one of the rooms of the Minister's private apartments and worked there.

It was on the second or third day after the Cabinet's introduction to the Shah, I was driving home with my late brother, G.H. Meftah, the time was nearing two o'clock, news time, and my brother put on the radio. The first news, among the home news, was the appointment of a certain person as acting governor-general of Isfahan, which shocked both of us, particularly my brother who knew the man better than I did.

Apart from being a well-known corrupt official, he had been in Isfahan before, and had been strongly disliked by the people there. The news angered me and reminded me of what the Shah had said at the introduction of the Cabinet. I decided to criticize the appointment at the Cabinet meeting.

It was nearing 6 PM when my office attendant informed me that the Ministers were all in the commission hall. I joined them and after a few minutes Zahedi arrived. Zahedi was in a khaki military shirt. He took a seat in the middle of the table facing north and drew out his small revolver and placed it on the table. The Ministers sat down at the table, and I sat facing south, next to Engineer Meykadeh. As Zahedi was about to declare the meeting open, I asked permission to talk before the official opening of the meeting, and it was accorded. I related what I had heard by radio and expressed the opinion that after what H.M. the Shah had said at the introduction of the Cabinet, it was astonishing that the first appointment made by the Ministry of the Interior should be a man with an unpleasant reputation for an important province like Isfahan! My words were not yet finished, when the Acting Minister of the Interior, and Dovlatabadi (nobody knew why he was always at the meetings), who acted as secretary of the meetings, raised their voices against me and tried to prove that he was a very active and clever man. I said that, I had no doubt that the man was a very clever and active one, for himself, but my objection was to his unpleasant reputation,

and that he was a corrupt person, and therefore not at all appropriate for such a post, and insisted that the appointment should be revised. Dr. Amini and Dr. Djahanshah Saleh spoke in support of my view, which caused a wrangle at the meeting. Zahedi saw that the question was causing a dispute among the members of the Cabinet. He raised his hands and said, "Gentlemen, we need not quarrel over a person who was not approved by other members. It would be better that another person be chosen."



*Dr. Ali Amini*



*Dr. Jahanshah Saleh*

After Zahedi's verdict the quarrel stopped, and the meeting officially started to work. That was my first criticism which created among the members of the Cabinet, apart from two or three, a high prestige for me. Meykadeh named me 'the Lion of the meetings'. Yes, I was named 'the Lion of the meetings', not knowing that the Acting Minister of Interior was busy putting together a file of accusations against me. A dirty practice which, unfortunately, has a long precedence in my country!



## **RENEWING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS**

### **WHITH ENGLAND**

Zahedi established his office on the third floor of the Foreign Ministry and the meetings of The Cabinet took place there as well. In the morning of one of the first days He called my by phone to his office, and asked about Iran-Britain relations. I gave him a short report of how our relations stood, and added that, in principle, I was against diplomatic rupture, and if I could have reached Tehran one week earlier, I sure would have stopped it. Therefore in my opinion the relations should be established. Zahedi smiled and said, “I thought you had no sympathy for the British. How is it that you were against the diplomatic rupture, and now you believe that we should renew our relations?”

I replied, “As was said by us, each civil service case has a different files; and now we are faced with two different cases. The oil case and the Iran and Britain case! The oil case is purely an economic one. As I told Fatemi too, no country breaks her diplomatic relations due to economic differences. Apart from that, at present the Swiss Legations looking after British interests in Iran is headed by a very inefficient person, so we can not await positive action from him. In addition, I am not quite sure how much the American mediation was appreciated or trusted by Britain. We cam only read between the lines of the British Press, that England considers America even an obstacle. This is why I am of opinion that, for the sake of solving our present difficulties, in particular the lack of funds, we should renew our diplomatic relations. I hope that now Britain has been admonished as much to realize the necessity of changing her policy.”

But, regarding my lack of sympathy for Britain, I admit it was so because they always like to work with a “Yes Men”, but I always directly or indirectly made them understand that if they like to have a friend, I can be one, but not carrying orders and be a, Yes Man.”

“It is our duty to be friendly with everybody on condition that our friendship is reciprocated.”

“Apart from what I said, the present situation and that of England in the Near East, is like two unfriendly neighboring



farmers, who are under the threat of flood and have to take shovels and timbers to collaborate to divers the flood.”

Zahedi consulted other people outside the Foreign Ministry, who fortunately endorsed my opinion. That was the reason that the wish of the British government to re-establish diplomatic relations was accepted, and the British Charge des Affairs, Mr. Denis Wright, arrived to Tehran on the 19<sup>th</sup>. December 1953. Four days later, he presented himself to the Foreign Ministry. The appointment of this gentleman who had never been posted to the East, and therefore did not belong to the old Levant Service, was considered a good sign of change in British policy towards Iran.

We were still passing the first days of Zahedi’s government, with the country being in a desperate financial situation, with the only funds keeping the government running was the monthly five million Dollars, which was paid by America, which barely covered the civil service pay check.

Dr. Amini was instructed to present to the Cabinet a report on the financial condition of the country. To prepare such a report was not so difficult, due to the fact that there was no money in sight, about which to prepare his report! Therefore it did not take long for Dr. Amini to present his report. While he was reading his report at one of the Cabinet meetings, and reached the point that even the civil servant’s pension reserves and people’s deposits in the Bank Melli were all used, Zahedi suddenly raised his voice saying, “Gentlemen, please keep this to yourselves, do not repeat it to anybody, because if the present situation of the Bank were divulged, the Bank would have to close its doors.”

That was the harsh reality of the financial bankruptcy of the country. While the American Monetary help weakened Iran’s position vis-à-vis America, it also encouraged the Eastern European press to bitterly attack Iran’s regime and Zahedi’s government in particular. Surprisingly the Polish press, a country thousands of kilometers away from Iran, with a favorable commercial relation with our country, attacked us more than the other behind the curtain countries did! The paper *EXPRISE VITCHORNEY* treated the Iranian question and America’s help, and Zahedi in particular, in a most insulting way advocated that American capitalists aim to profit from Iran’s situation, and as England was observing the crisis anxiously one should expect a conflict between England and America in the Atlantic Pact.

**This sort of triviality could be read practically every day in Polish papers. Till one day I felt myself obliged to call the Polish Charge des Affairs to the Ministry and dressed him down vigorously against the behavior of the Polish papers. I told him, "Our countries are not neighbors; therefore we do not have frontier or political dispute, so that your government can permit its papers to insult the high personalities of our country. We have very weak commercial relation which is in your country's favor; therefore it was up to you to try to keep our relations as good as possible in order to keep your market in Iran. Where as the way your country is behaving leaves no doubt that Poland is not interested in having friendly relations with Iran. I, therefore, see no reason why we should bear the expenses of keeping our diplomatic mission in Warsaw. I have instructed our Minister in Warsaw to meet your Foreign Minister and protest vehemently against the Polish papers behavior, and if he can not obtain an assurance that the Polish papers will stop their abuse, he is to close down the Legation and leave Warsaw in a week. I asked you to come to see me so that I could inform you of the content of the telegram I dispatched to our Minister. It is natural that I expect you to leave Tehran within a week."**

**The poor Polish Charge des Affairs, who personally was a pleasant quiet man, felt too uneasy and went pale, in a stuttering voice, he said, "You are aware of my esteem and sympathy for Iran. You should not attach any importance to what the papers write." Before He finished his words, I said, "You know very well that your country is a Communist Dictatorial one, where freedom of pen and speech does not exist, and the papers write what they are told to write. You personally may be interested in conserving good relations between the two countries, but your papers show that your government does not respect your sympathy. Anyhow, I just wanted to inform you my government's decision and the instruction cabled to our representative in Warsaw." Then I got up, as a sign of termination of his visit.**

**For the worried condition in which He left my room I really pitied him. Next day, early morning, he telephoned and asked to see me immediately. He was asked to meet me at 12 noon. He came with a smiling face, and said, "I have been in direct telegraphic contact with my Ministry the entire last night, explaining to them the merits of your protest. They said, Iranian Minister has been to the Ministry and has informed**

them of your government's decision. I am glad to say that HE received assurances that the Polish papers will not write anything against Iran in future, and they have expressed their regret, that the Polish papers have angered the Iranian government. I am also instructed to repeat the assurances given to your representative and express my government's regret."

I appreciated his quick action and told him that new instructions would be sent to our Legation after receiving their full report.

After this demarche, the Polish papers stopped their anti-Iran campaign. Also the other behind the curtain countries took note of my reaction. As was practiced in those days, the representatives of the Eastern European countries in a non-communist country informed each other of local events. The news of Iran's action against the Polish papers was known to all of them and caused them to take precautions. On two occasions prior to the Polish case, I had to be rather severe with the two other Communist Embassies, which distributed propagandas papers in Persian, the print of which showed that it was printed outside of Iran. I had to ask Custom officials to open the suspected courier mail of those Embassies.

The Romanian Minister and his staff was fanatic Communists and they engaged in distributing propaganda pamphlets. Just before the uprising of 19<sup>th</sup> August 1953, the police reported that the personnel of Romanian Legation expressed the hope that the site of their Legation (which was a rented property), would be theirs soon!



## **MY LECTURE IN TEHRAN'S STAFF COLLEGE**

The uprising of 1953 and the appointment of General Zahedi brought great changes in all Iranian administrations, particularly in the Army. General Batmanghelich headed the Army Staff and General Hejazi became commanding officer of the Staff College.

My friendship with Hejazi dated back to nearly thirty years, when he was student in Paris and I was Attaché in our Legation in London. We met each other during vacations and got acquainted with one another's way of thinking and patriotic feelings. While in Iran, we met either at receptions or private gatherings. We got to know each other deeper.

After He was appointed Commanding Officer of the Staff College, I accidentally met him one day in the Darband Hotel. We discussed political matters. At that meeting He asked, if I would like to inform the Officers of the Staff College of my Diplomatic experience. I expressed my eagerness to do so. We agreed to prepare a series of Lectures concerning Iran's international relations, to be presented to the Staff College.

I had in mind to give, first, a short introduction on how I came to know my country through my career by traveling abroad, and then to treat the country's relations with each neighboring country and others.

I prepared the text of my first lecture and sent it for General Hejazi's approval. Two weeks later He informed me that the text had been approved by His Majesty, and that the afternoon of the 3<sup>rd</sup>. Bahman 1332, 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1954, was chosen for the lecture,

And he expected me to be there on that date. The lecture was titled **"The Iranians do not know who they are!"** The minister of war, Chief of the General Staff, plus over 200 high-ranking officers and the Staff College students, also some heads of the Dept. of the Foreign Ministry were present.

The lecture took about an hour. I never expected that it would create such strong emotion in the audience. Emotion which was very encouraging and at the same time proved that real Iranian blood ran in officer's veins. The audiences' emotion thought me that if the imposed difficulties and problems are exposed to the public, particularly to the Armed Forces Officers by means of conferences or publications, they

are ready to volunteer to defend and protect the integrity and independence of the country and their ancient traditional symbols, and no harmful diverse propaganda will be able to distract or mislead the people. I am certain that disclosing the past foreign injustice and misbehavior will fortify public patriotic feelings.

The proceedings at my lecture were immediately reported to the Shah by the Chief of the General Staff. Next day General Batmanghelich came to my office, and said, “I am instructed by His Imperial Majesty to come and express H. M.’s satisfaction for your lecture, and to convey, His Majesty’s order that you shall carry on with your lectures.”



General Nader Batmanghelich



General Hejazi

No doubt the Shah’s message encouraged me more than ever, so that I decided to prepare a fortnightly lecture for the Staff College students.

General Hedayat, Minister of War, who was also present at the lecture had to join the Cabinet meeting after my lecture. He had related to the Cabinet meeting how my lecture moved the audience.

The commanding officer of the Military Academy, who was present at the lecture requested me to repeat it for the pupils of the Academy. The director of Tehran Radio wanted to broadcast it. I refused them with the excuse that the lectures

**delivered at the Staff College are confidential, therefore should not be publicized, but as my lecture was published in the form of a pamphlet and distributed among the Officers and Iranian representatives abroad without pointing out its confidentiality, the foreigners were also informed of it.**

**Zahedi expressed willingness that I should join the Public Guidance Committee, which I refused owing to my heavy work in the Ministry.**



## **BALUCHESTAN FRONTIER DISPUTE**

Since 1896, we had an old dispute with England over Baluchistan boundaries. The dispute originated when a certain Capitan Goldsmith, under the pretext of surveying the telegraphic line which went through Mokran and Baluchistan coast to Bushehr, but in reality, he was sent to create discord among the tribal chiefs of the region and between the Khan of Kalat and Iran in particular. His mischievous activities resulted in presentation of a note to the Iranian government accompanied by a map which delineated the Khan's state. The map was called "Kalat's Border". The note and the map were presented to the Iranian government at a time when Goldsmith, with the excuse of protecting the Khan's interest, advanced as far as the small town of PANJGOOR and sent an ultimatum to the effect that if the note and its accompanying map was not accepted by the Iranian government, he would advance even further.

However, the reply to the ultimatum was written in a way which left ground for future claims as it read "... while recognizing our rights over Baluchistan region, to please the British government we accept the note and its accompanying map ...." But the Iranian government refrained from joining a demarcation-line commission for over sixty years.

It would have been better for both England and Iran if Great Britain had helped Iran out of her miseries caused by Turkamanchai Treaty instead of adding to Iran's troubles, particularly after Vienna Congress (1812-1822), in which England must have learned of the eventual intention and policy of Russia regarding the Middle East and Asia. A strong Iran and Great Britain could have pushed Russia out of Central Asia. The situation in Russia between 1880-1907, (due to revolutionary movement and hundred other problems left over by Napoleon invasion), was such that she could not face a major conflict, as she could not with Japan in 1905.

But, regrettably, the atmospheres of the Vienna Congress created such a blinding love of conquest for all of the then major powers, that no ethical behavior or logic could be expected! The result of that disaster, today we observe in Asia & Africa!

I was expecting that the Pakistanis, realizing their own illegal and unnatural creation, would take the past history of the region into consideration and behave in such a way as to attract Iran's sympathy. I was looking forward to see if Pakistan, considered Britain's forced occupation and penetration in Iran during the last 150 years, would propose the revision of the Goldsmith's note, a

revision which should be based on International Moral character and justice.

What followed proved that unfortunately, my expectation from Pakistan was very much wrong!

Soon after the declaration of independence and even before asking Iran for recognition, Pakistan profited from Iran's weakness resulting from the War to send a man named, Sheikh Faiz to Iran's Baluchistan in order to use the raging famine in that district to create disorder, by promising food etc., to gain people's sympathy for Pakistan and their eagerness to join Pakistan!

At the time a strong man, Ghavan-al-Saltaneh was the Prime Minister, but regrettably the Foreign Minister was in the clutches of the old school of political science personnel. Being ardent believers in keeping the status-quos, they were almost acting in a humiliating manner. When an order was received from the Foreign Ministry, being known in the Ministry as an informed person about Afghanistan and Baluchistan, I was asked to join the frontier commission. The chairman of the commission was Pirnazar, the then Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He was an inefficient, feeble character. The commission consisted of three other directors of the Foreign Ministry beside me.



Qavam-al-Saltaneh

One or two meetings of the commission passed under the chairmanship of Pirnazar, during which, my argument based on International Practice, prevented the recognition of Pakistan, which was urged by the department concerned, to halt the activities of Sheikh Feiz in Baluchistan. I reasoned that the anxiety of the government was improper therefore out of place! I proposed that for the next meeting of the commission, representatives of the Ministry



of Interior as well as the General Staff should be present. Before the next meeting of the commission a change took place in the Foreign Ministry. Pirnazar was replaced by Dr. Aligholi Ardalan. In the meantime, a report was received from our Consul-General in Quetta to the effect that Ahmad Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat, was asked to define his inclination, and that He was thinking to tell the authorities that He preferred to rejoin Iran. At the next commission meeting which now Ardalan was the chairman, I proposed that a positive answer should be given to the Khan. Dr. Ardalan strongly opposed my suggestion, arguing that it was contrary to the status-quo, therefore no attention should be paid to the Khan's request. I explained under what duress the present status quo had come to force in Iran, therefore it was not right for us to defend the status-quo. Rather we should base our policy on the "ante-status-quo" which is in our favor. Unfortunately, complexes were so strong in ou



Dr. Aligholi Ardalan

Foreign Ministry that no patriotic policy could play any part!?

Finally it was agreed that our Consul-General in Quetta and General Hejazi, Commanding Officer of the South Eastern Command, should come to Tehran and personally report the situation to the Commission.

After a week or so, the Commission including General Hejazi, Ahmad Ghadimi, Iranian Consul-General in Quetta and two officers from the General Staff met. The only person that Ghadimi met before the gathering of the commission was Dr. Ardalan. He got acquainted with His pro-status-quo opinion. That was why when I questioned Him about the report regarding his meeting with the Khan of Kalat, he mumbled and said, "Yes, I did send a report to that effect, but now the situation has changed". On hearing that, I

felt annoyed, and was obliged to disclose my esoteric and confidential opinion on the necessity for rectification of our South Eastern frontier lines. Considering that opinion is yet a national secret, I prefer not to divulge it for the time being! I then turned to the General Hejazi, and told him that on his return to Baluchistan, HE should inform the Sheikh Feiz, that if he did not leave Baluchistan in 24 hours, General Hejazi would not guarantee his safety, as the people were violently against him!

My opinion caused wrangles, which ended in dissolution of the commission!

After the commission was dissolved and Dr. Ardalan had left the room, the two Staff Officers congratulated me with quite encouraging words, and frankly said, "We, as Staff Officers, never realized the strategic importance of such a change in frontier line. We sincerely congratulate you on your patriotic feelings and knowledge of local strategic points." General Hejazi asked me, if I was serious in what I had said at the meeting regarding Shaikh Feiz? I replied, that I was hundred percent serious, moreover, he could be sure that nothing would happen. I gave him some other interesting tips. Hejazi returned to his command. Shortly after, Sheikh Feiz fled from Baluchistan!

My readers definitely will be surprised to know that about two month latter Hejazi was relived from his post!

The frontier dispute remained unsolved till about five years later when I became Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. To prepare the public opinion, I started a series of articles in the weakly magazine *ETTELAATE HAFTEGI*, under my pen-name, explaining the history of the Baluchistan boundary.

On the 4<sup>th</sup> February 1953, Nassim Hossein, the Pakistan Charge des Affairs, requested to meet me. We met next day at 10 A.M. He asked me if I had seen the article of *ETTELAAT HAFTEGI*. I replied that I have read a resume of the text prepared by the information department.

What I understand from the resume is that the writer was giving a concise history of the Baluchistan Boundary. If you find any mistakes in those articles that requires corrections, please write to the magazine and remind them their mistakes. In case they do not publish your reply, please let me know. I will do my best to see to it that your reply is published. But I am sure that the magazine will publish your letter, since they want to know the truth, as well as me!

Nassim Hossein did not say anything. He left after discussing other matters.

About seven years later, when Dr. Ardalan was Minister of Foreign Affairs, the frontier dispute was settled according to the Goldsmith note!!

The inferiority complexes is one of our problems, possibly, needs a few more generations before the country can get rid of it. During 100 years of capitulation the ruling class had totally lost their Patriotic National character. As much as our writers and poets tried to revive our pride in the nation, they have not yet succeeded. If an Iranian with slightest feeling for the country appeared on the scene, either he would be assassinated, such as, Sani-ed-Dovleh Hedayat, or will be dismissed from his key position. It is regrettable that even now, forty years after Reza Shah abolished the capitulation in 1928; the country is yet directly or indirectly is in the clutches of that generation or their descendants, who dropped their masks, after the forced abdication of Reza Shah, and continued their old practice!

That was why my interview with Denis Wright was shelved and forgotten! My views about Baluchistan border dispute, and plan to reform and reorganize the Ministry, particularly the creation of research department in the Ministry, are all filed away!



## **OIL CONSORTIUM**

Soheili left Tehran for London on 11<sup>th</sup>. March 1954. I did not hear or saw anything from him indicating that he had been perusing the subject of my conversation with Denis Wright in London.

On 31<sup>st</sup> March, I was invited to a luncheon at the British Embassy. After lunch, Denis Wright and I sat on a sofa talking about the Oil Consortium, which was going to be established. Mr. Alaa overheard our conversation and said, "May I sit between you two and hear your conversation, since I am interested on it?" Then He sat between us. Wright was explaining the difficulties existing in controlling the production in which the old company, A.I.O.C., and other members of Consortium wished to participate. I told him, when the board of the Consortium was constituted of Iranians and non-Iranians and a large number of foreign experts and engineers were engaged, there should not be any grounds for anxiety to oblige the members of the Consortium to have additional controls for production. Wright said, "As you respect public opinion here, we are also obliged to respect Britain's public opinion." I said, "No. The British public has no right to interfere in the affairs of a private company which was taking part in a foreign consortium."

During Mossadegh's period and Zahedi's term, the Foreign Ministry had no say in oil nationalization, because it was centralized in the Prime Minister's Office. But I, personally, due to what dishonestly and irregularities had seen of foreign concessionaires in Iran, from such things as oil, banks, telegraphs, etc., was against any kind of foreign concessions.

In a book I published in 1947 about social reforms in Iran, I frankly wrote, "In my opinion to call for foreign concessionaires hinders the economic development of the country and even some times threatens our independence and integrity. Therefore, for a weak country such as Iran to allow economic concessions to foreigners is a foolish and most dangerous affair. Hence, the Constitutional Law of the country should radically prevent any foreign concessions in Iran."

Apart from that, it is now well established that all over ground and underground wealth of the country was, not only, the best backbone of its economy, but was also the support of its interior and exterior policy. So, why should we, do not profit from our recourses ourselves?

When the National Front started, in Parliament, the oil nationalization movement, I saw that the move was backed by Shah,

head of the State, I did not fail to express my feelings in the weekly bulletin I published first in Istanbul and later in Humbug, in the two cities, at the time that I was Consul-General. I am not at all sorry for what I wrote. I am only sorry that the mistake committed by the National Front pushed the country to the brinks of bankruptcy. The mistakes which eventually led to the unpleasant arrangement with the consortium! Still I do not forget the day I asked Dr. Amini, if we were selling oil or giving concessions. I did not receive any answer, though I was not expecting one either! I just wanted to make him understand that keeping the oil question secret from me or from Foreign Ministry, did not prevent us to keep our ears and eyes open!

Even when I was in The Hage, as Ambassador, I received disturbing information which forced me to renew my activity and disclose my anxiety in a letter to Senator Lessany. In reply to my letter, Lessany sent me a copy of his speech in Parliament. He had expressed, that in the entire government there was not even one person who could show a little sympathy for the interest of the country!

I only wished that those who engaged themselves in Iran's Oil Affairs could have had only one percent of the sympathy for Iran that Mr. Elwell Sutton expressed in his book, "PERSIAN OIL."



## **I AND THE RUSSIAN CULTURAL INSTITUTE**

Our differences with the U.S.S.R. remained unsolved and the Commission which was established just before Mossadegh's downfall, for hammering out the differences, suspended its work. But the wounded Lavrentiev did not sit idle with folded arms. Toudeh's activity went underground. The secret police repeatedly verbally complained that members of the Toudeh Party, using the Diplomatic car number 102, went about the town and met in Russian Cultural Institute which was used as the center for their activities. I asked the police to make an explanatory written report. They did, it said that the diplomatic car number 102 belonging to the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, who was in-charge of the cultural affairs of the Embassy, and that Karim Keshavarz, who was sought by the police, were going about in that car with the Second Secretary of the Embassy.

I never wished to make propaganda of my activities or to brag about it. I therefore tried my best that my activities would remain un-publicized. No doubt our rights permitted us to close the Cultural Institute immediately and to expel the Diplomat, a measure which would have been taken by Soviet Russia, if an Iranian Diplomat in Russia had been involved in a similar case.

But I, being acquainted with the complex of Iranian government, thought, if I informed the government of what I intended to do, I would not achieve my plan. Therefore, I thought it better to divide my plan in two parts. To take the responsibility of the first part myself and issue the necessary instructions so that the government would be faced with an accomplished fact. The second part, I thought, it would be better to inform the Minister beforehand of what I intended to do.

Police immediately reported the arrest, and I, to fulfill the second part of my plan, reported the case to Entezam. I told him that I was asking the Counselor of the Embassy to meet me immediately. He approved my suggestion. I called for Mr. Brazanov the counselor to my office and told him the reason why the Iranian government wished to have permanent good neighborly relations with Soviet Russia, particularly the Zahedi government. We certainly expected that this policy of good will would be reciprocal. Most unfortunately, we remarked later that the Russian Cultural Institute with the help of the Embassy was behaving in a manner not only contrary to our policy of good will, yet very harmful to our existing good relations. I

then explained how Karim Keshavarz was seized in an Embassy car and communicated the government's protest to him.

Barzanov, after complaining about the language of Tehran press towards U.S.S.R., said that the car number 102 belongs to Feodorov, Second Secretary of the Embassy, who was in-charge of the Cultural Affairs of the Embassy, and simply wanted to give a lift to the Secretary of the Cultural Institute without knowing that he was sought for by the police! I told him that I took note of what he had said about Feodorov, and that he should leave Iran within a week, because his behavior was an act of interference in the country's affairs, and that for the Ministry it was impossible to accept that the Embassy was not informed of the police search for Keshavarz!

After Barzanov had left my office, Fahimi, director of the 2<sup>nd</sup>. Department, in-charge of the Eastern European Countries, who was present at the meeting, said, "Mr. Meftah, they were not acquainted with this sort of protest from us! This was again the complex of an old class of the College of Political Science of Capitulation time.

I told him, "Mr. Fahimi, you are right, but you have to realize that I am different from those who have been sitting behind this desk. If one of the members of our Embassy in Moscow behaved similarly, what would the Russians do to him? Anyhow, Feodorov left Iran after a very short time.



## **BAGHDAD PACT**

I passed each day of 1954 anxiously expecting new worries for the next day. It was during the second half of October 1953 that I received news that in Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan an activity for creating a collective defense plan was in progress. When I heard that, I remembered an interview that Iraqi Ambassador, Baha-ed-Din Noory had had with me some time back, in which He asked me, "What would be your opinion if one day my government proposed a collective defense treaty between Iraq, Iran and Turkey?"

Referring to Saad Abad Pact, I said, "How would the members be compelled to honor their signatures?"

He said, "of course there should be an article to guaranty that."

I told him, "Mr. Ambassador, I do not know what my government's opinion would be, but what I say is my personal opinion. You as army officer have been, and certainly you understand very well the strategic position of my country. I want to say that you realize that Iran is on the front line with over 2,000 kilometers of non-protected frontiers with Russia, which permits Russia to advance fast into the heart of our country, and would make our so-called allies face an accomplished fact. Therefore, what would be the after effect?"

He said, "Oh do not be so pessimistic."

I replied that it is not a case of being pessimistic or optimistic; I want to tell you that our confidence had once been betrayed.

I had that interview in mind, when a few days before receiving the above news, the Mister of Denmark, who was back from a tour in Pakistan and Iraq, informed me of a Defense Pact which was going to be concluded between Turkey and Pakistan.

This news was cause of a continual anxiety, because it was not clear who was behind this move, England or America, or both? I thought we should create some means of information to keep us alert to what was going on in the world, and particularly around us. Therefore I made a report to Entezam, in which I expressed the opinion that if a pact was concluded between our neighbors, an encirclement of military and political pressure would add to the present economic difficulties; which would make our position yet weaker in our oil struggle. I proposed three points in my report:

(I)- To establish a commission consisting of some experienced Staff Officers and Foreign Ministry officials to carefully study the political and military conditions prevailing in the world, and the Middle East



in particular, and propose a defensive plan to protect the country's interest.

(II)- To nominate a qualified diplomat with patriotic feelings, without complex towards foreigners, to be able to collect information about international activities and complexities in political and military affairs.

(III)- To re-establish our diplomatic relations with England without waiting for oil settlement.

I asked Entezam to inform the Prime Minister of my suggestions, because a delay in our decision would be harmful to our country.

I was aware that the third item of my suggestions would be hard for Zahedi, who had no sympathy for the British, to accept. Numbers of my friends, who have read my opinion about the British government in my book "ARMANE IRAN", were not expecting me to suggest such an opinion. But the difficulty lies there, that these Gentlemen accept that at the time of the flood, two enemy farmers would join hands for the sake of their mutual interests. At the same time I never was of the opinion that it was right to join any pact without conditions, or to pay sixty million Dollars yearly out of the poor people's pocket for a pact, the future of which was dubious!

However, now and then testing balloon was hoist to test the Iranian public opinion, till Jalal Bayar, the President of the Turkish Republic, in the middle of January 1954, left for New York via England. What we learned from his press conference in Washington was in favor of strengthening and completion of the Baghdad Pact, because when He was asked by reporters, "what if Iran dose not join the Pact, a ring in the chain would be missing!" He replied, "We have another pact with Iran named Saad Abad Pact, which will substitute the missing ring!"

Next day, few reporters visited me in my office. They asked of my opinion about Jalal Bayar's declaration, regarding the Saad Abad Pact. My reply was very frank, and without ambiguity. I told them, "Saad Abad Pact was a dead letter for us and therefore does not exist!"

Then they asked my opinion regarding Iran entering in any block. I replied, "It was true that during the last two wars we declared our neutrality, which was not respected with the result that our country was invaded, but we have also seen that countries, which had a system of positive neutrality could keep their neutrality and were as well respected by belligerents. They did not rely on a simple written declaration and International Law. Anyhow to join a block is a question which needs very careful study. Nothing should be done in haste.

## **I FELT MYSELF UNDESIRABLE IN THE** **MINISTRY**

My opinion was taken by Tehran papers as being against entering into any block. My interview and its interpretation by papers displeased the Embassies of the Baghdad Pact group. Especially the Turkish Ambassador was annoyed by my comments about the Saad Abad Pact. But when I had audience with the Shah before leaving for The Hague, His Majesty praised my opinion regarding the Saad Abad Pact, but regarding joining a block, he said, “You should not have spoken so frankly!”

As I have said, I was of opinion that we should try to create a positive neutral condition for our country, so that in case of being obliged to enter into any block, the entry should not be without conditions. I meant we should at least be able to settle our frontier differences with Iraq and Pakistan. I certainly preferred a positive neutral condition to anything else, because under that condition we could develop our position far better and stronger without heavy expenses. Above all, we could renew our old popularity and prestige in the Middle East.

My over-thirty-years in the Foreign Ministry taught me that whatever flattering words one hears from foreigners, especially from Europeans, were only for the purpose of deceiving or misleading us. Therefore, their flattery should not be taken seriously. I also had the experience that the British people have particular sympathy for the Arabs, even if they behave in an unfriendly way towards England! I was so glad when lately I got the confirmation of this opinion from a British Diplomat!

We have an expression in Persian, which says: “We heard of causeless friendship, but never heard of causeless enmity!” Will there be a brave Englishman to tell us frankly the cause of their antipathy towards Iran?

More over, I was sure that our entry into the Baghdad Pact would force Russia to spread her influence in the Middle East, as she did, and by that, encircled the Baghdad Pact. I did not fail, when in The Hague, to inform my Ministry of my anticipations.

What did we gain by joining the Baghdad Pact, Militarily or economically?

I remember what a colleague of mine told me when once He asked Dr. Eghbal, the then Prime Minister, what benefits Iran gained from the Baghdad Pact? His reaction was, “Militarily a burden of 120 million Dollars per year and economically (000) three Zeros?”

**That was why I was not in favor of entering into any block. A better reason was that, we would be strongly handcuffed and therefore we could not have a free hand to develop our prestige and popularity in the Middle East.**

**That was why when in The Hague I heard that Entezam had left Tehran for a short visit to Paris and London, I met him in London, and renewed my statement of dislike for the Baghdad Pact. Entezam told me, “Meftah, I promise to you that I shall not sign the Pact.” He kept his promise, but after Jalal Bayar visited Tehran, he obtained the agreement of the Iranian government to join The Pact. Entezam by pretext of being ill left Tehran to Paris for medical treatment. He closed himself in Hotel St, George, so that the pleasure of signing the Pact would be by Samii, his Under Secretary!**

**A second reason, which made me to adapt that policy of positive neutrality, was that, our delicate geographic and strategic position forced us to have a free hand in preparing the country, morally and materially, to be strong enough to be able to defend its positive neutrality.**

**The moral and material losses Iran suffered during the last war, especially what happened immediately after the war; when Russian Forces refused to evacuate Iran, in violation of the Tehran Declaration of 1943, we are naturally forced to believe that there was no fundamental change in U.S.S.R.’s Iran policy, which was the policy of conquest of Iran, inherited from the Tsarist Regime.**

**When at the time of Nicholas II, they spoke of division of Iran into spheres of influence between Britain and Russia. Nicholas, himself, was of the opinion that “There can be no division but entire Persia must belong to us.”**

**Also, we should not forget that as early as 1918, K.M. Troianovsky, a prominent communist, wrote of the importance of Iran for the World revolution, i.e. for Russia – “And because of its geopolitical position, and due to its significance for liberation of The East, it must be conquered politically first. The precious key to revolutions in The East must be in our hand: at all costs Persia must be ours. Persia must belong to The Revolution.”**

**These words have been written by those who presented, and yet pretend, that they are fighting against Imperialism, and not Communist Imperialism!**

**Therefore no change can be seen between the policy of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union of Russia. And non will be seen in future either! With such characteristics why should we encourage or give them a ground for unjust excuse?**

The so-called big powers will not change their policy regarding Iran, so long as the Iranians are physically and morally weak. Having these in mind, I insisted in my “Armane Iran” no moral and physical development of people through eliminating illiteracy in Iran is possible. When the population are literate they soon get interested in their National Moral, responsibility, through learning their history, getting acquainted with the part their ancestors played in the over all World Civilization.

It was true that the Nuclear weapons and Russo-Chinese differences have greatly reduced the danger we felt from our northern neighbor, and also Russia by now must have realized that aggression and building walls brings nothing but fear and hatred to the people of the world.

By joining the Pact unconditionally we handcuffed ourselves, and accepted the heavy burden of a defense plan which was forced upon us solely for the sake of OIL and the economic advantage of others. At the same time, Russia was encouraged to extend her influence in the countries beyond Iran, so that virtually encircle the Pact, the effect of which could soon be seen by Iraq who left the Pact.

Another point which should not be forgotten when we are united to sign a pact, we should bear in mind the condition of Poland. The independence and integrity of that country was not granted by France and England. Is Poland of today the same pre-war Poland, the integrity of which was guaranties by the said two countries?

Does our Defense Pact provide for Iran enough strong power to defend its frontiers at least for three or four months till our allies clarify their attitude? Or was the Defense Pact so arranged to defend only the oilfields of south of Iran, Persian Gulf and the Middle East?

The answer to these questions had been seen in the English and American press, in which they described the defense line of the Pact as the mountain ranges of Zagros in South of Iran. Now if the existence of oil in Qom, if there were any, has changed the plan, I do not know. My other reason for not being in favor of the Pact can be read in an answer I gave to the Turkish Charge des Affairs question, when at a reception, he asked, “by the way, Mr. Ambassador why were you not in favor of joining the Pact?” I replied, “Did not we have Saad Abad Pact with you? Did you respect your signature? Before I finish my words, he said, “No, we did not even issue a declaration!”

“Well, then, with such an experience, what would be the assurance that the same behavior would not be repeated?”

America is a member of NATO and if any member of that organization becomes a victim of Russia’s attack, America

automatically runs to help the attacked partner, as she has shown in the famous maneuver of the Berlin Big Lift, she was able to come to the assistance of allies in a short time. But our situation vis-à-vis America is quite different. She was not a military member of Cento, and therefore it was not clear what her reaction would be, if Iran becomes victim to an attack from the North?

These were the reasons why I had no sympathy for the Baghdad Pact. And today, after Iraq's withdrawal from the Pact, Pakistan's flirtation with Red China plus unstable situation of Turkey, and above all, the refusal of America to commit herself militarily in Cento Pact, while keeping on helping the Arab countries, one can be dubious about recognizing the defensive value of the Pact.

Yes, it was due to uttering these patriotic feelings, that I felt myself undesirable in the Ministry.

A very weak hope that we preserve, was that, the next war would be so fast, that before it reaches us, it might be over!



## **BUILDING TANKERS IN HOLLAND**

From what had been written till now, one can discover by ease, how my patriotic effort worked against me who increased my troubles. Yet, I did not want to leave my desk in the Foreign Ministry before the settlement of two long-standing questions: the Iran-Pakistan frontier dispute and the Foreign Ministry's reform. But as I felt myself uncomfortable in the Ministry, I thought it would be better for me to leave the Ministry and go to the post which was offered to me few months ago. Therefore with reluctance, I left my desk in Foreign Ministry and flew to The Hague on 20<sup>th</sup> June 1954. I presented my Letters on 23<sup>rd</sup>. to H. M. Juliana at Suzdek Palace.

The Iranian Embassy was in a "Villa Wilzang Wassenaar" near to The Hague, the villa in which I met Dr. Mossadegh for the first time about three years ago. I was fortunate that I had collaborators such as Ashtiany and Ahmad Mir Fenderesky, (the present Ambassador in Algeria and latter on in Moscow, also the late Peyamiras and Nakhai. I was also fortunate to have contact with helpful personalities such as Dr. Lunez, Mr. Bewen and Eshosi in the Dutch Foreign Ministry.

Although on my arrival to Amsterdam airport, the Iranian Flag was hoisted upside down, (the Iranian flag without its emblem can look for the Hungarian one), but I am not superstitious. As a matter of fact, I passed a very pleasant, successful and happy part of my career in The Hague.

Apart from Ministers and personalities that I had to visit, according to the Dutch Protocol, I visited the late Professor Gerbrandy who was the Prime Minister. He was a short but very clever man. On leaving for The Hague, Mr. Mehbod, later on Managing Director of the Iranian Shipping Company, gave me a beautiful Khatam (very small inlaid mosaic work) cigarette case to give to Prof. Gerbrandy. After presenting the gift, I used the opportunity to speak about the possibilities of developing economic relation between the two countries. I told him that one of many questions or problems that interested me from the very beginning of my career was the establishment of a merchant marine for my country. For that reason I had been the cause of the establishment of several commissions in the Foreign Ministry or the War Ministry to find out how this lack of possibility could be solved. I now felt very happy to see that H.M. the Shah has shown great interest concerning this possibility, and that under His guidance this difficult problem was going to be solved. Prof. Gerbrandy told me that the question had been discussed with Mr. Mehbod several times, but it did not pass beyond discussion! I told him that, I, personally am very

interested, and if my help could be of any use, it would give me great pleasure to put it at the disposal of the interested parties. He thanked me and said there was no doubt that they would be in need of my help.

After few days Prof. Gerbrandy flew to Tehran, and on His return, reported to me that everybody in Tehran had been helpful, but the British displeasure, based on Iran's decision to build one or two tankers and profit from the 12 and ½ % of oil products, which according to the agreement with the oil consortium should be put at the disposal of Iran to transport and sell, was obstructive. This news depressed me a lot because; I knew if the British disapproved the construction of tankers for Iran, I would not be successful in that respect in Holland. Dutch yards will participate in building tankers, only when they can be assured that the consortium will supply them with the Iranian share of oil.

At the same time Mehbod was in London seeking the help of Soheili to obtain the agreement of British Petroleum. Mehbod and Soheili could not succeed in their efforts. Mehbod had asked Soheili to contact me by telephone to get my opinion.

It was on 16<sup>th</sup>. August, when I was in my office that Soheili rang and said, "Mr. Meftah, Mr. Mehbod is here insisting that I should obtain the agreement of the British to supply oil for the Iranian tankers from the 12 and ½ %. I did what I could, but I regret to say that I did not succeed in my effort, simply due to their refusal to accept our request."

Upon hearing this, I really felt nervous and told, "Mr. Soheili, you are well aware that I was always seeking an occasion to find a possibility for establishing a merchant marine. Now that the possibility is at hand, the Gentlemen, your friends, are not ready to help us with our own material, in such a simple and meager request? Then, well Mr. Soheili, I will call an international press conference and shall explain the details of our efforts during the last century to develop our country and how we have always been confronted with strong British opposition, which stone walled our efforts."

Soheili was aware of my fearless character. On hearing my words, he said, "Oh, no, no, no! No do not do it. Let me speak to them once more. I will contact them first hours of the morning and will phone you back immediately of the result."

I told him that, this was my decision, that He could inform them of my decision.

Next afternoon, Soheili called and said, "I spoke to the Gentlemen and informed them of your decision. They are prepared to consent, under one condition, and that is, that no flag discrimination from our

side.” I replied, “Mr. Soheili, you know very well that this is purely searching for an excuse. How is it possible for a government or a country to act against its own interest? Flag discrimination, in my opinion, is against our own interest.” Soheili replied, “They gave example of Onassis behavior and said the Iranian government could have likewise.” I told Soheili, “If it is not possible for you to assure them that no flag discrimination will be seen from Iran’s side, please give them this assurance on my behalf, as Ambassador of Iran.”

Next day Soheili called back and informed me that my assurance was conveyed to the B.P. people, and that they had informed the Shell people in The Hague. Mr. Mehbod returned to The Hague, and immediately Mr. Mehbod & I met Mr. Blumengarte who was the managing director of Shell. When we entered his office, he said, “I have been informed of what had passed between you and London.” I replied, “I am here to confirm what has passed between us. I mean flag discrimination, and now, what will be your next step?”

Blumengarten said that now that the assurance had been given, he would make a favorable report to the Board.

Apparently the objection of B.P. was removed, the necessary capital for building tankers should be thought of. To obtain the required capital, Mr. Mehbod had been touring rounds America, Italy and France with no result. On 26<sup>th</sup> July 1955, he came to me and explained his difficulty to obtain credit from the Dutch Export Credit Bank without the consent of the Dutch Finance Ministry. I immediately called the Finance Minister and got an appointment for 12 noon of the same day. I was not optimistic about the Minister’s consent, because I knew that in principle the British were not in favor of our tanker building scheme. Therefore the Dutch would not do anything to displease them, more so, since B.P. and Shell are one and their influence in the Dutch government was great. Considering this complex of the Dutch government, without hope, Mr. Mehbod and I, met the Minister at the appointed time.

I explained the purpose of our visit and said that as the tankers would be built in Holland, the credit would help the Dutch export. On the other hand, as the order of building was given by a financial organization, which was financed by H.M. the Shah, therefore His Majesty was personally interested in the project; there could be no imaginable loss in permitting the Bank to open the required credit.

The minister said, the business was no doubt a very interesting one that calls for study, but if the Bank could have an assurance that the installments of the credit would be paid in time, the consent of the of guaranty of the Finance Ministry was not so necessary. He



therefore asked us to first obtain the confidence of the Bank, because it was the Bank which was the responsible factor.

As I expected, we left the Minister without result. Now the only way left was how to obtain the Bank's confidence? To obtain the Bank's confidence, I had to assure them that the credit would be refunded according to the signed contract. Fortunately, in that respect, I was successful, and it was arranged that Mr. Postuma, the Managing Director of the Bank should take a trip to Tehran. On the 13<sup>th</sup> August, Mr. Postuma visited me to inform that He had decided to grant the necessary credit without the guaranty of their Finance Ministry, and that He would leave for Tehran on the 17<sup>th</sup> August. I certainly over came with joy and prayed that He would not come back from Tehran disappointed.

Mr. Postum returned from Tehran with satisfaction. Mr. Mehbod also came from Tehran and on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October 1955, the agreement between the Bank and Mr. Mehbod, who was Managing Director of the National Iranian Shipping Company, was signed.

To celebrate the victory, I arranged a dinner party at the Embassy, at which more than thirty people were present, among them, the late Prof. Gerbrandy, directors of the Bank and Verolme United Shipyard of Rotterdam. We all drank to the health of the Shah.

Next day the event was telegraphed to the Prime Minister, the late Hossein Alaa. After few days a reply was received from him, the translation of which has come in the preface of the book at hand.

Mr. Mehbod left for Tehran and the Verolme Shipyard started the construction of the new yard at Rosenborg, Rotterdam, big enough to be able to construct a tanker of 30.000 tons.

In early 1956, Mr. Mehbod returned to The Hague with eight young men who had to go into training as ship's mechanics and sailors. The boys were entrusted to Verolme Shipyard for training and two instructors were put in-charge of their training. To prevent the boys from feeling homesick, a monthly Persian Lunch was arranged for them and their instructors in the Embassy. At the beginning, the training was difficult for them, but my personal interest in their training and encouragement that they received from me helped them to overcome the difficulties, therefore they advanced rapidly.

The boys carried on their difficult task with interest, and to keep their moral high, I always told them that they had to keep in mind that they could boast of being the first group who was going to fulfill a duty which had been a National Devine Desire for generations.

In the morning of the 9<sup>th</sup> August 1956, while busy in my office, my third secretary, the late Payamirass entered and said, "Mr. A. P. (an Iranian) is here. He wishes to see you." For a few moments, I could not make who Mr. A. P. was, because I never had an occasion to see him, but the name was familiar. Suddenly I remembered that among the reports I received in the Ministry of those visiting Fatemi, the name of this man was often mentioned. Anyhow, I told Mr. Payamirass if there was anything that we could do for him, to do it, therefore it was not necessary for him to see me. Payamirass said that he had asked him the same, but He had replied, no, since he was passing through The Hague, He wished to pay a visit to the Ambassador! I said, "Well, then show Him in."

Mr. A. P. entered, and I saw him for the first time. A short thin and light-colored face, with dark eyes and hair, his repeated visit to Fatemi, and then his going to Baghdad, had kept me always suspicious about him. However, on entering my office, he said, "good morning Mr. Meftah. I know you dislike me, but I have respect for you, and now that I was passing through The Hague, I felt it was my duty to pay respect to you."

I have never seen you before to like or dislike you. What makes you think so? He said, "That was my impression!" Then he started to introduce himself. And by producing photos of himself, taken with Iranian and foreign personalities, he tried to prove that He had intimate contact with these people. In short, he wanted to tell me that he was an efficient agent. After visiting certain personalities in England, he was returning from London, to express the opinion that shortly there would be changes in England, and the conservative's left wing would be in-power, and they would have a complete new policy for Iran. Then he started to introduce me to myself, emphasizing my poor financial condition and the heavy load I had to bear! Possibly he was trying to show me how well he or his masters were informed about people's personal affairs in Iran.

I said, "Mr. A.P. what are you aiming at by speaking as such?"

He replied, "As I told you, there will be changes in England and the Conservative's left wing will be in-power, which has a different policy for Iran, and to obtain Iran's sympathy, they want to work with a group of patriotic and honest persons. Among the number of Iranians they know, they have chosen twenty. You are one of them. There is only one condition for you, and that is, that you should descend from Satan's Donkey." (Az khare sheitan paeen beyaid)!

His expression made me laugh and thought that his Masters were not prepared to see even twenty persons patriotic and honest in Iran, and now by this trick they want to disgrace them!

At that moment a historic event passed my mind like a lightening, that it was not out of place to bring it in here: Soon after WW1 and establishment of the Peace Conference in Paris, the Iranian government sent a mission headed by the late Aligholi Khan Moshaver-al-Mamalek Ansari, with the Iranian claim to Paris. Of course the Allied interest did not give a chance to the Iranian Delegate to join the Conferences to present Iranian claim. Therefore Ansari started a strong press campaign in Paris, which was reflected in the world press. Lord Curzon thought of playing a dirty trick on Ansari, by inviting him to London, so that as soon as Ansari was in London, the British could start propaganda in Tehran that Ansari had gone to London to obtain instructions! But Ansari was cleverer to realize that what Lord Curzon had up his sleeves. He refused the invitation!

I replied, “M. A. P. You said that I should descend from Satan’s Donkey. What did you mean by that? I thought I was riding a limping Persian Donkey!”

He said, “I mean that you should abandon this fanatic antipathy towards England and accept that you have to come to terms with them.”

His reply reminded me of a conversation I had with Ghods Nakhai, ex Minister of the Imperial Court, in Chalet Suisse restaurant in The Hague, in which, he expressed the opinion that if we came to terms with England, we would be better off! I, after giving few examples of trying to come to terms with England, that all failed, said that the way America was behaving, due to his ignorance about the international relations, and the Middle East in particular, I was also of opinion that we had to come to term with England on the basis of equality and our country’s interest. But there was a great difference between coming to terms and that of being a Yes-Man! If they required a friend on equal terms, I was at their disposal, but if they need a simple yes-man, that could not be me! One point which should be remembered by my compatriots and by the British (the ones who are interested in Iran-Britain relations) is that, Iran during the hundred years of imposed Capitulation (1828-1928), had no right to act or say anything. Her destiny was in the hands of England and Russia. During that period, aggression and penetration reduced Iran to the half of the size as before capitulation. Iran was deprived of having any military force. As she was condemned to be a “Scorched Land buffer state” she was plunged into a most miserable state of living. The underground wealth was in British and American hands and over ground wealth was the victim of “Scorched land, buffer state, policy. And if we had signed the agreement of 1919, even the

country's nominal independence would have disappeared. Even now that our underground wealth was again in their hands, they did not cease interfering in our affairs. Taking all these facts into consideration, I do not know what they meant by coming to terms. I wished these Gentlemen had had enough courage to say what they meant by "coming to terms with this or that?" We had to remember that we had a strong neighbor on the North, with which we had a very long open frontier. We were forced to adopt a policy to be able to keep the balance.

I personally have been on the best terms with Britain. I married twice to British Girls, and I am very pleased with my wife. Does not that prove that I was on good terms with the British? I am terribly sorry that I am not rich enough to rely on Mohammedan Law to marry another three wives!

I told Mr. A. P., what I had said to Mr. Ghods Nakhai, and repeated, "if they need a friend I am at their disposal, but if they want me to be a Yes-Man, that, I am not for it."

Mr. A. P. said, "Mr. Meftah, you are mistaken."

A few days later, I was informed that Mr. A.P. had been in Rotterdam inducing the students to give up their studies, because Iran would never be allowed to have a merchant marine and that, they were wasting their time! On hearing this news, I found myself in a new struggle. I put efforts into counter acting the effect of his talk on the students.

About the beginning of June 1957 Verolme, the owner of the Verolme United Shipyard in Rotterdam, informed me that the yard is ready to start the first tanker named REZA SHAH the GREAT, and that I should be there on the 27<sup>th</sup> June to lay the keel of the tanker. I can not describe the joy I felt in seeing the work about to start. However, on the appointed day, my wife, Mr. Mehbod, and I went to Rosenberg to lay the keel. As it was first ship to be build in that yard a big crowd was present.

At the same time a thousand-ton steamer was under construction in another yard for coastal service in the Persian Gulf, its launching was very near. Two days later, my wife was invited to lunch the one-thousand-ton ship called "Persepolis" on the 14<sup>th</sup> September 1957. On that day the weather was cold and rainy, but for me it was a very happy day, because, I could see how our merchant marine was taking shape.

I was interested in watching how the building of the ship was advancing. Therefore every now and then I went to Rotterdam and took photos of the ship's development, and counting the days when they will be lunched.

Two months past from the day I laid the keel of the tanker, when Verolme met me angrily and said that the construction of the tanker would be halted because the National Iranian Shipping Company had failed to send the Bank Melli's guaranty and to fulfill its other obligations, which resulted in the dismissal of the Managing Director of the Bank; and that Postuma, counting on assurances, bore the responsibility and opened the credit for the yard. I was very much ashamed and felt angry. Immediately I telegraphed to Tehran and reported the harm done to the Managing Director of the Bank because of the delay of the Bank Melli's guarantee. Two days latter the Bank's Guaranty reached The Hague, but most unfortunately, Postuma's situation could not be revised.

Again after few days, Mr. Mehbod arrived from Tehran with decoration for Prof. Gerbrandy, the war-time Prime Minister of Holland, Postuma, Stein and Verolme, with which they were invested on the Norooz, 21<sup>st</sup> of March, (Persian New Year's Day), at the Embassy's reception for the New Year occasion were present.

My term of office in The Hague was quickly reaching its end, and I was preparing to return home. At the same time, the yard informed me that the tanker, REZA SHAH the Great, would be ready for launching on the 15<sup>th</sup> July 1957. I felt sorry that my term of office in The Hague would end a month before the launching date, therefore I would not be able to be present to enjoy the occasion, but I was very happy that my humble effort solved one of our very important problems.

I informed Tehran of the date of my departure. A few days later I received an answer to the effect that, by order of His Majesty, I should delay my departure till after the launching of the tanker! This, no doubt, was great news. I can not describe my happiness when I saw that big tanker started to slide down majestically into the sea. My emotion was so intense, that when Mr. Mehbod asked me to speak a few words on the phone to Tehran, I did not know what to say!



## **ON MY RETURN I FOUND MY COUNTRY AN AMERICAN SATELLITE**

I am glad to say that my four years stay in The Hague passed successfully in every respect. To obtain financial credit from the Bank, to obtain B.P. and Shell's agreement for building tankers, to send a group of engineers and technicians of NEDCO to study the development of Persian Gulf Ports, to succeed in reducing the import tax on Persian carpets, to encourage the Dutch firms to have contact with Iran, and other interesting profitable works for both the countries, were part of my achievements. My contact with the Dutch Foreign Ministry was always friendly and pleasant, and its superiors, particularly the Minister, Mr. M. Lunz and Beyen, also the Director General, Mr. Echossier, are some of those to whom I feel indebted to. My practice was to settle my problems through personal contacts, rather than by formal exchange of notes. The relation between the diplomatic missions was limited to the official cocktails and receptions. The Belgian Ambassador, who was an old-fashioned, reserved and unsociable person, was our Doyen. He could not create an intimate atmosphere among the heads of missions. For me, who like to be very much sociable and develop contacts, his attitude was unacceptable. To be snobbish was perhaps acceptable from the representatives of the two or three, so-called great powers, but from the second-class small nations, in my opinion one of their instruments of propaganda was the popularity and friendly behavior of their diplomatic representatives. For me to respect the traditional snobbish atmosphere of The Hague's diplomatic corps was indeed difficult. We could not limit our receptions to the presence of high officials and heads of missions alone, and terminate the reception at a fixed time. Therefore our receptions were always open to all, old and young. The guests were entertained generously. We did not observe any time limit, at our receptions, whether cocktail, dinner, or supper dances, it went up to wee hours of the mornings.

I had an especial way of taking some of my colleague-diplomats into intimacy and profiting from their experiences. After arrival at a post, I studied the behavior, social contacts and the interest in the International events of my diplomatic colleagues, from which I chose a few to arrange weekly meetings, in turn, among us, so that we

could discuss the international questions and inform each other according to our knowledge and experiences.

It is needless to say that, this way of living played great influence in my wife and myself, being popular in The Hague, so much so that on leaving it, contrary to The Hague's diplomatic corps traditions the C.D. presented us with a pair of beautiful big fighting silver cocks. The ceremony took place at the Australian Embassy. The event was a very encouraging, because practically every mission, from East to West, participated it. The ceremony should have taken place in the Canadian Embassy due to the fact that the Canadian Ambassador was the Dean of the diplomatic corps in The Hague. But as it was contrary to the tradition, the Australian Embassy was chosen. Yet the Canadian Ambassador was one of the participants of the gift! The Australian Ambassador was one of the seven that I can say, were consulting friends. My wife and I certainly will remember and appreciate their friendship, for long time, although the two cocks are at a permanent fight on the middle of our dining table!

We also will not forget the gentle gesture of Dr. Lunz, the Dutch Foreign Minister, who left an official meeting in Paris to host a farewell party arranged for us. At the table, he said, "I came from Paris; where I was very busy, only to act as a host to you. I will fly back to Paris soon after the lunch. As you see, I have collected all your Dutch friends round this table which indicates your success in this country. I only hope that our cold and rainy weather will not leave in you an unpleasant memory of The Hague."

In reply, I thanked him for the lunch and taking the trouble to come from Paris just to be present at this lunch to honor us, I said..."But during our four years stay in The Hague I have been in such a happy contact with the warm hearts of my colleagues in Foreign Ministry and Dutch friends in general, that I had not felt the cold and the damp of The Hague."

The reason I mentioned the friendly way I was treated by Dr. Lunz, is that, a few days before my departure, an Ambassador from a great Asiatic country left The Hague, but his farewell party was limited to a small dinner party at the Chief of Protocol's house!

One point that should always be remembered in Western countries of Europe is that, if a representative fails to obtain a respectable good reputation and popularity, the local authorities will not hesitate to make him feel, at an appropriate time, their displeasure!

The reason for my success in The Hague, as in my previous posts, was that, I sought a good and respectable reputation by gentle behavior and particularly through disregard for money. In no post

my entertainment budget met my generous way of living and entertainment. Therefore I had to use my own allowances without saving anything for my future. My wife was always the best-dressed lady of the Diplomatic Corps, so much so that she was photographed and even some times interviewed by the papers on new fashions!

I remember when the Shah returned from his trip to Holland, his chief of protocol, Mr. Gharagozloo, told me, "Oh, it was you, Mr. Meftah, who was so popular in The Hague?"

However, with such a successful background in The Hague, I hopefully left for Tehran on 17<sup>th</sup> July 1958, accompanied by my wife and two children, Bojang and Dey, in my private car, for Tehran. We left the big park of the Embassy, Wilzang, behind while carrying the best souvenirs of our career with us.

We passed through Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. A very interesting, informative, and in some parts dangerous journey!

As I was not expecting to get an active job in Tehran, we traveled at leisure to avoid the heat on the roads in Turkey and Iran. But we had to be in Tehran before the 1<sup>st</sup> September for the sake of the children's school. We arrived to Tehran on the 1<sup>st</sup> September.

Two days later I paid a visit to the Minister of the Imperial Court, Mr. Alaa, and later on to the high officials of the Foreign Ministry. On visiting the permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, he told me that there was a suggestion that I should go to Baghdad as Ambassador. I said, I have just ended my term abroad, and according to the regulations, I could not be sent to another post abroad after a laps of at least one or two years. He replied that, they have been working to find a legal way to circumvent the regulations to send me to Baghdad! I said, I had never been in Iraq on a post and with the present situation there, I wonder if I was the right person for the job. He said everything had been taken into consideration. "First, you have enough knowledge about Iraq, and second, with the change of regime over there, we need a courageous person. That was why you were suggested." I said for the sake of country's interest, if I could be of any use, I had no objection, but personally I am not interested.

To send me to Baghdad was the suggestion of the Ministry, not Ali Asghar Hekmat, the then Foreign Minister, who was not in Tehran upon my arrival.

On September 6<sup>th</sup> I met the Minister. From him I did not learn anything about myself. I was not even expecting anything from him. By principle he, who at the beginning of Zahedi's government was a member of the Cabinet, as a Minister of State, had worked hard



unsuccessfully along with the Minister of Interior, to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, just to push me out of the Ministry!

On arriving to Tehran, I found the atmosphere and the situation quite different from what I had in mind. The capital looked more like a town occupied by the Americans. One could hear every day that the Americans were pressing on the Iranian government to pass a law to get rid of generations which worked with Reza Shah! They considered those men as being fanatic Nationalists, who were difficult to work with!

Therefore they should be replaced by a younger generation, especially those who had had an American education.

These sayings or hearings made me remember what I heard from a Ministry colleague a year ago in The Hague, on his return from America: he said, "The situation in Tehran will completely change and the Americans will be the leading power!"

Here I have to fully agree with the Americans, that those who worked with Reza Shah, strongly disliked foreign interference into our affairs, and certainly hated to receive orders from foreigners. Curiously enough, I heard from a member the Parliament that the Prime Minister of the time made the Shah accept that those who were one year older than the Shah himself never told the truth to the Shah, and therefore were not reliable and trustworthy! These two and more particularly, the American pressure, forced the government to pass a law to permit itself to retire those having thirty years of service, without taking their age into consideration!

At that time I had over thirty years of service and therefore the new law would apply to me as well. Apart from that my patriotic character and the respect which I always reserved for Reza Shah the Great, plus my published book "Armane Iran" and more so, my activities in the Ministry, during the times of Mossadegh and Zahedi, caused that I was black listed by all the foreign powers, especially the super ones! So to receive an order of retirement could not surprise me. A few days later I received the retirement order. The law was not practiced without exceptions. Those who could obtain American support or had American Education maintained their office.

I admit that the great number of our old generation, particularly of the higher class, who had important influence on the country's policy, were corrupted, destructive tools of those powers, whose economic and political interests deprived Iran of any kind of development. But there were some among the older generation who were patriotic, experienced, honest men who believed in a complete change in the present miserable existence of the people. I can not say that those who are holding the key positions in the country today are

less pro-foreigner when we look through Tehran papers. They have been imposed by foreign influence. When the experienced officials of Reza Shah's regime were swept away by the famous American-imposed law, the departments were filled with so-called American experts who directed everything. I remember once, I went to the department concerned to obtain certain information regarding the construction of houses, for the members of the Foreign Ministry, the so-called Persian director, occupying a luxuriously-furnished room, was seated behind a large walnut desk. I began my questions. Surprisingly I received my answer from an American innocently sitting on a couch sipping his cup of tea! I also do not forget the day I went to Mr. Alaa and expressed my astonishment at a certain government's decision. With his usual gesture, he said, "what can we do, Mr. Meftah? The Americans wanted it; therefore it had to be done!" From what I saw, heard and read Tehran papers, after my return from The Hague, I found my country an American Satellite!

It did not take long for me to see the confirmation of my opinion in the book "From Yalta to Vietnam" which reads as follows:

*"The sequel of these events is not so widely known. As the Russian left, the American moved in – not with troops and revolution- but silently with Dollars in support of status-quo. In addition to American funds, the Iranian government received American advisers, civil and military. Iran, in effect became an American Satellite; If America did not yet have military base there, she could have them any time she wished."*<sup>(1)</sup>

For a person such as me with strong patriotic feelings, to see the country in such a state was indeed very unpleasant, because I believed we could have carried on with the reform of the country according to the way I showed in my book (Armane Iran), without the help of the American C.I.A. or its elements in Iran. What benefit did we draw from American interference? Did we increase our foreign exchange reserve, or under the astonishing excuse of inflation of foreign exchange (an economic term that can not be found in any economic textbook); we left our exchange reserve to fly to Europe and America? Our agriculture reached a zero state, so that we had to import grain from America! Iran, a country which exported wheat during Reza Shah's reign! The industrial situation of the country went down to zero as well. Due to adopting Open-Door commercial policy and the foundry which was nearly completed was looted by the occupying powers, whereas during the last twenty years, poor India erected three foundries. But we yet were busy stupefying the people with lies!

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(1)- See, "From Yalta to Vietnam" By David Horowitz. Page 84

**We knew very well that to industrialize the country, first and foremost, we were in need of basic industry, that is to say we needed a “Foundry”.**

**From the Shah’s interview with New York Times reporter in December 1965, one can easily feel that America was not pleased with our arrangement with Russians over erection of a foundry in Iran!**

**When in 1951 in Hamburg I asked Dr. Schacht and Dr. Loppenberg, (an industrialist), if it was necessary to have a foundry, their answers was that to industrialize a country, the first thing needed was a foundry, without which an industrial country can not produce the spare parts for its machines. And if the country which supplied the machinery, for any reason, refused to furnish the spare parts, the industry would collapse. The result of which is unemployment and other monumental difficulties for the country.**



*Russian erected Esfahan foundry*



## **SPECIAL SATUS**

In short, we are condemned not to advance fast, to remain in a permanent slow-motion state; we are forced to adhere to “special status”. And to conserve that “special status”, selected elements have to be in power in Iran to be able to protect the status. Today America has taken charge of the responsibility of keeping us in that “special status”.

What was the “special status”? It was an interesting story which I deem it right recount, so that my compatriots and the world may understand why so many disturbances and so much of uneasiness always prevail in Iran.

The Word War II was nearing to its end when the late Mr. Stocks, the labor member party & the British government, was traveling with another gentleman through Turkey and Iraq to Iran. At the time I was counselor to the Iranian Embassy in Ankara. Upon arriving to Ankara, Mr. Stocks asked Mr. Lomax, the Economic Councilor of the British Embassy in Ankara, to obtain some economic information about Iran and to suggest whom he could contact in Iran to get necessary information. Mr. Lomax thought it best to put him in-touch with me. After a telephone conversation it was arranged that I should join the dinner party given by Mr. Stocks in the Soraya restaurant, as Mr. Stocks time was limited, therefore he could not accept my invitation to tea. At the dinner table beside us, there were the American Commercial Counselor, a gentleman traveling with Mr. Stocks and some others. In all, we were ten people at the table. Mr. Lomax had a few drinks before dinner and was talkative. Being a sympathizer of the Conservatives, he kept talking politics criticizing Labor’s Party politics with Mr. Stocks, who was placed opposite him. His chattering prevented Mr. Stocks conversing with me. I therefore turned to the gentleman accompanying Mr. Stocks and asked him if he was going to Tehran with Mr. Stocks? He said, “No, because your country’s exchange formalities are too difficult to permit any transactions.” I suddenly realized that Mr. Lomax, cutting short his conversation with Mr. Stocks, was speaking to me, saying, “Because you are all Germans!” I was so shocked that I could not say a word for few moments. At the same time I saw Mr. Stock’s looks were fixed on me with an expression as good as asking me to pay no attention to Mr. Lomax utterance! But suddenly I remembered that, the truth can be heard from a drunkard and a child. I asked him in a very soft voice, what he meant, if he was talking to me? He said, “Yes, I was talking to you. I want to

emphasize that the Persians are all Germans.” I said, “That is a news to me. I never knew it”, He said, “I wanted to say that your country is smothered with Germans!” I replied, “as far as I know you collected them, that they were not more than seven hundred in all”. He continued, “Yes I know, but that number was quite sufficient. I said, “You give great importance to that small number of Germans, that we did not, since they were all working in factories, and above all, you know very well, that all the foreigners were constantly and close watch.”

Finally, he had shown his true face. He flared up and said, “Can you people tell me actually what you want? Do you think that we want to capture your country?” Then he started to name all the British Colonies, one after another, and concluded by saying, “We only want your oil”. I replied, “You have it, have not you?” he said, “yes, but I want to know what YOU want?” I replied, “I believe that our request is very simple. We accept that our country was a buffer state for your Colonies, but you have other countries as buffer states as well. How is it that my country can not be one of them?” He asked, “such as?” I said, “such as Scandinavian countries, Holland and Belgium!” Lifting his finger, he said, “Oh, no, you must have a “SPECIAL STATUS”!

I saw from the paled face of Mr. Stocks that Mr. Lomax’s utterance had angered him. I therefore did not continue talking to Mr. Lomax, while he was yet carrying on with his nonsense. Or perhaps, I should say with his true confessions!

In my heart I felt very depressed, but at the same time, I was glad to have come to know the cause of all our troubles and problems.

Mr. Stocks was very unhappy with Mr. Lomax’s behavior and was sorry that he could not get a chance to talk to me. I invited him, his friend and the Economic Counselor of the American Embassy to take tea next day, in my place, so that he could have the information he required. And I could get a chance to explain to him, in brief, some of our National grievances. They all accepted my invitation and attended the tea party. I furnished Mr. Stocks with economic information, and gave him some names that could be useful to him while in Tehran.

Then I started with our National grievances, relating to him a short history of what Iran suffered during the last two centuries by British policy in Iran. Finally, I touched to their behavior in Iran during and after the war, and mentioned their black listing of the Iranian businessmen, which had paralyzed the Iranian international trade. His reason was that, they were trading with Germany. I told him that he himself is industrialist and businessman; therefore

should understand me better than their diplomats. I explained the case of an Iranian exporter, who was at the time in Ankara, who had a great number of different raw materials, and had asked his agents in America, England and France to report on the market for the materials. The answers were, "No demand and no quotations," but when he inquired about the German market, the reply was, "Any amount, any price!" I asked, "What would you do Mr. Stocks, as a businessman?" He answered, "Anyhow, at present the war is over and there is no reason to stick fanatically to that blacklist!" He justified my reasoning, and before leaving Ankara, used his influence to modify the blacklist.

I am diverted from my original subject, "Special status". My aim is to inform my compatriots that it was the "special status" which was hampering our freedom of action. So long as we were in the clutches of the guardians of that policy, we could not have freedom of action. We were stupefied by deceitful words, to stop us from taking one effective fundamental step.

When we study the proceedings of our daily life, we can realize what "Special Status" meant.

In 1956, by order of the Shah, a meeting of the heads of our diplomatic missions in Europe was organized at the Iranian Embassy in Paris under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister at the time, Dr. Ardalan. At that conference I said, "We are not here to discuss and solve each country's problems, which is out of our capabilities. We are here to study the parts of international problems and activities, which concerns our National Interests and how to protect them, because, as long as we are unable to solve our international problems, we will not be able to solve our National problems. To be able to solve our National problems, we are in need of public opinion's support. And to be able to obtain the support of the public opinion, we have to prepare a comfortable life for the people. The means to achieve this goal are the following five points: cheap food, cheap clothing, cheap lodging, cheap medical treatment and cheap education or literacy."

Mr. Raiis, our Ambassador in Paris at the time, confirmed these points. At that meeting, I claimed that in several reports I have indicated to solve these five problems in between three to five years.

From that date how many hundred per cents have been added to the cost of living in Iran? By how many percent has the 85% illiterates been reduced? My claim was, within five years I could reduce illiteracy to 50 per cent. Why, my claim should not be taken into consideration? Why they did not even ask me what my method would be? Because we were condemned to live under that famous

**British concept of “Special Status”! And now, that every aspect of our lives was directed by the Americans, they also found that the policy of “Special Status” was the best one to keep us busy struggling with it!**

**What I wrote here was not to strengthen the existing antipathy for the Britain or the Americans in Iran, but to unveil to the public of these countries, and our own, the cause of antipathy feelings in Iran, so that they could force their governments to abandon their harmful policy, and to tell my countrymen, what they are in and where their misfortune lies.**

**However, we reached Tehran on 31<sup>st</sup> August 1958, just in-time for the autumn’s term of the children’s school.**

**After the letter of appreciation I received, while still in The Hague, from Mr. Alaa, the then Prime Minister, I certainly was expecting a proper reward on my return to Tehran. The reward was promptly accorded by furnishing me with an order of retirement, according to the enacted new law by the American interference, at the age of fifty eight, for having thirty years of service to my country.**

**After some time, I received a telephone call from Mr. A. P., who greeted me in a cynical manner, and said, “How are you Mr. Meftah?” I replied, “I am all right, what you mean by emphasizing HOW I AM?” He said, “What did I tell you in The Hague? You see now that I was not talking nonsense!” I told him, that I did not reject his views. One should expect such things when a country is managed by others!”**



## **RUSSIA PROPOSED A BILATERAL DEFENSE** **PACT**

My colleagues in the Foreign Ministry, who were aware of my heavy burden of expenses and that the poor retirement salary could not meet it, felt themselves indebted to me for what I did for them during Mossadegh's regime. They searched for a way to solve my problems. By suggestion of Mr. Kafai, Permanent Undersecretary of the time, (Ex-Ambassador to Ankara), I was elected by the members of the Ministry, as the Managing Director of the Housing Corporation of the Ministry. At the same time, Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal, The Prime Minister, issued a circular order to the effect that a sever campaign against corruption should begin.



*Dr. Manoucheh Eghbal*

This order necessitated a Commission to study the file of each member to prepare a report on them. Right or wrong, due to my well-known impartiality and trustworthiness, I was chosen to establish the Commission under my own chairmanship. At first I tried to avoid the responsibility of such a delicate task, because I was not sure if the policy or decision was a serious one! Also, I was not sure if my report would be kept secret, as was promised. However, after serious assurances that the report of the Commission would be kept absolutely secret, I accepted the job on condition that no one would be forced upon me as a member of the Commission, which was also accepted.

I chose Mr. Javad Ghadimi, (ex-Ambassador in Jakarta), and Mr. Mahmoud Bahadory, (ex-Ambassador in Prague).



The more we advanced in our study, the less we found ourselves enthusiastic about continuing the task. But, the daily pressure of the Prime Minister forced us to pursue the work.

Finally, after about eight months, using our maximum leniency the study of over 400 files finished. The Commission found seventeen persons unsuitable to work in the Ministry! In its report, the Commission suggested that their files should be studied before giving them any new appointment. I personally sent a copy of the report to the Shah, through Mr. Alla.

Strangely enough, apart from a few that are retired now, the majority of them kept occupying important posts! This inadvertence of the Commission's report made me remember certain American gangster's tales, which relate how the gangsters tried to obtain information about corrupted employees of different banks or establishments to involve them in their crimes.

### **Politics-Playing by the Minister**

Being engaged in the housing project of the Members of the Foreign Ministry, and being as well at the head of the Commission Against Corruption, I had at my disposal an office in the Foreign Ministry, in which, I often received the Directors and members of the Ministry. These visits naturally kept me informed of what was going on in the Ministry, sometimes, they even came for consultations.

The first few months of 1959 Mr. Hekmat was still the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Rumors circulated that Mr. Hekmat was not pleased with his work, and was thinking of resigning. One day I asked the Permanent Under-Secretary, if the rumor was based on any truth? He said, "You know Hekmat is very ambitious man; therefore he will never abandon his desk unless asked to do so! But as the rumors run, something unpleasant has been happening with regard to Iran-Russian relations, who may end to his disadvantage, the particulars of which are not yet known".

My private inquiries indicated that, when Mr. Abdolhossein Masoud Ansari, the new Ambassador to Moscow delivered the copies of his letters to the Russian Foreign Secretary; the Minister had expressed Russia's dislike in witnessing that Iran joined the Baghdad Pact. The new ambassador had reported the conversation to Tehran. Also in Tehran the Russian Ambassador had repeatedly informed the Iranian authorities of his government's concern regarding the Baghdad Pact, and Iran-American bilateral agreement. Since He received no satisfactory reply from Iranian side, he proposed a bilateral defensive pact between Russia and Iran. Indeed such a

**bilateral pact with Russia would make the pact of Iran-American agreement ineffective! After a short time a rumor spread that Mr. Syed Ziaedin Tabatabaii, with the help of ex-Iranian ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Sayyah was trying to bring about better relations between Iran and Russia! One wonders, if this move by Mr. Seyed Ziaidin could be without the Britain's knowledge?**

**Due to these Demarches a Russian mission was delegated to Tehran to conclude the treaty, with the instruction to accept whatever the Iranian side proposed! This mission even had audience with the Shah. As Mr. Sayyah told me, "at the last meeting the behavior of Mr. Hekmat angered the Russians which caused the Mission to leave without any result." Was Mr. Hekmat indeed the cause of the break, or the American flu epidemic which over-run the Royal Palace? If we remember, radio Moscow commented on this subject in its Persian broadcast on the 16<sup>th</sup> February 1959, at 8 P.M. Tehran time, saying, "The Iranian government showed an interest in concluding a non-aggression pact with U.S.S.R. and WE being interested in having friendly relations with Iran, welcomed the Iranian view, and even instructed our mission to accept the Iranian proposals without any amendments, but now the Iranian government dishonors her own view and ends up the conversation!"**

**Could this incident, be taken as another reason that Iran was an American Satellite? Was it the result of bashfulness of our statesmen, or of those determining our international policy, as it happened at the time of our joining the Baghdad Pact?**



## **IRAN-AFGHAN FRONTIER DIFFERENCES**

The Iran-Afghan frontier and Helmand's water differences have a long precedent. It started with Anglo-Iran's treaties of 1812 and 1814. A very interesting long history that unfortunately, there is no space for it, but I would like to make a short reference for the readers of this book.

It started soon after the Napoleonic wars, when Britain forgot her engagement in tow Anglo-Iranian treaties in 1812 and 1813 to interfere in Iran-Afghan relations, the result of which was the existing Helmand differences between the two countries.

When I returned from The Hague, our province of Sistan was suffering from a heavy drought and the local population was emigrating either to Afghanistan or to the other provinces in Iran. A Commission consisting of representatives of the Ministries of Justice, Agriculture, war and Foreign Affairs was studying the problem. The Foreign Minister had to preside over the Commission, but being fully occupied with the daily work of the Ministry, he could not spare enough time to attend the Commission. His Under-Secretary advised him to take me into the Commission. In the evening of 24<sup>th</sup> January 1959, I received a telephone call from Mr. Kafai, the Permanent Under-Secretary, he asked if the present Minister of Justice, Dr. Sadr had been meeting me? My reply was negative. I asked why he wanted see me. Mr. Kafai said, that there was going to be a change in the Helmand Commission, therefore, He had to see you.

Next morning, Dr. Sadr on his way to the Justice Ministry left a card for me in which he asked me to be at the Ministry at 11 A.M. to meet the Minister. I went a bit earlier with the intention of meeting the Under-Secretary before meeting the Minister. I went to Mr. Kafai's office and asked Dr. Sadr, by phone to join me. He came and gave me a short account of the Helmand Commission's work, and that the change in its formation and program was in sight, about which the Minister would give me a full explanation. The idea was to have somebody from the Ministry to head the Commission. Dr. Sadr suggested, as being a serious and competent person, I am more suitable than anybody else.

While we were busy talking in Mr. Kafai's office, Mr. Hekmat was called to the Palace, so my meeting with the Minister was postponed to the beginning of February 1959.

On that day after having a few minutes talk with the Minister, we went to join the Commission. The members of the Commission were all present. They were waiting the Minister's presence to start the

job. Mr. Hekmat introduced me and the work began with discussion on the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture's proposal to send a high ranking personality to Kabul to have a last talk with the Afghans before entering into other demarches. I did not agree with the proposal and suggested a way which was found to be successfully practical during Reza Shah's time. The commission, while accepting my suggestion, preferred that first, someone should be sent to Kabul.

However the Commission's decision was reported by Mr. Hekmat to the Shah. Next day at a luncheon party at the Iran Club, given by one of his colleagues in honor of Mr. Ashtiani, who was posted to Amman as Ambassador, Mr. Hekmat asked me to sit next to him at the table, as he had something to discuss with me.

He said that the decision of the Commission was reported to the Shah and it was approved by him, and he had ordered that someone should be chosen. Mr. Hekmat had suggested that either Mr. Soroori, or Mr. Sajadi or General Jahanbani, should be selected. Mr. Hekmat asked my opinion. I said, as Mr. Soroori had been working with the Commission for a long time, and I knew him as an honest competent person, I preferred Mr. Soroori for the first choice and Mr. Sajadi as second. A few days later Mr. Hekmat told me that the three names were proposed to the Shah and that he had chosen General Jahanbani! My private information was that, as General Jahanbani was related to Mr. Hekmat, he had suggested only General Jahanbani to the Shah!



*General Jahanbani*



*Ali Asghar Hekmat*

However, Jahanbani went to Kabul, and as I had foreseen, He came back empty-handed!

About our relation with Afghanistan, I had a special opinion, which I told Mr. Hekmat, and he liked it too, but, as I explained above, so long as our statesmen are suffering from non-Iranian complexes, one can not be sure, or even expect that they ever allowed themselves independently to adopt a regional or international and worse National Policy!

I had always believed that we must look upon Afghanistan as we look upon our own country. We must know Afghanistan as our legitimate brother. Naturally they are, as we both live on the greater part of the Iranian Plateau, we belong to the same race, we speak the same language, we belong to the same religion, and above all, our political and literary history is inseparable.

When Afghanistan obtained her independence, it was received with great joy by our public, and as I remember the Afghans were expecting us to give them every help to strengthen their struggle for independence and cultural developments. But our Statesmen, being under the influence of the inhibition produced by foreign domination, did not show a serious interest in that matter. Still worse, once a person such as Mr. Farrokh was sent to Kabul as Ambassador, which was a great mistake!

While we were aware that the great powers were interested in keeping our relations with our neighbors, always obscure and unfriendly, instead of adopting a resistant policy against their intrigues, our Statesmen's behavior strengthened it.

Mr. Farrokh on his return from Kabul, published a book about Afghanistan, which was distributed while I was acting Foreign Minister, I had to stop its distribution.

What induced him to behave as such? Was it not because of the fixed ideas which influenced our Statesmen?

As I proposed in "Armane Iran" we should prepare the ground for a "Confederation" of States of Iranian Land, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq, beginning with "customs Union" between the three countries, as it is done in Europe between the Benelux Countries.

My thought was based on this policy when I asked Mr. Hekmat to constitute a Commission which could handle all Iran-Afghan questions and problems, and prepare a program to put my idea into practice. I was not sure if Mr. Hekmat was really as much in agreement as his open approval suggested. However, it did not take long before that Mr. Hekmat was sacrificed due to Iran-Soviet relation, and Iran-Afghan Helmand dispute remained uncertain and unplanned.

Mr. Gholam Abbas Aram replaced Mr. Hekmat. Knowing him very well, I certainly could not expect him to engage himself with

such high policy. Not being an administrator, soon his lack of administrative ability caused a great uneasiness among the members of the Foreign Ministry, particularly among those colleagues who had helped him to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs!



*Gholam Abbas Aram*

They did not hesitate to contact me and ask me to do something to save the Ministry from disaster. Being aware of my assistances with him for the last thirty years and knowing as well, how I fought with Fatemi to protect the Ministry's interest, they expected me to advise him about his administrative interference.

No doubt the way the Ministry was administrated depressed me very much, but I never liked to interfere in other people's affairs, unless I was asked by the person himself.

In my opinion, a Minister should have at least two qualities: one, to be married and has children, to be able to realize the responsibility of keeping a family. And two: to have at least some knowledge of administration.



## **ELECTIFICATION OF NINTY-TWO TOWNS OF IRAN**

As the year 1959 advanced towards its end, the more my financial problems grew complicated and worrisome. To be able to fight with that complicated situation, my wife decided to open an English class, and by teaching English, to earn a little to ease our financial difficulties. The teaching went well. The students, who were mostly girls, were preparing themselves for going to England, profited from my wife's bashfulness and stood longer than they should have done, therefore she could not get a chance to have a break between lessons. The lessons went on for over twelve hours daily, with one break for lunch only. This non-stop teaching was very tiring, until one day the pressure of work made her collapse which caused me intense worry. I immediately called Dr. Moayed Hekmat, our family doctor and explained her condition. It was a nervous breakdown, physical weakness and fatigue. She regained her strength after a few days by doctor's care, but she had to reduce her working hours, which naturally affected our income.

While we were thinking of how to balance our budget, an old well-known friend, Mr. Yoones Vahabzadeh, who was establishing a company for the electrification of ninety-two towns of Iran with the cooperation of Westinghouse, an American firm, asked me to accept the membership of the Board of Directors of the company.

I thought, as a member of the Board would gain a substantial income which would enable us to do without smaller incomes.

The company board was established with the membership of Mr. Mohammad Khosroshahi, (present Chairman of Tehran Chamber of Commerce), Mr. Boozari, (ex-Minister of Justice), Mr. Vahabzadeh & I. The firm was also legally registered.

According to the contract between Westinghouse and Vahabzadeh, Westinghouse was to electrify ninety-two towns and the work should have started within seventeen months. To fulfill this gigantic undertaking a capital of \$28.000.000 was foreseen, for which Tehran's Electric Organization guaranteed payment by issuing eleven drafts which were countersigned by the Minister of Finance, and the transfer of the foreign exchange was also accepted by the National Bank.

The most important part of the contract between Vahabzadeh and Westinghouse was fixed rate on power for the consumers. It was fixed at Rials 1.25 per Kwt. This no doubt, would have caused an industrial revolution in Iran, since the present rate is about 7 Rials.

The scheme was so important that the Shah, who is very much interested in industrial development of the country, supported and encouraged Vahabzadeh in his effort to succeed in such an important project. It required several journeys to America, and spending over one million Dollars. It took over two years to bring the matter to a final stage. Vahabzadeh had to make a last visit to Westinghouse, where the firm asked him for re-confirmation of the contract by the Tehran Electric Organization, and re-confirmation of the payment of the drafts by the National Bank! The payments of the drafts were already guarantied by the Bank. Vahabzadeh rushed back to Tehran to obtain the re-confirmations. Upon his return, Mr. Rahmat Atabaki, the Minister of Interior (present Ambassador in Vienna),



*Rahmat Atabaki*

refused the reconfirmation of the Contract. So did the Bank, expressing the opinion that the first confirmation had only a moral value!

This bizarre behavior of the Iranian government resulted in total bankruptcy of Mr. Vahabzadeh, who fell ill in hospital in Baden-Baden, Germany for some time and is now living on a very meager income received from his brothers. With the dissolution of the Electric Company, I lost the hope of improving my financial position.





## **GUARDIANSHIP OF PRINCE ALI**

I was asked to join two or three Commissions, inside and outside the Foreign Ministry, which were all honorary! The result of almost two years struggle was the increase of my overdraft with “Bank-e-Bazargani”. To Mr. Tjadod, the bank’s Managing Director, I felt myself indebted and thankful.



*Tjadod*

But I had to find some way out of financial difficulties so that I could pay my debts to the Bank. Of course, with Gholam Abbas Aram as the Foreign Minister, I could not expect anything from him. But it did not take long before Aram was replaced by the late Yadollah Azodi. Apart from being an old family friend, I had succeeded in sending him to New Delhi as Ambassador during Mossadegh’s period. He may have thought that he should repay my gesture now that he was at the head of Foreign Ministry.

Some of my colleagues, who, like myself, were hit by the new law and were retired, suggested that a petition should be addressed to The Queen Farah Pahlavi, who was recently married to the Shah. This was done, and the law was more loosely enforced, because it did not give government the power to apply it widely.

One day Mr. Azodi asked me to see him. He proposed that I should go to Nigeria and insisted that I should decide quickly. I studied the conditions in Nigeria and the possibilities of education of my children, from whom I did not like to be separated, therefore it

was not possible to go to a country such as Nigeria. Mr. Azodi was anxious to find a post for me, but all the posts abroad were occupied. Hence he asked me to wait. While waiting for Mr. Azodi's efforts, I thought it better to write something to the Shah and explain my situation. I prepared the letter and gave it to Managing Director of the National Iranian Oil Company, Mr. Abdullah Entezam, who had audience with the Shah regularly to report about N.I.O.C. every two weeks.

On November 23<sup>rd</sup> I received a telephone call from Mr. Entezam, asking me to see him on 26<sup>th</sup> in his office. He told me that he did not give my letter to the Shah, because he thought it better to discuss something with me before passing the letter to the Shah. The matter was that he was in-charge of supervising Prince Ali's affairs, but being too busy with the Oil Company, he could not spare time for the Prince's Affairs, and the Shah had asked him to find someone who could look after the Prince. Mr. Entezam not being sure that I would accept the guardianship of the Prince, started by asking me if I knew anyone with such-and-such qualities and character, who could undertake Prince Ali's guardianship? I named two or three retired colleagues of the Foreign Ministry, whom he knew very well too. He did not agree with them. He went on explaining more about the character the guardian should have. I felt that, he was aiming at me, but was shy to be direct. I asked him, had he me in his mind. He said, "Yes, what you think about it?"

I replied, "I had sympathy for his father, but do not know his mother. Besides I wonder if it is a suitable position for me. Apart from that, what I heard from the Shah, in Hamburg, in 1955, (1) about the Prince, when he was discussing the Prince's affairs with Mr. Zand, the then Iranian Ambassador in Rome indicated the Shah's anxiety about the future of the Prince. There I learned something about Prince Ali and his mother. But to accept your proposal, it necessitates having a respectable post in The Court, such as Under-Secretary to the Minister of Imperial Court with suitable pay." Mr. Entezam thought that Mr. Alaa, Minister of Imperial Court, would not agree to have an Under-Secretary because, once he had one who displeased him. But Mr. Entezam would do his best to

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(1)- In February 1955, the Shah had an official invitation to visit West Germany. He reached Hamburg on 23<sup>rd</sup>. February, after His U.S.A. tour. I was at the time in The Hague, where I received an order to be in Hamburg when the Shah arrived there. Mr. Raiis, from Paris, Forooohar from Bern, Zand from Rome, and Tehrani from Brussels, were called to be present as well. On 24<sup>th</sup> of February, the Shah called a meeting with these Ambassadors, in His private suit at the hotel Atlantic, in which He discussed the new oil agreement with the Consortium and some international events. At the end of the meeting Mr. Zand complained of the behavior of Prince Ali and his Mother, who, at the time were in Rome.

obtain a respectable situation in The Court for me. He added that the Prince and His mother were not as bad as they were five years ago.

However, at the next audience, Mr. Entezam had described my petition and explained the difficulty he had in making me accept the guardianship of The Prince, and the conditions I had proposed. On December 4<sup>th</sup> at 7.30 A.M. As soon as I entered his room, Mr. Entezam said, "Mr. Meftah, I congratulate you! His Majesty was very pleased to hear you have accepted the guardianship of Prince Ali, and ordered that a Royal Decree should be issued to the effect, giving you the rank of Ambassador and Civil Adjutant or A.D.C. to His Majesty.

Regarding the salary you proposed, it was agreed upon in principle, but as no one receives such high pay in The Court, His Majesty's suggestion is that half of it should be paid as a monthly salary and the other half, at the end of the year as a reward."

Next day, Mr. Alaa telephoned and asked me to see him on 5<sup>th</sup> December. I told Mr. Alla, "I am highly honored that my acceptance pleased His Majesty, but, I have told Mr. Entezam, this is really a trivial position. What indeed induced me to go along is the sympathy that I have for the late Price Ali Reza who showed me and my brother extreme kindness. He remembered us, and every now and then enquired about us. This small gesture forces me in recognition of his kindness, to do what I can for his son."

On 8<sup>th</sup> of December, when I left for home to have lunch, I received a telephone call from Mr. Azodi, asking me in what sort of a job I had been engaged. I said, "Why"? He said, "He had had an audience with His Majesty and proposed a post for me, and His Majesty had said, something is arranged for him." Mr. Azodi wanted to know what the job was. I told him, and he was annoyed and asked me why I did not consult him before hand. I had seen him few days before to find out if he had any news for me, but he had said, "Not yet!"

Anyhow, at my last meeting with Mr. Alaa it was arranged that I should go to him on Wednesday, 25<sup>th</sup> December 1960, to be presented officially to the Shah, as Prince Ali's guardian. I went to Mr. Alaa at 8.30 A.M. as it was arranged where I heard that he already had left for the Private Palace. According to the tradition, the Minister of the Court was the first man to have audience with the Shah every day. Therefore I followed him to the Private Palace, and waited in the waiting room. From the comings and goings, I could see that the Shah was very busy. Finally, at about 11 A.M. one of the Palace attendants led me to H. M.'s working room on the next floor. When we reached the door the attendant stopped and said, "His Majesty is sitting on the right-hand side of the room," and opened the door.


On entering the room, I saw the Shah standing about three or four paces from the door, with Mr. Alaa behind him. I bowed, and the Shah stretched out his hand, which I kissed. Then Mr. Alaa introduced me, with the following words, "Mr. Meftah, one of the old and experienced Officers of the Foreign Ministry". The Shah spoke about the Prince; "This child is the son of my brother and I am concerned that he be well groomed and educated. Unfortunately, he is living in an unpleasant and harmful atmosphere, which is contrary to what I wish for him. After all, he is a Prince and should be brought up as a PRINCE." Then His Majesty went on to describe how the Prince's mother was living. I said, I would do my best and referred to problems that I have been told before, and I requested His Majesty's help in overcoming those problems.

Mr. Alaa turned to me and said, "Mr. Meftah, the mother of the Prince is called \*Madam Sholsky\* (Shol in Persian, means, soft), but remember she is very \*SEFTSKY\* (In Persian, very hard), "On hearing this joke the Shah and I unintentionally burst out laughing! On taking leave, the Shah said, "Anyhow, make a proper study of the matter, and report to me afterwards."

It is true that by accepting that post my expenses to some certain extent were secured, but I could not yet pay my debts. On the other hand, the humiliating behavior of the Prince's Mother and His Grandmother, who were originally Polish, but naturalized French, was simply unbearable! The ten months that I passed with them was indeed a mental torture! At the same time, during that period, I managed to improve their relations with the Royal Family. I obtained permission for Madame Sholsky, to call herself "Madam Pahlavi" and increased her monthly pay by Rials 20.000, moved her from her dirty house in town to a beautiful house in Shemiran, with a large garden and swimming pool. I put Mr. M. Z. Behrooz a well known and able man in-charge of the Prince's Persian Language studies. My ten months struggle with the Prince's Mother and his family, make an interesting subject for a story. A subject I would not like to write anything about! However, in the meantime the Cabinet changed and Mr. Ghods Nakhaii was recalled from London to be in charge of the Foreign Ministry. I was also a member of the Committee of National Archives. I was chosen a member of the UNESCO Committee because of the extensive knowledge I had obtained during 1936-1937 touring Europe to learn their existing working system. The committee charged me to draft a law for a "National Archives Office", an establishment which my country needed badly.



Abdullah Entezam



Ghods Nakhaii

**After two or three sittings, the Committee's recommendation was approved and sent to the Education Ministry, under the title, "Proposed law draft for the preservation of National Archives drawn by Mr. A. H. Meftah, and approved by the Committee."**

**The draft was sent to the Ministry of Education, but nobody knows what has happened to it! As with many other projects in my country!**



## **PART III**

### **Ambassador to Tunisia**

The misbehavior of Prince Ali's mother always kept me uneasy and thoughtful I was planning how to get rid of a horrible situation? But before I made an effective plan, I received a telephone call from the Foreign Ministry that Ghods Nakhaii would like to see me, if I would call on him sometimes next day. He told me that he was not pleased with the way that our Diplomatic Missions are administered. He wanted to ask me to go to Bern, but the Ambassador there, whose four years assignment was over, came to Tehran, and with an audience with His Majesty, succeeded to prolong his term for one more year. Therefore the only post available was Tunisia, and he asked for my opinion. I replied, "You know that Tunisia is not an appropriate post for me, but, since at present I am in a most disagreeable situation, I will accept anything to get away from Tehran.

Ghods Nakhaii took immediate action and obtained the Shah's consent. (Few years latter I learned that the Shah was not at all pleased to see me leaving the guardianship of the Prince). As soon as I received my appointment order, I sent my wife and my son to London for his schooling in England. On 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1961 with my daughter, Dey, we left for Tunisia.

My arrangement with my wife was to meet her at Rome airport on 23<sup>rd</sup> November, so that we could fly together to Tunisia. It was a very rough flight; fortunately we went through it without getting sick.

After I delivered the copies of my letters to Dr. Moghadam, the Tunisian Foreign Minister on 27<sup>th</sup> November, and presented my Credentials to Habib Bourghiba, the President on 4<sup>th</sup> December, I though that now I have to put myself to work. Remembering Mr. Abdollah Entezam's report on North Africa, some time in 1958, (1) I set myself to work. I sat myself in an Embassy to work where there were no means for work existed! I had no collaborator. The staff consisted of a second secretary, who knew neither French nor Arabic, and a Persian local secretary not at all trustworthy.

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(1)- Abdullah Entezam was sent to North Africa for a study tour. He visited Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. In his report He had urged the necessity of establishing Diplomatic Relations with the said countries. He had expressed the opinion that how and what kind of official relations should be established.

The Embassy was small comfortable villa of white marble, far away from being suitable for an Embassy. Yet it had a large garden that a proper residence for ambassador and an office could be built in that compound.

Anyhow, I had to work in an Embassy with such a discouraging atmosphere. There were no archives, no files about the different Tunisian Parties, Papers, and Personalities. And above all, nothing about the Algerian Provisional Government! The Embassy was established five years ago, therefore it should have these preliminary informative files.

My arrival in Tunisia coincided with Bizerte incident which resulted in French-Tunisia diplomatic rupture. In my introductory visits to my colleagues, I tried to obtain, as much information on true picture of the Bizerte incident as it was polite.

My contact with the Tunisian authorities and diplomatic colleagues convinced me that Tunisia was indeed interesting place for getting to know White Africa, or, as it is known by the local inhabitants, "Maghreb." So I found myself mistaken in disliking the post while in Tehran. Therefore I started to study their problems in depth.

The first thing that attracted my curiosity was the Bizerte incident. I fully profited from my first contacts with my diplomat colleagues to obtain the truth as to whether the Tunisians were armed or not? All my colleagues except one of them confirmed that the Tunisians were unarmed. When I asked the one, from Western Europe, what proof there was that they were armed, he said that the photos taken on that day showed that the Tunisian were indeed armed. I personally did not see such photos. Apart from that, it was not reported that anybody from French side was killed or even wounded. The incident resulted in the departure of all the French technicians, doctors and teachers, which paralyzed Tunisia's economy. Strangely enough, the population's reaction consisted of smile and harmless demonstrations in Tunis; while foreigners and even Embassies, were expecting a strong, positive reaction.

Another effect was the temporary damage it caused to Bourghiba's prestige, which gave a chance to the President Nasser of Egypt to instigate powerful propaganda against Bourghiba.

The behavior of the French garrison in Bizerte, which resulted in a massacre of one thousand five hundred young Tunisians, met with such strong reaction in France that it was rumored that the Commanding Officer of the garrison acted without Paris order. But this rumor could not be substantiated since General de Gaulle sent a telegram of appreciation to the Commanding Officer of the garrison.

Another reason given to justify the behavior of the French garrison was that, at that time France was heavily engaged by Algerian problem, and for the sake of her prestige, could not do otherwise!

The majority of the foreigners, knowing President Bourghiba as a clever man, could not believe that the President would allow such a demonstration, taking the circumstances into consideration. It was said that the President was deluded by some of his fanatic entourage.

There was no doubt that the Bizerte incident caused, in the first instance, great worry and sorrow for both Tunisia and France. But in my opinion, it should be accepted that the liberation of Algeria, owe a debt to the blood of those one thousand five hundred young Tunisians who shed their blood in Bizerte.

The closure of all the French economic and commercial establishments, and the departure of all the technicians and even Medical Doctors, left the field open for other nationalities, particularly for technicians from Eastern Europe. Among the foreign doctors, there were twelve Iranians with their families. I felt very pleased when my enquiries about them proved very satisfactory.

It did not take long before Tunisia resumed Diplomatic Relations with France. In spite of the ugly memories of the Bizerte incident, the people were pleased to see the resumption of the diplomatic relations; due to the fact that they knew it was their economy and commercial relations with France which could bring prosperity to Tunisia. France had always been best purchaser of all Tunisian products.

### **Union of Maghreb Arab**

Another subject which drew my attention was the move to establish a Union between the three North African countries, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The policy was advocated more by Tunisia and Algeria. The difficulty remained as always, which country would take the leadership?

The Tunisians claimed that theirs was the only country among the three which could at least keep her autonomy, and which had a long-standing administrative system, and a better cultural organization, and above all, it was President Bourghiba who laid the first stone of Maghreb Union by establishing the “Maghreb Bureau” while in refuge in Egypt.

Morocco claimed that she was the first of the three to give a mortal blow to the French Empire, and pulled herself out of the French yoke, and apart from that, she could always conserve her monarchy.



Algerians asserted that because of the great sacrifices they made during their seven years war of independence, and beside that, as they were the most populated and richer country than either of the two, Algeria should have the right of Leadership.

Perhaps, to a certain extent, the Algerian claim was the most justified, because in reality, the person who for the first time raised the voice of “Maghreb Union” was the Algerian Abdul Qader, who fought the French from 1822-1874 to establish the union, and if his ally, Morocco, had not been defeated, he most probably would have succeeded.

In 1962 a meeting between the leaders of Algeria and Morocco took place to work out the possibilities of establishment of the Union. A mixed commission was set up to study the case and prepare a working program for the Union. I have yet to hear the success of that commission! It should not be forgotten that Nasser, who cherished in his heart the ambition to establish an Arab Empire under his own leadership, was against any other kind of union, and therefore his agents were busy to engage Tunisia and Morocco, in particular, with propaganda against the Maghreb Union. But we know that Nasser’s effort was wasted, because none of the three Maghreb countries were prepared to accept a leader from Near Eastern Arabs. I heard from certain Algerian and Tunisian eminent personalities that they consider the Maghreb Arabs far more superior and civilized than Middle Eastern Arabs. I discovered that if some times they show some tendency towards Nasser, it is only to annoy and irritate the Western Powers!

However, the Maghreb question interested me very much, so much so, that I started to collect documents.

In my first report, which was the result of my primary study, I briefly explained, the situation of each of the countries, their internal problems and difficulties with each other. I promised to make a complete report at the end of my studies. The report was seen by the Shah with appreciation, as Mr. Alaa, the Minister of Court, informed me in a personal letter.

The situation in North Africa, particularly in Tunisia, which according to President Bourghiba, was the capital of Algeria, induced many countries, who had no representatives in Tunis, to send somebody to watch and study the situation. At a moment it was so interesting and exciting, that the world’s eyes were fixed on North Africa and on Tunis in particular. Suddenly on the 10<sup>th</sup> of August (My wife’s birthday), while my children and I were preparing ourselves to celebrate the occasion, I received a telegram from Gholam Abass Aram to the effect that due to tight financial condition

of the country, the government had decided to close five Embassies including Tunis! In the telegram I was instructed to visit the Tunisian Foreign Minister and inform him of the government's decision. Nothing was said in that telegram, as to what my personal situation would be! It goes without saying to what degree this news upset my wife and my children. My wife said, "What a nice birthday present from your friend Aram!?"

To calm my wife and my children, I told them that probably the government would ask me to go to Madrid, because our representative there was due to finish his term in Spain in about a month. I knew I was wrong. Posts in Europe were for favorites only and I was not among them. Few days later I received a telegram telling me to go to Saudi Arabia. Of course Saudi Arabia was more important for Iran than Tunisia. But my personal situation would not allow me to go to Riaz. My son was studying in England, my daughter studying in Tunis French school, my wife being European (English), could not come to Riaz or Jeddah with me, so I had to send my wife and daughter to England or to Tehran. The question was, would my financial standing meet the extra expenses I would be forced into? I had to split my income into three; but with my overdraft in the bank still outstanding, I simply could not manage it. In a civilized country they definitely would have behaved differently; but in my country, where the Minister had not the slightest knowledge of administration, rules or regulations, and had no family responsibilities, one could not expect human considerations! All these thoughts and the pressure of worry put me to bed with a nervous breakdown for over two weeks.

This decision of Iranian government not only surprised me and upset my life it also deeply surprised Tunisian Foreign Ministry and the Diplomatic Corps over there. It even shocked Athens Diplomatic Corps, as our Ambassador there told me that, He was questioned by his Diplomatic Colleagues, "Why did Iran take such a decision at such an important moment?"

However, I forced myself out of the bed to go to see Dr. Moghadam, Tunisian Foreign Minister, on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1962. I conveyed to him the instruction I had received from Tehran. Dr. Moghadam was surprised and very much displeased. He said, "I am sure the President and the Prime Minister will not be pleased to hear the news. The president no doubt, is not expecting that H.M. the Shah will place Tunisia among countries like Greece and Ethiopia," (None Moslem countries in which the Embassies were as well closed). "And with the respect and admiration which we conserve for Iran, this decision of your government is considered as an unfriendly one". His

last phrase made me very uneasy. I tried my best, in vain, to convince him that there were no unfriendly intentions in my government's decision. Dr. Moghadam was frank and a revolutionary person, therefore he could not hide his inward feelings. During the half an hour that I was with him, he repeated the phrase "Unfriendly Decision" several times. I reported my meeting with him in detail to Aram. When Aram realized that his unwise decision surprised and displeased the local authorities, to exonerate himself, made the Shah to believe that the phrase "unfriendly decision" was my own invention, because, I did not want to leave Tunis! Naturally this unfounded remark angered the Shah so much, that on my return to Tehran, my request to have an audience with the Shah was refused!

The great problem that Iran was confronted with was that, the Shah, unlike his father, a man who could not be deceived, is very whimsical and easy to deceive! I personally know of cases that are interesting. Such as Jalal Bayar deceived him to join Baghdad Pact!



Jalal Bayar

Anyhow, after consulting with my wife, the only solution we found to solve our problems was to sell the few carpets we had and send my wife and daughter to London, so that the education of my children should not be interrupted. Then I left for Tehran alone.

In Tehran I felt, unexpectedly, the atmosphere of the Imperial Court and the Foreign Ministry against me. The more I tried to find somebody to listen to me, the least I succeeded. My situation was

going from bad to worse. I could see my life, including my family was moving towards perilous stage.

As I have said, after returning to Tehran, I requested an audience repeatedly, finally I was instructed to put in writing my motive for requesting an audience with the Shah. I did not fail to fulfill that instruction immediately and passed it to the Shah through Mr. Entezam. In that petition I criticized the Foreign Ministry's mistake by closing the Tunis Embassy, and proposed a way to counteract that mistake which, if it could have been accepted, would have improved my situation as well, and remove the great worry and nerve strain that I was suffering from.

While I was in the waiting room of the private Palace, Mr. Entezam returned from his audience, and stretching out his hand to give back my petition, He said, "His Majesty read your petition and gave it back to be returned to you, because, as His Majesty said, he did not want to fall in other hands and added that he will give necessary instructions to Aram."

Mr. Entezam added that the Shah was cross with me, I said, "What for?" He said "due to the phrase you wrote in your report from Tunis, that the Tunisian Foreign Minister used the phrase "Unfriendly Decision" was your own invention because you did not want to leave Tunis" I replied that His Majesty should not be angry, because that expression was used by Dr. Moghadam which I felt my duty to report it.

After six months worry and being upset, finally I came to know who was the cause of such trouble and lose for me. I thought perhaps it would be better to write a letter to Dr. Moghadam, who was now Ambassador of Tunisia in Paris, and ask him, in an appropriate way to confirm his utterance "Unfriendly Decision" to Aram, so that he could see by himself that Meftah was not a liar, has never told a lie and will never do.

Next day I met Mr. Entezam and consulted him about what I intended to do, saying, "What would Dr. Moghadam think of our administration?" I then asked Mr. Entezam that in his next audience to request to do one of the three followings:

- 1) - For me to write a letter to Dr. Moghadam, as I explained to him.
- 2) - An instruction to be issued to Mr. Raiis, our Ambassador in Paris, to contact Dr. Moghadam, and clarify the case.



*Mohsen Raiis*

**3) - To allow me to go to Paris and contact Dr. Moghadam in presence of Mr. Raiis.**

**This is for if the Shah was not yet convinced that what I reported from Tunis was the truth!**



## **AMBASSADOR TO OSLO**

Finally, after continues request by Mr. Entezam, an instruction was issued that I should go to Oslo to establish our Embassy there. This instruction did not please Aram, who argued rightly, that after closing five Embassies, there was no point in establishing a new one. The remark could be an absolutely logical, only if he was honest about it, that he was not, since the budget of certain other Embassies were augmented.

Well, to go into details of how the very small budget of Oslo Embassy, without any assistant, was passed would be a good introduction to our administration, which unfortunately it can not be pressed into the present book. At the same time the question was, if Oslo was more important for Iran than Tunisia?

During the period of more than six months which I was struggling for a settlement, the few hundred Pounds that my wife took to London, for the expenses of our children's education and lodging, was nearing its end. Therefore, she thought to use her maiden name to be able to search for a job which could at least cover the rent of her flat in London. One month after, I received the Royal Decree appointing me as Ambassador to Oslo.

I left Tehran for Oslo on 19<sup>th</sup> April 1963. At the airport of Oslo, the chief of protocol who received & took me to a hotel, informed me that due to the absence of His Majesty King Olav and the Foreign Minister, who were in London to attend the wedding ceremony of Princess Alexandra, it will take few days for the presentation of your letters, therefore you should leave the copies of your credential letters to me, and use the time to go to London to bring your wife and daughter back to Oslo.

That was a good suggestion; therefore I left for London the next day. In Copenhagen the Danish Royal couple, who were attending the wedding ceremony, came on board the same plane!

The week in London was quite pleasant for me being with my wife and children again. The wedding of Princess Alexandra with Angus Ogilvy changed their monotonous daily life. They enjoyed running around to catch glimpses of the married Royal couple. I left London on 28<sup>th</sup> April with my daughter, leaving my wife behind until my son would return to school in Dorset at the end of his holidays.

At 11 A.M. next day I went to the Foreign Ministry in Oslo to pay my first visit to the Foreign Minister and other high officials of the Ministry. Being the first Iranian Ambassador in Oslo, obviously I expected to go through certain difficulties before the Embassy actually could be able to function. I had experienced to establish a

mission, when I was assigned to Hamburg in 1950 to establish our Consulate General over there, without any initial establishing fund, specially at the time in Germany that nothing could be found! The entire Germany was in ruins. Towns were still covered with rubble. It was almost impossible to find a house with running water in Hamburg. Yet I succeeded to establish our Consulate General in that ruined country. My success was not only to my eagerness and hard work; it was also due to the assistance I received from local authorities as well as from one of the Iranian merchants, Mr. M. Khosroshahi, present chairman of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, to whom I shall remain grateful.

Therefore to establish an Embassy in Oslo without initial fund was not a new happening. There were at least some suitable hotels to begin with. Being without any collaborator, I thought it easier to establish the Embassy in a hotel, therefore I chose the Oslo Grand Hotel which was right in the heart of town in a walking distance to the Foreign Ministry.

Oslo is small town with about 600.000 inhabitants, surrounded by pretty hills and fiords with a pleasant atmosphere. A proper place for a person like me, who has been in a nerve breaking struggle for the last two years!

What attracted me to Oslo first, was the First of May Parade. The display of different Guilds, flags in a disciplined way without police interference, which can be a sign of peoples national disciplined character. Actually apart from rush hours, no police men were to be seen anywhere on the streets. It was quite unlike Tehran where the undisciplined behavior of the people, particularly of taxi and army drivers, is the cause of the presence of police every where, which by itself justly or otherwise, necessitates police presence and interference. There is a distinct contrast between our two people, or even between the two countries. The Norwegian working class is slow and easy going workers. It may be possible that due to high standard of living, it makes them so easy going. The minimum income of a person is Norwegian Kroner 16.000 and maximum Kr. 22.000 per year. I remember a small part of Karl Johan Street was under repair, when I arrived to Oslo, how long before my arrival the repair had started I had no idea, but it went on for another couple of months! One day I asked my dentist, who had his clinic in the same street, why fixing of that small part is taking so long, where it is not a complicated work? He laughed and said, “ Oh no, it is not at all complicated job, and if it was in another country it would have been done in few days, but our workers are very easy-going people, and their motto is that, if the work is not finished today, we leave it for

tomorrow!" I said, "Well it will be very costly." He replied, "No it will not, since those people who are patching up that small hole are municipality workers, and Oslo municipality is very rich!" However it took several months for that job to finally finish!

Another thing which attracted my attention, and I think it attracts each and every foreigner visiting Norway, was the exaggerated free way of living of the Norwegian youth, particularly the girls!

Lately a move has started by Moral Rearmament (M.R.A.) Sect, if it could be called SECT? To fight this over-doing of free way of living of the girls, teenagers in particular!

There was a belief in Oslo that now that the Socialists government was out of office, some steps should be taken to tackle the problem. What was heard among Diplomatic Corps in Oslo was that, some Eastern European countries encourage ethical demoralization outside Eastern Europe.

Anyhow, the King returned from London and I presented my credentials on 17<sup>th</sup> May 1963. The presentation of my letters to the Sovereign, which is very simple in Norway, took place at 11 A.M.

The first month passed in exchange of curtesy calls to the Diplomatic Colleagues. There is no doubt that these exchanges of visits are the best method of collecting information, and getting to know the country & the colleagues. It was through these meetings that I learned that the Norwegians, like other Scandinavians, do not know the world! What is outside of Scandinavia, except England, is unknown to the majority of these people! Apart from a very limited number of people, who have been in the Diplomatic Service or businessmen and merchant marine, the majority do not know where Asia or Africa is located? That was why one of the most important duties of an Asian or African diplomat in Scandinavia was to introduce his country by various means. Today the best instrument for spreading information is television, provided the local authorities of the host country where the Diplomat is serving, are willing to inform their people with the realities of conditions in Asia and Africa.

Before leaving Tehran for Oslo some of my Moral Rearmament friends sent a letter of introduction to their members in Oslo, who were quite helpful in knowing local people and also putting at my disposal their hall for showing films and delivering lectures to introduce my land.

The Scandinavian countries particularly Norway, are not acquainted with countries outside Europe, but the present struggle for freedom and independence in Africa brought the situation of that continent to the notice of the Scandinavian countries; and any country unknown to them is taken as an African one! If one talks



about Iran, he is asked; where in Africa Iran is located! And since when she got her independence?

I had an amusing experience that it would not be out of place to recount it here: The Red Cross of Norway, every year organizes a "Red Cross Week" during which they go around and make collections for the Red Cross. In 1964, the Red Cross of the town of Trondheim decided to organize an Iranian Bazaar in the biggest hotel of the town, not knowing where Iran is situated. The Chairman of the Red Cross of Trondheim, who was a lady, wrote me a letter and informed me of their decision and asked what sort of help they could expect from the Embassy? I requested that they should delegate a responsible person to discuss the matter. The Lady in-charge of Trondheim section was chosen. I invited her to come for one afternoon tea. When she arrived, one could easily gather from her expression that she was not expecting to see us, my wife & me in European attire, or to see the house furnished and arranged in European style. My wife, noticing her expression, without hesitation said, "It seems that you were expecting to meet people different from us? People with a different appearance and dress in long robes sitting crossed legged on the floor!" The lady frankly admitted it, and said that the truth was that they were not well acquainted with the world geography, and thought Iran was one of the emerging independent African countries. I then had to introduce my country on a world map and give her a short historical account of Iran. Her lack of knowledge about Iran encouraged me to pay special attention to the success of their Iranian Bazaar. I contacted my Iranian Merchant friends in Hamburg and the Iranian Red Lion and Son, for help. I felt so happy when I saw that my appeal was promptly and generously acknowledged. The Norwegian Red Cross's plan was to produce an Iranian menu for the evening. My wife went to Trondheim to help the cook of the hotel to prepare the Iranian menu. Most unfortunately for my wife and me, our only daughter was killed by a tramway, shortly before the Red Cross Week. Therefore my wife could not go to Trondheim. But I was pleased to see that the cook of the hotel managed successfully to prepare the Iranian menu, which every body enjoyed.

The Bazaar was set up in the large and famous Hotel Britannia of Trondheim, beautifully decorated and the valuable presents of handy crafts and samples of the Iranian produce gave a rich aspect to the Bazaar. The Bazaar was so successful that there was not a single empty chair left. I only longed that my wife and daughter could be present to enjoy the evening, as the other five hundred guests did.

A few days later, the Chairman of the Norwegian Red Cross, accompanied by two of his assistants, called on me and presented a Plaque in recognition of the success of the Bazaar. As this was due to the generous and beautiful presents sent by the Iranian Red Lion and Son, as well as my merchant friends in Hamburg, I feel myself indebted to them all.

However after a long search I succeeded in finding a house for the Embassy and established my office. Now I found myself having time to spare to study the Norwegian life, mentality of people, and the way the National and International Policies were carried out. In studying Norway's commercial relations with Iran, I realized that our commercial contact was via Germany or England. I thought it better if I could work out to bring our commercial relations, though small, into direct contact. To realize that ambition, it was necessary that a group of Norwegian business men travel to Tehran and study the possibilities themselves. To that end I arranged that I accompany the Chairman of Norwegian Export Council with other four members of the Council from different industries, to Tehran. I left for Tehran on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1964, by the first plane opening a weekly Oslo-Tehran direct route.

At the time, Norway was working hard to change her depending on fisheries alone, to other industries such as Aluminum and textiles; therefore she was searching for markets for her new products. To achieve her aims, Norway organized industrial exhibitions in different countries. The Norwegian Week in Tehran seemed to have been successful. From the Iranian side, most unfortunately, nothing had been done. I insisted that a commercial treaty should be concluded between the two countries, so that the benefit would not be one-sided. Having this in mind, I sent a copy of the last Norwegian and Japanese treaty of commerce, to show the Iranians how the new treaties were concluded, to prevent one-sided advantage. Now that Norway was producing manufactured goods, we could manage our commercial relations to a market for our own products and raw materials. Again unfortunately my efforts produced no reaction in Tehran!

The only thing I managed to do, was to obtain work permit for an Iranian merchant in Norway, so that through him direct contact could be established and to be the only means for introduction of the Iranian products! Bearing in mind that for a foreigner that his country had no commercial treaty with Norway it was almost impossible to work! The Norwegian factory's pretext for not using Iranian raw materials was that: first they have old American or Egyptian suppliers, whom they do not like to change. The second

excuse was that, they had unpleasant experience with Iranian raw materials, because they found differences between the samples and the actual goods!

However, to encourage the Iranian merchant, I joined him in establishing a small company under the name of “Tehran Huset” (Tehran House), to manage it myself, after finishing my term of office in Oslo. The capital we invested in that company was meager, because neither of us could afford a large sum; but my old standing friendship with some of my compatriot merchants in Hamburg, and their trust in me gave the opportunity to obtain from them a substantial credit in kind. A genteel gesture which I shall always remember!

Another question which drew my attention in Norway was the strategic situation vis-à-vis Russia and the Western World, particularly England.

The Scandinavian countries in general are considered buffer states for England against Russia. That is why they are always in favor of Great Britain, while Russia is seeking hard to penetrate in this buffer zone, by obtaining certain concessions in Norwegian Islands in the arctic sea. The strategic situation of Norway resembles that of Iran, since both the countries have contact with Russia by land as well as the sea. The establishment of the North Atlantic Organization opened their eyes more to their strategic importance. About the middle of 1963, Mr. Erik Quam, a retired colonel in a booklet named “Norway a Frontier State” compared Norway’s strategic position of that of the Baltic States, annexed to Russia, and expressed the opinion that, for Russia, Norway was far more valuable than the Baltic States. He wrote that the Russian effort in transforming the peninsula of Kola into a great Ballistic-Missile base, as well as important air and sea base, brought the whole of the Norwegian coast under Russian watch. A watch for which a larger space was essential. He also expressed the opinion that with the strength that Russia has obtained by these means, the Russian naval power should be counted as second after that of United States of America, the defeat of which, after the North Atlantic Organization, would take a long time.

The publication of the booklet of Colonel Qvam, was interpreted in Norway to mean that he was talking the French suggestion that N.A.T.O. should be armed with Nuclear Atomic weapons.

From what I learned by my Principal Norwegian contacts, they were not happy to be a member of N.A.T.O. They expressed the opinion that, until before the W.W.II, Norway was always quiet, happy and away from scandals. Now, being in N.A.T.O. she is forced

into an arena which is contrary to her political and economic interest, particularly if this state caused Russia to have constant request on Norway. Among the Liberals, one can find personalities who believe that a collective, positive, neutrality-pact between the Scandinavian countries could far more be effective. To justify their argument, they take as an example, Sweden's neutrality in the W.W.II. This belief is of course, to a certain extent correct, under the condition that Scandinavian countries collectively, be able to establish a strong Defensive Army, which can effectively defend their countries. It is true that the geographical position and contours of Norway gives great defensive help and possibilities for constructing strong fortifications; but it is doubtful if the small population of Norway could afford to bear the brunt of heavy expenses of a modern defense plan. During the W.W.II, a chain of valuable fortifications was built by the Germans in Norway, all of which was demolished after the war!

There is a paragraph in Erik Qvam's booklet in which he compares the two countries of Finland and Poland, and writes, "From the point of view of the small and weak States it is deplorable that the reaction of the democracies is dependant upon the victim's own strength and ability, but it is all the same, a truth that must be faced that the able receive help, whereas the slack and inefficient are left to their fate!" (Iran is a good example)!

When I was reading the above paragraph, I remembered what the late Dr. Khalif, a Russian emigrant in Tehran, told me, during the war, when discussing the way the Finns and Poles defended their countries. He said the difference between the Finns and the Poles was that the farmer is indeed attached to his land, therefore his country, whereas the later is to the braids of his uniform!



## **Iran's Land Reform Film on Norwegian TV**

While busy introducing my country, by distributing bulletins and giving lectures, I received a telephone call from Mr. Bjerkholt, a journalist friend, on 15<sup>th</sup> May 1964, that a film on land reform in Iran would be televised at 10 P.M. I was invited to an Italian concert, but explained to my host, Italian Ambassador, the reason why I had to leave before the concert was over.

The film was produced in such a way that nothing could be seen save the problems and difficulties of a peasant life in Iran and nothing of the new developments such as new schools, hospitals, universities, or industrial developments. To watch that film made me very uncomfortable, and reminded me of a film I saw about thirty years ago in Quetta, where I was Vice-Consul, shown by C. Skrine (now Sir C. Skrine), at a dinner party, in which the only brick building visible was the British Embassy in Tehran!

Needless to say how unpleasant it was for me to watch that film, particularly when it was commented on by the Shah himself! I passed two or three days in contemplating what action I should take? In the mean time I enquired about the identity of the film producer. I came to know that the producer was an English company, and that before Oslo, the film had been shown, first in Milan!

On the second day a Norwegian gentleman, who had been in Iran for two years, visited me and asked if I had seen the film, and what my reaction was? I told him frankly that it did not appeal to me. "Nor to me" was his reaction. He continued by saying that he was called by his father and reproachfully had been asked, why he had told so many lies about Iran? Since the story of the film was quite different from what the father had heard from his son about Iran! The son had replied to his father, "If a film was taken in Lapland about the way the Norwegian people live up north and exhibited in Tehran, as the way the people live in Norway, how would you like it?" He satisfied his father with that explanation, but he asked, "What about the thousands of people who have seen the film, and do not know anything about the truth?" He argued why they had shown only one side of the coin and not the other side, so that people could see also that there had been great efforts underway for extensive development of the country?"

I gave him the truth, but to cover our own mistakes, I said, "I believe that the film had the other side of the coin, but the maliciousness of those who search every means to show to the Europeans that the Asia-African people are backward, uncivilized

and inefficient, had cut off the other side of the coin.” Who knows, my hypothesis might be true?

I reported the case to Tehran and requested them to send to the Embassy a few films of Tehran, Esfahan and other towns, to be shown in Norway. I got no reply to my request, but received two films which I sent to Norwegian Broad Casting agency, as it was arranged. The films were kept by nearly two months without being broad cased with the pretext that one of the films was in color that they had no means to broad cast it, and the other one was too pale for black and white TV!!! Their refusal to broad cast the films strengthened my supposition that the land reform film was mishandled. Therefore through my Norwegian friends, I started in-depth investigation, it came out that the Director of Broad Casting was a communist at heart, and therefore avoided showing the other side of the coin of the film. In socialist countries they avoid showing developments in none socialist countries as their main anti imperialist policy! Yet, it did not keep me from showing the films myself. I used the M.R.A. hall to exhibit them. I showed them at the Embassy receptions. At one of the Embassy’s receptions, which was arranged in honor of a number of members of the Pen Congress which had a meeting in Oslo, among the delegates Mr. Rahnama and Mr. Nategh from Iran, the film attracted the attention of the guests, and added to the success of the Evening.

The two films afterwards were sent to the Lady Director of the Red Cross of Trondheim, to be shown in their Technical University hall, clubs and cinemas, accompanied by hundreds of maps and magazines about Iran. I can confidently say the people of Trondheim now know Iran well.



Land reform

From right: Arsanjani-Alam-M.R.Shah-Amini-Abdolhamid Hakimi



## **The Death of “DEY” my only daughter**

In Oslo there is no school that Diplomats can send their children where lessons are given either in English or French.

Americans have a school of ten grades for the children of the officers of N.A.T.O. Serving in Norway. British also have school of six grades, which is for their own children. My children frequented the American school in Tehran.

When I was assigned to Tunis, I sent my son with my wife to England to continue his studies and I took my daughter to Tunis. But my wife was not prepared to be separated from her daughter, she joined us in Tunis. There was no English-speaking school in Tunis, therefore I was forced to send her to a French school, called, Jeanne d, Arc, and to enable her to continue her English studies employed an English teacher for her. She was talented to learn different languages. She advanced rapidly. She could manage herself in French language in ten months, till, we had to leave Tunis. Now it was a pity to leave her to forget the French Language. Therefore I sent her along with her mother to London to join French Institute, in which she could continue both the French and English languages! Unfortunately the French Institute in London is a day school which has no capacity to accept boarding students. Hence I had to take my daughter back to Oslo. The wandering of the past two-three years, which is one of the worse suffering of Diplomats specially the Iranian ones, with the result of perpetual changing schools was naturally very disturbing for children as well as their parents. Non existence of an English school in Oslo caused a halt in my daughter’s education.

The goodwill and personal interest of the headmaster of the small English school of six grades necessitated him to add a class to the school, under the name of “advanced Class” in which the children of eleven to seventeen years old were admitted. The headmaster personally had to bear the difficulty of looking after the study of twelve students of that special class. When I failed to get admission for my daughter to enroll into American School, which was a larger one, I had no choice but to send her to the English school. She joined the Advance Class, and again I had to engage a private teacher for her French studies. But after about a year, and complains to the American Ambassador for not admitting my daughter to the American school, he used his influence to curb the school’s decision to admit the children of the Diplomatic Corps. She then joined the American school, in the eight grades. Being a sociable girl, soon she got friendly with a number of girls from her class, so much so that

she spent her vacations with them, either playing tennis, or going cross-country skiing and swimming.

In Norway, especially in Oslo, summer is very quiet, because the Norwegians as well as the Diplomats leave Oslo for south of France or any other sunny spots of the world. For me, who had no efficient assistant, it was not possible to leave my post; therefore I had to stay in Oslo. The only pleasure my daughter had was to go to the Frogner Park swimming pool.

On 13<sup>th</sup> July 1964 at about 10.30 A.M. she entered my office to say that she is going for swimming pool. She disliked using the official car to go to school or for any other personal use, considering it, very snobbish! She preferred to use the school bus going to school and public transportation and her bicycle for other purposes. It was past 11 a.m. when my telephone rang and my private secretary told me that Mrs. Olson wanted to talk to me. Mrs. Olson, was the wife of an American Officer from N.A.T.O. contingent in Oslo, was on the line and spoke in an uneasy manner. She said that she was taking her daughter to the swimming pool to join my daughter, when she saw a big crowd around the tramway. She got out of her car to find out what was happening and she saw my daughter on the ground rolling in her blood, and nobody was making any move to call the police or ambulance. She stopped the first pickup truck passing and sent my daughter to hospital. She did not say in what condition my daughter was! She simply said, "Go to hospital as soon as you can." My wife had taken the Embassy's car for shopping; hence I had to ask my secretary to take me to hospital. Upon arriving to hospital, DEY was on stretcher ready to be taken to the operating chamber. The blood streamed from her left ear, nose and mouth as she moved from one side to the other. I took her hand and kissed it and asked her what had happened and if she could hear me? She turned towards me but did not utter a word. I do not know if she could not speak, or if she was unconscious. OH, what a ghastly, painful, unforgettable sight for a father! I was completely lost, did not know neither where I was, where to go nor what to do nor who to call for help. I was so shocked that I could neither cry nor to speak, just moving around without willpower, like a robot. The nurse pushed her stretcher to the lift to take DEY to the operating floor, while my daughter still moving her legs and hands, was breathing with difficulty through her blood congested mouth. Apart from her head which was dangerously damaged, the rest of her body seemed quite sound. She was taken to the operating chamber where Professor Dr. Christiansen, who had an international reputation in brain surgery, worked over an hour on her head. In the meantime, my wife arrived in complete lost state. I



left my secretary to explain in what state I found my daughter. We could not do anything save to wait and pray.

After one hour, she was brought to her room, but motionless and breathing through a machine. She was well cleaned and bandaged. I asked the professor's opinion. He said, he was not without hope, but the cerebral was badly damaged. His opinion aggravated our depression and fear, but he tried in vain to console us by saying that she was a healthy and strong girl and could fight it through. Yes, she was a strong and healthy girl, but the injury and most probably the anesthetics, were stronger, as the professor himself thought!

However after twenty hours of unconsciousness, which worried the doctors, the second operation was thought necessary to find out the reason for the prolonged unconsciousness. After the second operation the doctor's opinion was that, the damage to the cerebellum was the cause. The doctor and his assistant did what was in their power to revive my daughter. I often went to her bedside trying in vain to wake her up by massaging her hands and calling her. The unconsciousness lasted for more than thirty six hours, but the heart and blood circulation still worked normally. The doctor lost hope, and tried painfully to make me understand that because of the depth of her unconsciousness it was difficult to remain optimistic. Finally, after three days being in coma, on July the 6<sup>th</sup> at about 4 P.M. the accident separated our dearly beloved daughter from us for ever, and buried our happiness with her.

What was the real cause, the damage to her cerebellum or overdose of anesthetics? She was still moving before she received the anesthetic! No, the problem lies with our own bad luck to have the head of the Ministry an unknown man who was allowed to play with me, to be kicked like a football from one country to the other for the past four years. After forty five years of honest service, I was treated worse than a young newcomer would ever be! My readers can well judge the reason, after having read this book, my sincerity to my country plus honesty in my work, never permitted me to be a flatterer, a yes-man and with an obsession against my country's real interests.

However immediately after the accident, I informed my sister and asked if there was a competent doctor who might save my daughter, although Professor Christiansen considered himself as good a brain surgeon as any existing in Europe. Most unfortunately, my sister could not find anybody, because of the vacation months. She flew to Oslo to be with my wife.

When I was in Hamburg (1950-1952) my daughter was three years old. There I obtained, from the local authorities a peace of land in the

famous cemetery of Olsdorf as a grave yard for Iranians, little I knew of the fact that twelve years later, I would bury my own daughter in that grave yard!

Anyhow, next day, 17<sup>th</sup> July, the body of our beloved daughter was respectfully flown to Hamburg, by a private plane. The heads of the Diplomatic Corps were kind enough to be present at the airport, where the flags of the two countries were hoisted half mast.

That was how my last post abroad, like the first one, ended in unforgettable tragedy, the death of my only daughter, DEY (an angle who holds the plan and prudence of the month of Dey in her possession, the 10<sup>th</sup> month of the Iranian solar calendar).

In Tehran, my Ministry was kind enough to publish a statement that my daughter was killed due to her carelessness cycling in the streets! Contrary to their bizarre kindness, the Oslo police report, which is in my possession, after a through investigation, decided that the tram driver was fully responsible for the occurrence of the tragedy? Strangely enough, the same tram driver had had a similar accident with a car the year before, which was his fault as well, and his driving license was withdrawn for three months.

After having studied the report of the police, I watched the movement of the tram on the spot several times, a feeling of suspicion developed in me. Was the man suffering from sadism or strong anti-foreign feeling, which is quite considerable among the Norwegians, particularly among the elderly? One feels this prejudice distinctively in Oslo. When shopping, I always avoided consulting elderly assistants while entering the shop.

If it was my daughter's fault, then why did the Oslo tramway company paid 30,000 Krone for the material damage caused us? Anyhow I could not convince myself that the killing of my daughter was not intentional. I revealed my opinion to my lawyer, and asked him to peruse the case in the court. He claimed that, he did what he could according to the Norwegian jurisprudence. I told him if he was not going to be offended, I would like to call for a foreign lawyer. His reaction was that foreign lawyers are not allowed to practice in Norway. So my daughter was killed by a blood thirsty sadist, who escaped the deserved punishment, while our beloved daughter, along with our happiness, was buried for ever! Strangely enough, no attention was paid to my report on this case to the Foreign Ministry!

That was how my forty five years service came to the end. Please do not embarrass me by asking how the forty five years were rewarded? Just remember that I was an Iranian Civil Servant without any weak points, but graced by sensitivities. I wished I could

have complexes, and not be so sensitive. Do not say it is too late, since I know it!

Well after all, I can not say I finished my forty five years of honest service without any reward. There was an unforgettable one and here it is!



*Mother dressing her daughter*

Well do not be surprised, my dear readers, if I, in spite of all that you have read, bring the end with the words “Javid Shah” (Long Live the Shah), because the independence and integrity of my country depends on the existence of this ancient symbol. But to be able to conserve this ancient institution, it is badly in need of reforms, cleaning it inside-out from the heavily corrupt and immoral elements.



## **APENDIX**

### **1-The Document of rupturing Diplomatic Relations with England**

**The Ministry of Foreign Affairs letter to Her Britannic Majesty's Charge d, Affairs in Tehran**

**Monsieur le Charge d, Affairs,**

**I have the honor to inform you of the decision of the Imperial Iranian Government to break off diplomatic relation with Her Majesty's Government. The Iranian government much regrets that they have been compelled to adopt this decision.**

**In the course of dispute with the former Oil Company my government constantly endeavored to prevent the dispute from impairing the friendly relations between our two governments and are of the opinion that, had the British government taken into account, the due regards to equitability and friendship, the purpose of the Iranian Nation and government which solely consisted in recovering their despoiled rights, the relations between our two governments would never have reached the present state.**

**Unfortunately, however, in this matter which is of vital importance to our people, your government not only did not help to bring about a settlement of the dispute but, by giving illegal protection to the Former Company, prevented the attainment of an agreement. Further more, certain officials of the government made difficulties, by provocations and unjustified interferences, for the purpose of disturbing the country's peace and tranquility.**

**The Imperial government of Iran hopes that Her Britannic Majesty's government, realizing the truth and the nature of the Iranian Nation's movement, will revise their attitude. Should such a favorable atmosphere and good understanding be produced, the Iranian government, being always desirous of maintaining good relations between the two governments, will take with great pleasure, measures to resume diplomatic relations.**

**In conclusion I would like to inform you that the members of the Imperial Embassy in London have been instructed to leave for Tehran within a week as from October 22, 1952.**

**Please accept the assurances of my high consideration.**

**Dr. Hossein Fatemi  
Minister for Foreign Affairs**



## **(2)-MOSSADEGH'S MESSAGE TO THE BRITISH NATION**

Dear Mr. Middelton,

Now that you and your colleagues are homeward bound and your sojourn in Iran is a matter of days, I would like to send through you a message to your countrymen, with the hope that they may become acquainted with the facts as they stand, that in the course of our campaign of the last eighteen months, the Iranians have constantly endeavored to employ all the means in their power to prevent any flaw from appearing in the friendly relations of long duration between the two nations. It is with this hope and expectation that I would like to present in a summery form the facts concerning the developments of the last nineteen months in Iran, which have, undoubtedly, been concealed from the British people by the activities of the former company. My government also did its best to find an equitable solution for the oil dispute through amicable negotiations, so as to remove the clouds of suspicion and pessimism which have darkened the horizon of the relations between the two states, created for so many years through the covetousness of a profit-seeking company – and make prevalent an atmosphere of mutual confidence and concurrent sincerity and open a new chapter in the diplomatic relation of Iran and the United Kingdom.

The valuable time which of necessity must have been employed for the introduction of internal reforms was wasted by the continuation of futile negotiations with various missions and exchange of acts during the last nineteen months.

However, it brought about this result that when to our great regret the diplomatic relations between the states have reached the present stage, the government and the people of Iran can easily demonstrate to the world that, from the very beginning, they have been desiring with utmost goodwill to come to a settlement of the oil dispute and that they have spared no effort for the fulfillment of this object. While on the contrary the covetous Company, which was conscious of the fact that it enjoyed full protection of the British government as far as its legal expectations and desires were concerned, resorted to threats and “Philippic” and brought the dispute before international tribunals which was not regarded as competent to give it a hearing. Further more, following a policy of procrastination to derive benefit from the time element in preparing the ground for the collapse of the Iranian people, it deliberately caused the failure of the various oil missions; and with false

propaganda, financed out of the pillage of the recourses of the poor Iranians, it spread the rumors, even in the remotest parts of the world that the government and the people of Iran are not prepared to arrive at a settlement of the oil dispute. This undesirable policy on the part of the former Company was continued and the United Kingdom government went to such extremes in extending their protection of the fictitious and illegitimate claims of the former Company that all the principles of amicable relations were put aside on the shelf of oblivion; and through taking advantage of internal intrigues and machinations, supplemented by financial pressures and unreasonable economic restrictions which ought to thrive amongst the various members of the United Nations Organization were ignored and trampled by the United Kingdom government through "economic punishment of its own reaction". The Iranian government bore stoically this aggression upon its rights for months without showing any reaction.

It is needless to point out to those who are acquainted with the story of this adventure that the British government established a dictatorial regime in Iran for the sole purpose of safeguarding its illegitimate interests. The second step taken by the British government was to impose a new agreement in 1933 upon the Iranian people through the instrumentality of the regime of its own creation, while invoking the original d, Arcy Concession which had never received the sanction of the Iranian Parliament. Besides potential economic affects, which was detrimental to our interests, the imposed 1933 Agreement endangered our political integrity and independence by allowing the former Company to interferer unduly in our social and political affairs.

During the fifty years of operation in Iran, the former Company, while exploiting our oil recourses which have yield revenues amounting to hundreds of million of Pounds, has not even acted for a single day as a commercial enterprise free from politics; but, on the contrary, it has had a finger in every pie of corruption which we have witnessed in Iran during the last fifty years.

Taking the recent world development into due consideration as regards the self-determination of nations, the Iranians could no longer tolerate the behavior of the Former Company; and the best interest of the nation demanded an immediate change of the situation which manifested itself through the nationalization of the oil industry throughout the country. In other words, The Iranian availed themselves of the birthright of any free and independent nation. Many other counties and particularly the United Kingdom have availed themselves of the right to nationalize their industries.

Notwithstanding the faith that the Iranian government were within their established right to nationalize the oil industry, yet the United Kingdom government from the outset took measures, inside and outside of Iran, meant for the protection of the unlawful interest of the former Company which were contrary to the spirit of friendship between the two governments. Subsequent to the very rigid and unlawful fight against our national sentiments and aspirations, they finally had no alternative but to recognize the undeniable right of the Iranian Nation to nationalize their oil industry. The Iranians consequently expected the British government to abide by its recognition of the principle of nationalization and act accordingly. The Iranian government also did its best to take into consideration the British interests in so far as they were not in contravention of the provisions of the Oil Nationalization law, and made great efforts to demonstrate their goodwill. For example, we were prepared to allow the Former Company to export any amount of oil it desired against receipts for what was to be shipped, the price of which was to be taken into account when the compensation claims were to be settled. But the former Company did not show any willingness to agree to this proposal.

The second proposal, which was made by the Iranian government to the former Company, relative to the continuation of services of its technical staff according to their existing contracts, was also rejected. Since the British technical staff was not willing to work for the Iranian National Oil Company, the Iranian government could not pay them their salary and hence their dismissal was forced upon us by the circumstances.

The British government transformed the dispute between the former Oil Company and the Iranian government into an interstate dispute; and a case which logically should have received a hearing in the Iranian Tribunals was brought before the Security Council. Having faced disappointment, the British government referred the case to the International Court of Justice, but there also no positive result was obtained and even the British Member of the Court, Sir Arnold Duncan MacNair took sides with Iran as well. At this junction, I deem it necessary to thank him for his fairness and impartiality.

The former Company act being faced with the decision of the International Court of Justice failed a plea with the said Court to appoint an arbitrator, but again the reply was in the negative.

It was our expectation that the British government after so many unfriendly actions would change its policy towards us, but, to our regret, it pursued the same course.



In order to settle the differences, the Iranian government showed its readiness to pay compensation to the former Company in accordance with the nationalization laws enacted in Great Britain or according to laws of any country which the former Company may prefer to choose, and in order to show its utmost goodwill the Iranian government, as an exception, refrained from referring the said case to the Iranian Tribunals which were the only competent course to deal with it, and agreed to submit the case to the jurisdictions of the International Court of Justice. This proposal was also rejected. Finally, the Iranian government requested an advance payment of Pounds 20,000,000 (Gold Guaranteed and convertible into Dollars) out of the 49,000,000 million Pounds which the former Company incontestably owed Iran according to its own published balance sheet, so that the existing economic tension in Iran might be somewhat ameliorated, but this proposal was also rejected.

It may be explained that the twenty million pounds, the immediate payment of which had been requested, was part of the share of the government of Iran from the general reserve fund of the former Company in accordance with the 1951 balance sheet and the imposed 1933 Concession Agreement. The general reserve fund of the former Company, according to the 1951 balance sheet amounted to 110,500,000. Therefore, the twenty per cent, Iranian share on the basis of the imposed 1933 Agreement from the total of 110,500,000 of general reserve fund amounted to 22,100,000, which was immediately due on the account of the nationalization of Oil Industry. From this total 20,000,000, had been requested on account. Meanwhile as mentioned above, the British government, besides raising other difficulties, did not refrain from supporting the unlawful interests of the former Oil Company by bringing financial and economic pressure on the people of Iran, through prevention of the sale of Iranian oil in world market, and even by refusing to release Iranian Sterling holdings in British Banks.

Finally, in the note sent by H.E. Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on October 15, 1952, to me in reply to the proposals of the Iranian government, the intentions of the British government were disclosed.

It was made clear that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs demanded compensation for profits that would have accrued to the former Company, had the Company continued its activities of plundering the wealth of this country.

Industries are nationalized evidently to remove private profiteering, and to pass on the proceeds of nationalization exclusively to the public treasury. The British government, according

to the latest note, intended clearly to revive the 1933 Agreement in another form, for, instead of limiting their compensation claims to the properties and installations of the Former Company in Iran, they demanded such payment of compensation as would cover all unlawful profits supposed to ensue from the Agreement.

The receipt of this recent note left no doubt in the minds of impartial observers that the British government, besides the unfriendly measures so far taken, did not wish to revise their policy in the smallest degree, but wished to carry on their unfriendly policy contrary to the aspirations of the two nations.

Those steps compelled the government of Iran to sever diplomatic relations with the British government and to leave the resumption of the relations to such time as the British government might care to revise their policy with regard to world development and the awakening of the people of Iran, and with due consideration for the principles of justice and equity.

The Iranian government explicitly declares that sincere and friendly relations between the people of Iran and Great Britain shall continue to stand on their firm foundations. For this reason now that the last members of the diplomatic staff of the British Empire are leaving the Iranian Capital, no difficulties are created for British nationals, whether merchants or travelers.

I am sure that, if some day the books and records of the former Company are opened before the eyes of the truth-loving people of Great Britain and they are given opportunity to see the interference, injustice, intrigues, political maneuvers and pulverous activities of the former Company, they will no doubt admire the patience and fortitude of our people. But the black curtain of unjust propaganda that the former Company carries on in Great Britain and elsewhere prevents the spread of truth, and this has once more proved the power of money still mocks truth and justice in the twentieth century. But our people shall continue their manly struggle until the majority of the people of Great Britain shall arrive at the impartial judgment of Sir Arnold Duncan MacNair and shall hear and read lines from what he read and heard.



### **(3)- Interview with Sir Denis Wright**

**“Thank you for coming. What made me to ask you to be good enough to come to see me was that, I wanted to discuss with you a matter, which will have great influence in our countries friendly relations. “**

**“The last few days, I was thinking that, if even the oil question ends one hundred per cent, in favour of my country, still the opponents will try to find other problems for criticism. I, therefore, tried to study our other differences, which have always been the cause of complaint, pessimism and distrust of the people in our relations. Among the differences, I found one which can serve as a good means of propaganda in showing to the people that this time England is really sincere in her approach, which is supported by goodwill, and that was our frontier differences with Pakistan. I do not know how far you are familiar with it?”**

**He said: “I am not yet acquainted with the differences, but I am busy studying our relations through the books and archive I found in the Embassy library.”**

**“Then I had better give you a short history of the case. According to our treaties of 1812 and 1814, England engaged herself not to interfere in Iran-Afghan relations. But after the Iran-Russian wars, which resulted in our losing Caucasia and Trans-Caspian to Russia, the Russian frontier with Iran advanced greatly. This, of course, worried Great Britain and instead of coming to some arrangement with Iran to stop further Russian infiltration, she tried to occupy, or bring under her protection, regions of Iran, which she considered as India’s defense outpost, regions which have always been part of Persia. The treaties of 1812-1814 are best evidence of Great Britain’s RECOGNITION of Iran’s supremacy in these regions.”**

**“So it was necessary to find some excuse to enable Great Britain to interfere in these regions. The Herat incident, which began with disloyalty of the Herat governor, backed by Kabul, served as a good excuse. The interference of Great Britain in this matter, which was kept very secret, soon became known when, contrary to the engagements taken in the said two treaties, the British Minister in Tehran mediated the conflict, which had a long history, and I am sure you can obtain full knowledge from your Embassy’s archives.”**

**“In short, a war which was created by the Minister and was nearing its end in favour of Iran, took different turn when British landed troops in Bushehr, and not only forced Iran to evacuate Afghanistan, but to abandon Herat, which was always a part of Khorasan. Iran was forced to sign a peace treaty with Britain, in 1858, known as the Paris Peace Treaty. Therefore Afghanistan, as north-west defence outpost of India, fell under the protection of Great Britain.”**

**“The game did not end here. The weakness of Iran, after the last two wars, encouraged Britain on her expansion policy by means of penetration. So about the end of the nineteenth century, a man named Goldsmith under the false occupation, as telegraph engineer to survey the possibility of extending the Indo-European telegraph line to Bushehr via overland, entered Baluchistan. It was revealed that his real mission was to create discord among the tribes or Sardars of the region,**

**And in particular between Khan of Kalat and Tehran, the result of which was the desire of the Khan to extend his domain over a great part of Mokran, Kharan and Changi. When Iran refused the Kahn’s claim, Goldsmith appeared on the scene as mediator, with a map showing the Khan’s claim. When the Tehran government refused to concede to the Khan’s claim, Goldsmith backed by the government of India, entered Panjgoor at the head of a strong military force and sent a strong note to the Tehran government intimidating them, saying that if his note and the proposed map was not accepted by the Tehran government he would advance further! So Nasser-din-Shah, under the duress, issued a decree, which read as follows: “while we recognize our legitimate and historic rights over Baluchistan, to please the British government, we accept the note and the map attached to it.” This acceptance is known by us as the Iran-Kalat Agreement of 1896.”**

**“What proved, even today, that the Iranian government is still against the said treaty is that from the said date till now they refused to join in any demarcation commission. As you see this map, which is an English map and was published by the Calcutta Survey Department, which is an official department, no definite boundary is drawn.”**

**Mr. Wright asked: “How far does your claim cover?”**

**I told him: “According to the documents we possess and what has been registered in books written by British, like, MacKeen, Secretary to Sir J. Malcom, our claim covers the whole Baluchistan,**

because before England came to this part of the world, we were in possession of the whole of the Iranian Plateau. But now our claim covers the whole of Mokran, Kharan and Changi,' (I showed him these districts on the map.)

Mr. Wright examined the map carefully, and said: "These areas embrace thousands of miles. How can we cut such a big chunk off of another country and give it to you?"

I said: "I agree that is a big piece, but when they were cutting it from our country, nobody was there to express such an opinion. Apart from that, how can one recognize rights on Baluchistan for a newly-created country, which is not yet properly constituted and has no historic background, and, comically enough, when we talk to Pakistani representatives here in Tehran, about Baluchistan, they have no notion where Mokran, Kharan or Changi are. I therefore believe, if the truth could be revealed to the Pakistanis and there was goodwill on the part of the British government, they could suggest to the Pakistanis that they meet Iran's claim. This would give an opportunity to the Iranian government to make good use of propaganda in favour of Great Britain's goodwill, which will be very effective in challenging the opposition's activities."

At the end of my interview with Mr. Wright, I expressed this opinion: "One thing kept my mind wondering was why England seeks to create artificial countries, which are indebted to England for their independence, but stand against them?" as I gave him some examples.

Mr. Wright, after listening carefully to my words and taking notes of them, referred to my lecture in the Staff College, and said: "You also mentioned in your lecture in the Staff College about Baluchistan."

I replied: "You surely know that it is customary in the Staff Colleges, delivering speeches on the International Relations of the country by politicians or by their own Staff Officers in order to keep the students acquainted with the general international policy or relations of our country. That was why lectures on International Relations have been given and will be given in future. But I don not remember if I discussed our International Relations in my first lecture, but in the next lecture, I can not avoid the truth, that your demarche will give me the opportunity to inform my listeners that through goodwill of Great Britain, we regained a part of the country we had lost before."

He asked me when my next conference would take place.

**I told him: “To give you ample time to give me the opportunity to break the good news to the students, I will delay my lecture for two or three weeks and wish you every success in this respect.”**



Sir Denis Wright  
1911-2005

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*The editor,*

*Sir Denis Wright has written two books about Iran (Persia).*

- 1) The English amongst Persians – 1977*
- 2) The Persians amongst the English - 1985*





**(4) Document of the origin of Meftah Family.**  
**In Persian Verse**



**(5)-His Excellency Late Abdol Houssein Meftah  
1899-1991.**



**-Senior Iranian diplomat & Ambassador in many countries  
including Tunisia, India, Holland, Germany & Norway.  
Acting Foreign Minister under Mossadegh & late General  
Zahedi.**

**A Great Iranian thinker, a legendary figure, politician and  
patriot.**

***May God bless his soul***



**In an audience with the members of the British  
Parliament**

**Mr. Meftah's statement in Britain's House of  
Commons about Iran Iraq War:**

In order to protest against the British government's shady position to prolong the Iran/ Iraq war in mid 80's, I contacted His Excellency Mr. Abdol Houssein Meftah, who at that time was residing in Antibes, South of France. I suggested to Mr. Meftah that if he was willing, we should approach both the British government, the British Foreign Office and the British Parliament to protest against Britain's part in the continuation of that war . Mr. Meftah agreed with, and said he would do any thing in his power to make our views heard and if necessary he would travel to Britain to meet with the British officials in person.

I approached both Margaret Thatcher's office in Downing Street as well as Geoffrey Howe's office at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office with no luck. Meanwhile I contacted over 60 of the members of the British House of Commons. Many did not reply, some tried to avoid me. Others were not committing themselves on this sensitive subject.

One Conservative MP who promised to attend was Peter Temple-Morris. He was married to the daughter of the former Iranian Senator, Late Khozeymeh-Alam, who was his private Secretary since 1974. Peter Temple-Morris was a member of the Anglo-Iranian parliamentary committee. He showed interest but did not attend that meeting.

About 25 MPs agreed to meet us. The meeting was arranged. I accompanying His Excellency Mr. Meftah went to the House of Commons in London. We were directed to a large hall.

Only 9 or 10 attended that short meeting. Once Mr. Meftah started telling them that Britain was actively promoting this deadly war and the people of Iran are holding the Brits responsible for the death and destruction caused in this war, MPs one by one left the room. I and Mr. Meftah were the very last two people to leave that hall.

The followings were Mr. Meftah's short statement in that meeting:


Mohammad-Reza Pardisan,  
London, England.

**In 1984, his Excellency late Mr. Meftah said the followings:**

- 1- Every brick falls in this war, we hold Britain responsible.
- 2- Every blood shed in Iran, we hold Britain responsible.
- 3- Every single life perishes in Iran we hold Britain responsible.
- 4- You have imposed Khomeini's madness on Iran.
- 5- You have created this mess for us.
- 6- You brought the Mullahs to power.
- 7- You are responsible for the pain and suffering of our people.
- 8- You have created this war and you are prolonging it.
- 9- You are destroying Iran and we will hold Britain accountable.  
Iranians will not forget nor forgive.

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**Britain is Iran's *Number 1* Enemy.**



*Young A. H. Meftah*

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## **Notes**



Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, General plan



Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Garden & Guest Entrance



Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministerial Entrance



